

JPRS-UPA-91-021
18 APRIL 1991



JPRS Report

Soviet Union

Political Affairs

19991028 092

DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 2

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A
Approved for Public Release
Distribution Unlimited

Soviet Union

Political Affairs

JPRS-UPA-91-021

CONTENTS

18 April 1991

NATIONAL PARTY AND STATE AFFAIRS

Gorbachev's 'Ideologized' Centrism Decried [V. Tretyakov; NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, 5 Mar 91]	1
CPSU Registered as First All-Union Party [N. Tuzov; SELSKAYA ZHIZN, 11 Apr 91]	2
CPSU Aide Mikhaylov Cited on Referendum Results [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 27 Mar 91]	2
CPSU Relations with Opposition Parties Viewed [V.A. Kuptsov; GLASNOST No 12, 21 Mar 91]	3
Disarray in Primary Party Organizations Examined [S. Shipunova; SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, 29 Mar 91]	4
Political 'Ideologue' Kurginyan Profiled [A. Podkopalov; KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, 10 Apr 91]	6
Reasons for 'War of Laws,' Measures Cited [Yu. Kalmykov; IZVESTIYA, 5 Apr 91]	9
Poll Shows Differences Over Who Has Power [NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, 9 Mar 91]	13

REPUBLIC PARTY AND STATE AFFAIRS

Baltics

Results of December Political Poll in Narva [S. Gorokhov; SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA, 1 Mar 91]	14
Results of Referendum in Estonian Cities [I. Loginov; NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, 7 Mar 91]	15
Armed Units Within Latvian People's Front Rejected [SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH, 22 Mar 91]	16
Latvian CP Views Role in USSR Referendum [SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA, 22 Mar 91]	16
Latvian CP Protests SS Anniversary Meeting [SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA, 22 Mar 91]	18
Latvia's Parliamentary Factions Negotiate [A. Petropavlovskaya; SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH, 21 Feb 91]	19
USSR Deputies Deplore Use of Force [LITERATURNAYA GAZETA No 2, 16 Jan 91]	19

RSFSR

Democratic Russia 'Instructions' Cited [A.N. Murashev; LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA No 10, 8 Mar 91]	20
RSFSR Foreign Minister Interviewed [A. Kozyrev; NOVOYE VREMYA No 9, Mar 91]	21
Yakovlev on Yeltsin's New Powers [RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA, 10 Apr 91]	24
RSFSR Politburo Member on Party Program [G. Zyuganov; KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, 29 Mar 91]	24
Rutskoy on Split With Communists of Russia [A. Rutskoy; LITERATURNAYA GAZETA No 14, 10 Apr 91]	26
Russian Front Leader Splits With Centrists [A. Sorokin; NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, 9 Mar 91] .	27
'Communists for Democracy' Goals Explained [B.M. Pugachev; RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA, 10 Apr 91]	28
United Workers Front Congress Reported [A. Krayevskaya, Y. Lebedev; NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, 7 Mar 91]	28
Chechen-Ingush Russian Speakers Protest [TRUD, 10 Apr 91]	29
Bank Official Dismissed Over Ekho Deal [Ya. Dubenetskiy; SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, 20 Mar 91]	30
Tarasov Account of Istok Raid Disputed [A. Kovalev; SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, 6 Feb 91]	30

Western Republics

Belorussian Reaction to Gorbachev Visit	31
Writer Pens 'Subjective' Observations [S. Bukchin; ZNAMYA YUNOSTI, 5 Mar 91]	31
Article Draws Readers' Response [ZNAMYA YUNOSTI, 30 Mar 91]	33
Belorussian Constitutional Changes Intended To Promote Economic Reform [SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA, 14 Mar 91]	37

Kravchuk on Leadership Role, Parliament, Yeltsin [L. Kravchuk; KOMSOMOLSKOYE ZNAMYA, 2, 5 Mar 91]	38
Hurenko Assesses Ukrainian Referendum Results [PRAVDA UKRAINY, 21 Mar 91]	46
Ukrainian Opposition Figure Comments on Sovereignty Issues [O. Yemets; LITERATURNAYA UKRAYINA, 7 Mar 91]	48
Ukrainian UN Representative Interviewed [G.I. Udovenko; PRAVDA UKRAINY, 14 Mar 91]	53

Caucasus

Georgian Law on New Ministries, Departments [VESTNIK GRUZII, 12 Mar 91]	55
Georgian Law on Partial Abolition of Death Penalty [VESTNIK GRUZII, 23 Mar 91]	56
Extracts From Official Documents on April 1989 Tbilisi Events [Yu. Nikolayev; SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, 15 Mar 91]	57
Abkhazia Relationship to Georgia, Future in Union Viewed [V. Arsenyev; IZVESTIYA, 29 Mar 91]	69
Abkhazia's Ardzinba Defends Sovereignty [V.G. Ardzinba; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 10 Apr 91]	71

Central Asia

Tajik CP Plenum on Current Party Tasks	74
Information Report [KOMMUNIST TADZHIKISTANA, 20 Feb 91]	74
Makhkamov Address on Party Goals [K.M. Makhkamov; KOMMUNIST TADZHIKISTANA, 21 Feb 91]	74

NATIONALITY ISSUES

Kaunas, Tyumen Sign Cooperation Agreement [V. Pavlenko; TRUD, 10 Apr 91]	84
Ethnic Soldiers in Baltic MD Polled [N. Stepanets; SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA, 23 Feb 91]	84

LAW AND ORDER

Pugo Presents Statistical Crime Report [B. Pugo; VETERAN Vol 11, Feb 91]	86
MVD Special Purpose Subunit Described [D. Andreyev; ARGUMENTY I FAKTY No 14, Apr 91]	88
Commentary on Kalugin Civil Action Against Ryzhkov [Yu. Feofanov; IZVESTIYA, 2 Apr 91]	89
Hijack Attempt Over Baltic Defeated by Crew [Yu. Trefilov; PRAVDA, 1 Apr 91]	90
Estonian KGB's Role in Fighting Economic Sabotage Discussed [A. Arro; SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA, 17 Feb 91]	91
RSFSR Crime Figures for 1990 Detailed [V. Kolesnikov; ARGUMENTY I FAKTY No 14, Apr 91]	93
Azerbaijan Termed 'Magnet' for Foreign Intelligence Services [A. Kyazimzade; BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY, 6 Mar 91]	93

MEDIA AND JOURNALISM

Poll on Popularity of Newspapers Reflects Societal Polarization [B. Dubin; IZVESTIYA, 30 Mar 91]	95
GLASNOST Institutes 'Canard' Awards [GLASNOST No 12, 21 Mar 91]	96
Ukrainian Democratic Press Group Founded [LITERATURNAYA UKRAYINA, 21 Mar 91]	97
Computer Publication Introduced in Ukraine [Kiev Radio, 2 Mar 91]	97
USSR TV Trends Outlined [SEM DNEY No 11, 11-17 Mar 91]	98
Journalist's 'Means to an End' Questioned [V. Potemkin; SOVETSKAYA KULTURA No 50, 15 Dec 90]	100

Gorbachev's 'Ideologized' Centrism Decried

91UN1245B Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 5 Mar 91 p 1

[Article by Vitaliy Tretyakov: "Will Centrism Save Us":
"This New Political Miracle Weapon of Gorbachev's"]

[Text] After acceleration, the human factor, cooperation, party reform, the rule-of-law state, pluralism, general human values, republic sovereignty, presidential power, and many other things, here comes the "age" of centrism—the "philosopher's stone" for our country which has just been found in the laboratories of Kremlin political thought.

On the eve of our 60th anniversary and the sixth anniversary of perestroika, out of an earth poisoned by the fumes from the Chernobyl monster, Mikhail Gorbachev has proclaimed his readiness to create a new political miracle weapon: centrism. Centrism is the blood brother of the consolidation that has been touted for the past several months, which, however, was too amorphous to unite proletarians of if not all then at least 15 countries (or 16 if you include the Soviet Union).

Only two points distinguish centrism from consolidation. The first is that consolidation unites all indiscriminately, while centrism cuts off the extremes on both the left and right. Especially the left, since this is where the main danger to perestroika lies. And a definition has been found for left-wing radicalism: right-wing opposition. But this distinction is not the main thing. The main thing lies elsewhere.

At the center of consolidation, as we know, were general human values, a kind of excessively abstract humanism. This will not feed the people any more than any other abstraction will. Therefore at the center of centrism is something much more definite, namely the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. And to make sure that there are no doubts about this, in parallel with the proclamation by the USSR president of centrism as the banner of our future victories, his (the president's) deputy in the party, Vladimir Ivashko, is publishing a series of his interviews in which he declares in plain terms: "Only the CPSU can solve the country's problems." And the president's deputy in the government, Valentin Pavlov, having frustrated the imperialist conspiracy of financiers against the USSR, without any special lengthy discourse, forms the communist Cabinet of Ministers. In order to make the entire situation more melodramatic, which should undoubtedly find a response in the hearts of the hungry and hence perhaps too apocalyptic viewers, one corporation of Soviet "thought factories" (!—this is not some kind of higher pedagogical school), the "Experimental Creative Center," is issuing additional information: Participating in the conspiracy are not only the CIA and the bankers, with whom everyone is bored, but also the actual "Medellin Cartel" (not to be confused with the corporation), that is, drug traffickers associated with this same World Anticommunist League. There you have it, Mr. Democrats. Do you now see who is playing with you

like toys? Do you now understand what the USSR president had in mind when, speaking on 26 February in Minsk, he threw out the phrase which gave the answer to why the opposition criticizes his policy? Because the "program of radical renewal of the society within the framework of the socialist option, which we are implementing unwaveringly, step by step, no longer suits the forces behind these politicians (that is, the "so-called democrats"—V.T.). They themselves are hostages of these forces."

No, we have not heard anything like this for a long time... But let me return to centrism if, after so many other things, we are destined to experience this as well.

The invitation to political centrism, in my view, is the same as the invitations to the presentations—so numerous in our day—from various firms, publications, funds, and associations. Those who are invited will come in throngs if they are promised a good place at the table. But this is not being promised this time. Because all the places at the table in the Cabinet of Ministers, not to mention the higher ones, are filled by communists. All that is left of the whole idea of the coalition is the nonparty, coalition minister of ecology, Vorontsov. So centrism is possible only in the debating societies where, as we know, there is no power either. What self-respecting political force would join such a coalition and be a party to this kind of centrism? The CPSU is the only one, and it is all the same to them. (I am not counting the dwarf and frequently also marionette parties that have sprung up recently and claim a place in the centrist bloc. A coalition with such parties is possible for the CPSU, but to call such a coalition a nationwide centrist bloc is a cynical political bluff.)

But perhaps the ideas of the CPSU have become so attractive that even without any additional enticement, the best minds and politicians are gathering in the center, that is, under its wing. During the past three years the CPSU has lost three million of its 19 million members—so they are not being very successful at bringing their own forces to the center. But even this is not the main thing. The main thing is that the centrism proclaimed by Gorbachev is ideologized through and through, and it again hinges completely on the socialist idea and the communist future. Both the idea and the future are perhaps true, but 73 years have not produced any appreciable real fruits for the ordinary person. Who can seriously believe that they will produce anything now?

If Gorbachev's centrism had proclaimed such a simple thing as an efficient economic program, including serious intentions to feed the people, clothe them, and build housing for them, many people would respond to this invitation. But they have invited people mainly to socialism, having forgotten even their own recent slogan that everything socialistic benefits man. But the entire economic program of centrism consists of old slogans reinforced by the also not new idea of strengthening the center in the bureaucratic sense.

In brief, centrism does not strive to satisfy the healthy interests of the consumer-voters. But it strives to satisfy their patriotic interests, for the second center of centrism after the CPSU is the USSR. These interests have been exploited for a long time, and today we can see where this exploitation has led. No less than six republics wish not to remain in the Union. Those that want to are the ones which comprise the geographical basis of the Union or those that are separated from the West by Russia and thus are forced to take into account this geopolitical situation, hoping that the old Big Brother is still better than the new Big Brothers who will appear the minute the separation from Russia takes place. In general one gets the impression that with centrism Gorbachev intends to "save" not the entire USSR but only the Slavic-Central Asian part, although he does not speak of this.

In a word, no matter how you look at it—politically, economically, or geostrategically—not everyone who lives on the territory of the USSR can find advantage in the centrism proclaimed by Gorbachev. For the concentrated essence of centrism consists in the following: Strengthen the shaky position of the CPSU and Center-Kremlin at the expense of weakening yourselves, and you will be given what is coming to you. How and when—this is not clear. Or, rather, it is clear that the CPSU is not offering anything to anyone. According to the crude but apt Russian proverb it turns out: "Give your wife to your uncle and you can go to..."

Of course, all this might attract Russian "patriots." Having felt out a weak spot, the Russian Communist Party is already consolidating with the Russian monarchists, the descendants of the noble families, and the Russian Orthodox Church, which it promises to protect from the expansion of religions that are "nontraditional" for Russia. But what here is communist, not to mention attractive to all residents of Russia, not to mention all residents of the USSR?

Finally, the last thing. Centrism invites everyone to cooperate, but it weeds out from this cooperation—through harsh criticism while proclaiming the doctrine—the most consistent democratic left wing. Even if they are the vanguard, if they are rushing ahead, as long as they are consistently democratic. And here a quite strange triune picture plays itself out: Democrats are the enemies of the president, enemies of communism, and enemies of the Russian-speaking population outside Russia.

Of course, some people might seriously believe that Yeltsin, Popov, Afanasyev, Starovoytova, Shatalin, and the other "so-called democrats" are calling for "hanging the communists." There is no limit to human stupidity. But on stupidity it is impossible to build either a centrist or any other really effective, long-term, constructive policy that works to the advantage of the citizens of the country. It turns out like this: Vanity of vanities. And, incidentally, it is a dangerous vanity.

CPSU Registered as First All-Union Party

*91UN1284A Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian
11 Apr 91 p 1*

[Interview with N. Tuzov, deputy head of the USSR Ministry of Justice administration of public associations, by TASS correspondent N. Stepanchenko in Moscow; date not given: "The CPSU Is Registered"]

[Text] The Communist Party of the Soviet Union will be the first political party of the country to receive the status of an all-Union party and all the rights of a corporate body. Presentation of the certificate of registration will take place on 11 April at the USSR Ministry of Justice.

[Tuzov] All documents presented by the CPSU were gathered together in strict accordance with the Law on Public Associations according to the rules approved by decree of the USSR Council of Ministers on 10 January 1991. After registration the CPSU will have the rights of a corporate body—that is, it will possess property and an account in the bank on a legal basis, it will be able to lease lodgings, and it will be able to perform purchase and sale operations and other transactions.

[Correspondent] Were there any difficulties in gathering together the documents?

[Tuzov] No. All of our requirements, and we are guided by the law alone, were fulfilled. Although imagine the difficulty of gathering documents, some of which date back to 1898. That is, at a time when the party existed illegally and people had to pay with their life or freedom for keeping any materials.

[Correspondent] If the party is protected by the law, then it should also be responsible in the event that it breaks the law. Who will monitor the activities of the CPSU?

[Tuzov] Until now that was the prerogative of the procuracy which, independent of whether a public organization was registered or not, submits a request for its liquidation to judicial authorities in the event of a violation of the law. After registration of the statute, the USSR Ministry of Justice takes upon itself the right to monitor activities. We can attend plenums, conferences, and other measures conducted by the party, demand any documents, and make inquiries on any issues that interest us.

CPSU Aide Mikhaylov Cited on Referendum Results

*PM0504114191 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 27 Mar 91 First Edition p 1*

["Our correspondent" report: "Stop the Avalanche of Confrontation"]

[Text] A briefing on the preliminary results of the all-union referendum was held in the CPSU Central Committee 25 March. The meeting with journalists was

chaired by V. Mikhaylov, head of the CPSU Central Committee Nationalities Policy Department.

Most of the figures given at the briefing have already been cited in the press. They are the preliminary results of the nationwide survey taken in the Soviet Union's republics, oblasts, and cities. If we are to avoid the reassurance provided by average indicators, we must admit that the results of the vote clearly indicate the existence of deep-rooted, opposite political trends in society. It would be a dangerous mistake to assume that the referendum only reflects the degree of sympathy for and antipathy to M. Gorbachev and B. Yeltsin. It is a question of the choice made by millions of people: undoubtedly a political choice above all else.

In V. Mikhaylov's opinion, even the preliminary results of the referendum warn that the correlation of opposing forces in society is such that any attempt by either side to achieve its objectives by force will inevitably exacerbate confrontation in the country and, at worst, lead to civil war. The level of mutual understanding between millions of people today is already high enough to continue whipping up the atmosphere of political passions and spur the masses into the "final, decisive battle" [sentence as published].

V. Mikhaylov said that one of the results of the plebiscite is that it confirms a fundamental fact: The policy of reforms and of renewing the Soviet Union has the people's support and must be consolidated by concluding the Union Treaty. But those who would like to interpret the results as giving them the right to use force in the interests of the majority are wrong. That would be a gross political mistake.

V. Mikhaylov said that if the Union Treaty is not signed within the next few months, there will be total disillusionment on a massive scale with the central structures of authority. In order to avoid this, decisive action must be taken now by the Federation Council and the USSR Supreme Soviet.

V. Mikhaylov described the results of the referendum in the Armed Forces as worrying. In the military districts, the proportion of those who said "no" to the Union varies between 6 and 23 percent.

"The Army is the bulwark of the USSR's unity," Vyacheslav Aleksandrovich said. "A total of 83.1 percent of Army and Navy personnel voted in favor of a united, inviolable Union. But, in my view, those who said 'no' were not so much expressing doubts about the USSR's inviolability and unity as voicing personal dissatisfaction with the social situation. Attacks on the Army—which recently have been increasingly reminiscent of outright persecution—have also taken their toll. We are aware that military servicemen have many problems, and the referendum has shown that they need to be urgently resolved."

CPSU Relations with Opposition Parties Viewed

91UN1208A Moscow GLASNOST in Russian No 12,
21 Mar 91 p 2

[Press conference held by V.A. Kuptsov, chief, CPSU Central Committee Liaison with Sociopolitical Organizations Department: "Consolidation—But Only on a Constructive Basis"]

[Text] A meeting was held at the CPSU Central Committee Press Center between V.A. Kuptsov, a Central Committee secretary and chief, CPSU Central Committee Liaison with Sociopolitical Organizations Department, and Soviet as well as foreign correspondents. We draw our readers' attention to certain portions of this press conference as presented below.

Last year was characterized by an upsurge in political activity and the formation of new organizations. Now functioning at the All-Union level are approximately 20 parties, about 500 diverse types of organizations in the republics, and yet another approximately 10,000 varied political clubs, citizens' initiatives, and other associations. It is impossible to say precisely how many of them there are nowadays. Only registration will show the genuine or true deployment of political forces.

The CPSU Central Committee has addressed a proposal concerning constructive cooperation to all sociopolitical movements which are functioning in accordance with the USSR Constitution and which have a well-motivated interest in our country's democratic development. What are the foundations of such an interaction and cooperation? First of all, carrying out the conversion to a socially oriented, market-type economy, providing people with the living conditions which they deserve, working out and adopting a new Union treaty, and regulating interethnic conflicts. Agreement is possible, for example, on such important problems as the emergence of a state based on the rule of law, the moral and spiritual development of this country's peoples on the basis of national and ethnic traditions, as well as environmental protection.

What are the real political forces opposed to the CPSU?

There are a great many emerging parties whose principal slogans proclaim their opposition to the CPSU. Why do they oppose it? Because in order to enhance their own prestige under the present-day circumstances, they need to come out against the ruling party, the vanguard party.

What are the membership figures of the opposition parties nowadays? The Democratic Party of Russia (N. Travkin's party) has the largest number of members—amounting to 25,000-30,000. In my opinion, the Republican Party, i.e., the party of Lysenko and Shostakovskiy (the former Democratic Platform) has as many as 20,000 members. I believe that the Social Democrats and Christian Democrats have approximately 10,000 members each in their respective organizations. All the remaining parties have considerably fewer members.

What is our attitude toward such organizations as Unity, Fatherland, the Dictatorship of the Proletariat Party, and the United Workers Front? We favor broad contacts with any political movement which stands for the socialist option. The four organizations cited above have their own characteristics. We could enumerate here an entire spectrum of new organizations which have specified socialism as their goal. But their forms and operating methods are varied. We support all those which are tied in with the socialist option, but we have a critical attitude toward their forms and operating methods.

How are we to evaluate the attempts to organize a public judgement on or condemnation of the CPSU? Indeed, a certain organizational bureau has been set up in Moscow for the purpose of carrying out a judgement on or condemnation of the CPSU. These initiators of this bureau are well known, and they include even certain people's deputies. We reject all these organizational claims, persons, and polititions attempting to carry out any sort of condemning judgements of the CPSU. The latter has not deserved such treatment. The CPSU constitutes our country's history and its people. It is 16.5 million persons; taking the family coefficient into account, it pertains to more than 50 million persons.

There is a call to judge condemn our party, the very same party which itself initiated perestroika, which proposed a program of action, a program of conversion. This is not merely unscientific; it is simply immoral.

Concerning the movement known as Democratic Russia. This is one of the most powerful organizations in our country today. It includes parties as well as movements, in particular, April, Shield, and Memorial. It relies on a group of deputies at all levels, as well as a specific portion of the intelligentsia. And we are obliged to take this movement into account. But we cannot accept those principles which Democratic Russia has presented nowadays as an ultimatum to the CPSU, the Supreme Soviet, the Congress of People's Deputies, and the President. Nor can we accept those forms which this movement is employing these days—i.e., including stirring up the situation, actions involving civil disobedience—something which, under present-day circumstances, would lead our country to chaos, to a collapse of the economy, and to a worsening of people's lives. Could it be that Democratic Russia advocates the principle of "the worse it is—the better for us" as the fundamental principle of its activity?

Is the CPSU helping to create a multi-party system in our country? For an entire year—particular during the last six months—we have been attempting to find acceptable forms and methods of interaction and cooperation. And the impression could have been created that we ourselves were stimulating a multi-party system. Many parties have turned to us for help in solving organizational, economic, and technical problems. Let me repeat once again that the basis of our activity has been and remains a striving toward consolidation and mutual understanding.

There has been an evolution in the views of many leaders—including those, for example, of G. Popov and others, who as recently as last year still considered that parties should abandon production, organizations, and other structures. Nowadays the following precise task is being assigned: Democratic Russia should become a part of all production-type structures and organizations; it should create there primary party organizations and form a structure similar to that of the CPSU. Analyzing the situation, I think that they will also proceed to set up cells, i.e., nuclear units, in their organizations.

Recent meetings in Krasnoyarsk Kray—from Shushensk to Norilsk—in various collectives allow us to state with confidence that the situation within the party is becoming stabilized. People are getting rid of that feeling of perplexity and confusion which they had previously experienced; they have become more confident in their actions. During the past year in Krasnoyarsk Kray 709 persons who had previously resigned from the CPSU have returned to it.

Disarray in Primary Party Organizations Examined

*91UN1220A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 29 Mar 91 First Edition p 3*

[Article by correspondent S. Shipunova: "Alongside and in Concert"]

[Text] Krasnodar—What is happening today in the CPSU's primary organizations? How do those whom we have become accustomed to calling the communist rank and file feel?

It is no secret that the departure of some of them from the party and the slack influx of fresh forces have markedly weakened the primary party organizations. And if we add to this the known psychological pressure of the Communists on the part of the democratic forces, it is clear that things are quite difficult for them at this time.

But there are also other factors seriously influencing the atmosphere in the party organizations. I would cite as the first of them the transition of many (if not the majority of) party leaders, from party committee secretaries through kraykom secretaries, to soviet and economic-management work. Whatever lies behind this transition in each specific case, in the eyes of the communist rank and file this has frequently appeared to be "leaving the sinking ship." It has to be acknowledged that the kray party organization has in a short space of time lost many experienced cadres. The slogan: Secure the Communists' influence in the soviets, get into them to keep Soviet power Soviet, which was previously advanced, was seemingly correct. But the party organizations were stripped bare here.

Here is a typical example. The Novorossiysk City party organization, one of the biggest in the kray (17,600 Communists), was in recent years headed by N.

Khvorostyanskiy, and valuable experience in political work with the Communists and the public had been accumulated here. As the city's most authoritative leader, Nikolay Fedorovich was, naturally, elected chairman of the city soviet and for a certain time combined both positions. But sooner or later a conclusive choice had to be made. As far as I know, it was an agonizing one both for Khvorostyanskiy and for Novorossiysk's entire party organization. The same goal—preservation of the constructive positions of soviet power in the city—tipped the scales. But what is happening now in the party organization?

It has come to be headed by the Afghan veteran Yu. Aksenov, the 32-year-old secretary of the commercial seaport party committee, who has an enviable store of enthusiasm and energy, but not, of course, experience. It is hard for him. And, in addition, three second secretaries have been replaced in the gorkom in a year, and they have all gone into... commercial work. Do you think all this is influencing the morale of the communist rank and file? You bet it is. And apathy and decline in party discipline already are being observed in many of the city's primaries. It was observed at the plenum that it had been possible to organize party enrollment at only four of Novorossiysk's 33 industrial enterprises. Many Communists have fallen behind in their contributions. Party meetings are not being held for months on end.

It is far from my intention to explain all this merely by one factor—the replacement of an authoritative leader—but this is not the least factor either, the more so in that there has simultaneously been a breakup of the gorkom administrative system to a considerable extent, and the raykoms, which had worked with the primaries, had been abolished even earlier.

The primary organizations have been thoroughly laid low by the reduction in the party budget. One-fourth of the full-time secretaries in the kray, it was said at the plenum, have been lost merely because there is no way in which they could be paid. Is it not paradoxical that the primaries themselves sought the right to reserve half of the dues for themselves, but that when this decision was finally adopted, it boomeranged on those same primary organizations. The dues collected by some of them, apparently, are barely sufficient for supporting a secretary, but there are also many which have the money, but the Communists are not allowed to pay their secretary a wage.

Last year, still under the old party rules, little more than four million rubles [R] were channeled into the needs of the kray's party organizations, and these resources were sufficient for supporting more than 1,000 full-time secretaries and, in addition, for rendering Communists financial assistance. Some R7.5 million remains at the party organizations' disposal this year. In addition, more than R1 million have been allocated as a CPSU Central Committee subsidy, but secretary cadres are gradually being lost. And this 50 percent of the dues is often being used in an unsupervised fashion, for purposes far

removed from party work. It was not fortuitous, evidently, that, addressing recently a joint plenum of the kraykom and the kray party organization control commission, V. Ryabysh, first secretary of Temryukskiy Raykom, said in a fit of temper: "The new scale of contributions is our mistake."

I recall that this question—concerning the wages of full-time secretaries—was invariably raised at all meetings and plenums throughout last year, and, responding to it, the kraykom [kray committee] leaders and CPSU Central Committee and Communist Party of the RSFSR Central Committee officials who came to the kray would invariably assure us: The matter will be resolved, it will be resolved. But how? The uncertainty had gone on for too long. Not waiting any more and, sometimes, having no faith in a happy solution of this problem, many secretaries found themselves other work. The cadres dispersed, melted away before our eyes. And there had in the course of the last report and election campaign been a 70-percent change in the elective activists.

Those secretaries for whom there was no money from the party budget have made do today as best they can. Some, for example, have taken a position in enterprise and farm management as, more often than not, deputies for amenities and educational work for the masses, and the duties of party organization secretary are being performed now on the job-pluralism basis. Some party organizations are paying some a small amount extra here, others, not.

A. Maslov, first secretary of the kraykom, cited the following eloquent example. Monies were found in Kalininskiy Rayon's Oktyabr Kolkhoz for the restoration of the local church. But the raykom [rayon committee] secretary was left without wages. Yet the chairman of the kolkhoz there is a Communist and the former first secretary of a neighboring raykom.

There are, however deplorable, instances of yesterday's party officials, switching to soviet or economic-management work, changing before our eyes, changing their attitude toward their party, refusing, for example, to become members of the gorkom [city committee] and raykom bureau and, at times, virtually entering into a confrontation with them. Such metamorphoses are painful to the communist rank and file.

We never before spoke of social protection for party officials, local secretaries primarily. But we are having to now. Some people have been left with paltry wages, official transportation has been taken away from many (and it is simply impossible to manage without it on the big farms scattered around a rayon), some people are being denied the legitimate acquisition of housing....

"Even the status of secretary of a primary party organization worked out by the CPSU Central Committee is not in fact capable in any respect of protecting us against the possible arbitrary action of business executives. Some of my colleagues have already felt this in their own

cases," V. Babicheva, secretary of the Shcherbinovskiy party raykom's Kirov Kolkhoz, said at the plenum.

Whence the conclusion: Today the party organization secretaries need not so much training and instruction as ordinary human assistance and support. And not only secretaries but many of the communist rank and file also.

There are primary organizations where lately there has been a manifest ideological reorientation on the part of some communists. These are research and VUZ [higher educational institution] outfits, as a rule.

A. Veligodskiy, former secretary of the party organization of the All-Union Research and Design Institute of Petroleum Gas Processing, quit the CPSU and is today an active participant in local democratic formations. He was followed by many associates of the institute, including the director. But we should be thinking about the fate of the Communists who, working in such surroundings, remain communists, for all that. It is they primarily whom party comrades need to support, help bolster in their choice, and simply shake their hand for their steadfastness.

Another conclusion that could be drawn from the discussion at the plenum is paradoxical. I would formulate it as follows: Earlier the higher committees—from the raykom through the Central Committee—were nudging the primary organizations: Be more assertive, act more decisively, do not go to sleep! Now the communist rank and file and the secretaries of the primaries are nudging from below party committees, from the raykom through the Central Committee: Do not go to sleep, act more decisively, be more assertive!

K. Pshidatok, secretary of the party committee of the Adygeyskiy Canning Works:

"How can we understand the indifferent, silent attitude of the kraykoms, gorkoms, and raykoms in respect to many of the political processes occurring in society? I refer to the mass meetings and other actions of a variety of parties and currents, at which dirt is heaped on the Communists and they are threatened with reprisals. Are we operating as actively and energetically as our opponents? Unfortunately, no."

V. Dandyarov, chairman of the Krasnodar Istina Political Club:

"We are currently dissatisfied with the work of the party organizations in the kray. There is no clear-cut political position, the line has been eroded. This same erosion of positions is observed both with the CPSU Central Committee and the general secretary. Thanks be to I. Polozkov and the Russian Communist Party Central Committee, which are today saying clearly where they stand and with whom."

V. Dandyarov, I would note, is not a member of the kraykom. The political club that he heads is a voluntary public organization uniting Communists and nonparty

people championing, as they themselves say, Marxist-Leninist teaching, the socialist choice, and the communist perspective. It is significant that this informal organization is already in terms of its assertiveness and militancy ahead of many party committees. The club's members have gone into the workforce and engaged in propaganda and organizing work there. Their example is a living reproach to the professional employees who even today are pursuing an office lifestyle.

I know that N. Gritsenko, first secretary of the Krasnodar Gorkom, for example, took out party registration with the organization of Krasnodarskiy DIP Production Association Shop No. 15, as did many, but far from all party committee secretaries.

Being together, reacting promptly to the political situation, formulating a clear and firm position on each matter of principle, defending it by concrete action—this is what, in fact, the Communists want of their guides, as people said earlier.

But it is this which is lacking in today's relations between the primary party organizations and the higher party committees. And for this reason criticism "from below" leveled at the latter is being heard increasingly often, and the Communists are asking the kraykom secretaries and the members of this elective body increasingly often: Where are you, whose side are you on, what is your position?

As one of those same rank-and-file Communists observed, "if I am told about a person that he is a Communist—even more, a member of the raykom—I want to be sure that he is my comrade and that we are in the same party and in concert."

Political 'Ideologue' Kurginyan Profiled

91UN1270A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 10 Apr 91 p 2

[Article by A. Podkopalov: "A KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA Investigation: Who Writes the Scripts for the Political Theater?"]

[Text] Sergey Yervandovich sank into an armchair and dialed a number right after bursting into his office and apologizing for being late—"you would understand, the congress is on, so many things to do..." His conversation with Yu. Prokofyev, first secretary of the CPSU Moscow City Committee and a Politburo member, resembled very much a report by the chief of intelligence to the commander of a group of forces. "The situation is difficult, they are putting pressure on us. However, the guys are standing firm: Apparently, they have dug in their heels to the end. The issue of confidence in Yeltsin will certainly be put to a vote—he has angered everyone... We have 545 ironclad votes, they have between 460 and 470. ...Indeed, Sokolov was all right, he spoke properly. ...In the lobby, the 'Democrats of Russia' promised to 'butcher' the Communists..." Probable scenarios for the next day (the conversation took place on 1

April). "First: Yeltsin and his team will pressure the congress as hard as they can on the issue of the presidency. We should stand firm. Second: A collective resignation of the Presidium is possible. However, this is not very likely: Yeltsin understands that the array is not in his favor, and he will not win a new election here, at the congress. He will not leave without resolving the issue of the presidency. Third, and very probable: 'Democrats of Russia' will leave the congress and take the people to the streets. Blood may be spilled, and we should be prepared for this. At present, they need blood very much. Do you understand, Yuriy Anatolyevich?"

Sergey Kurginyan is not merely a guest at the congress. He is a coordinator and an informant, the eyes and ears of the party leaders who are absent.

Sergey Yervandovich shifted his gaze upward: "Ultimately, everything I say on the 'Vremya' program and through MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA I say for 'him'..."

"Yes, I do have friends. You would understand that being given four pages in a capital-city newspaper on the first day the congress is in session is no mean feat.

"On one occasion, 'he' asked Prokofyev: How do you intend to propagate this—meaning my concept..."

S. Kurginyan is not lying. His connections are indeed extensive, and his friends are mighty. For example, he can easily get in touch with Prime Minister V. Pavlov over the phone and set up a meeting the same day.

From KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA files. Sergey Yervandovich Kurginyan. Candidate of physical and mathematical sciences, president of the corporation Experimental Creative Center (ETTs), chief director of "Theater on the Boards," script writer, essayist, political scientist. Comes from an academic family. Graduated from the institute of geological prospecting, graduate studies, and higher director course. Actors in his theater have a simple name for Sergey Yervandovich—Leonardo da Vinci. A CPSU member since 1988. His creed is: "I do not care who saves this country—Communists or capitalists. However, I do not believe in kind capitalists. As far as communism is concerned, it is possible, but the main point at present is the survival, independence, and development of the state."

Kurginyan is convinced that a decisive, crucial moment for the destiny of the state is coming. It is time to play for keeps and lay all cards on the table... An information war against the "democrats" should be unleashed. He knows precisely—his specialists have calculated it—that between 150 and 200 intellectuals who are well aware of their goals, and 40 to 50 presentations in the central press, will suffice to win this battle. Sergey Yervandovich assures us that the people are already available. His first appearance on Central Television, on the "Vremya" program, has already taken place.

Therefore, he is quite an important individual, and he knows how to get his way. This is why we should not pin

on him the "label" of a sick individual or Grishka Rasputin, as some publications have done in passing. Kurginyan is a phenomenon which is quite real and far from random.

"It may also be predicted that if Yeltsin and Gorbachev succeed in the cause of political self-annihilation, this will open the way to a 'third force' which exists only hypothetically." This is a quote from THE WASHINGTON POST. Understandably, the "third force" may appear to exist "only hypothetically" from across the ocean. However, even our press is quite monotonous in determining the "third force"—the Army, the KGB, the military-industrial complex... However, all of these are executive structures, strong and influential to be sure, but traditionally and genetically not independent. It is just that intellectual and political self-awareness and self-determination are lacking for a serious game of politics (however, I admit that this subjective assessment falls into the "desired" rather than the "actual" category). The case is the same with party structures. Being used to living according to commands and instructions and operating within the confines of a unified strategy, they are literally withering without administrative and ideological sustenance, all the more so because the danger of losing power is close and real; it is breathing down their necks...

Under the circumstances, anyone who has the courage to say: "I know how..." and propose "the immediate tasks of Soviet power" which are sufficiently attractive (preferably scientifically packaged) and harshly worded, has a very great opportunity to become an ideologue of administrative renaissance if not its leader.

The phenomenon of Sergey Kurginyan is of this precise order. He professes a profound conviction that nobody in the Union has a more profoundly and comprehensively developed program of stabilization and development than he and his colleagues from the Experimental Creative Center.

From the files of KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA. The Experimental Creative Center is a multifaceted state corporation without an institutional affiliation; its creation was sanctioned by N. Ryzhkov personally, and subsequently by V. Pavlov. Its sphere of operations is quite extensive—from developing program support and participation in conversion to architectural studies and political science research. The corporation has virtually unlimited powers in economic activities and foreign-trade operations. State allocations and financing, including in foreign exchange, are envisaged. There are positions for KGB, Army, and MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] officers on the Experimental Creative Center staff.

S. Kurginyan and like-minded individuals consider the thoroughly planned and well-organized subversive activities of the domestic criminal bourgeoisie, which has close contacts with the international mafia, world imperialism, and neofascism, to be the cause of all the current troubles. These forces vigorously use the democratic

movement in the USSR to their ends, bribing the corrupt and skillfully manipulating the ideologically committed supporters of democracy. Their goal is to destroy the country by using the democrats as a battering ram against the Communists, to sweep away both the former and the latter, and to turn the USSR into a plundered raw-material appendage of the West with a harsh neo-fascist regime. According to Kurginyan, this is only one of the possible scenarios, which is not the most frightening.

I will take the liberty of using several quotes from a policy document of the Experimental Creative Center, a manifesto of this group of sorts, called "Post-Perestroika," in order to outline for our readers the perception of the world by S. Kurginyan and his entourage as completely as possible.

"...applause to democracy caused by the lowering of the red flag on the flagpole of our ship will very soon give way to the shouts of terror because the 'Jolly Roger' will be run up instead."

Are you scared yet?

"The criminal beast is already forcing his way through our door, having smelled blood, having already set his sights on a victim, and pursuing it with the persistence of a predator guided by the instinct of violence dating back to the recesses of our prehistoric past. At the same time, instead of defending ourselves, we are reflecting on what a nice and useful domestic animal he is going to be after we open the door for him."

However, who will rescue our unfortunate country, and the entire world together with it, from the claws of the perfidious predator? Of course, the knights of "a Red religion," neocommunism (it turns out that the present-day CPSU has already surrendered de facto, and 80 percent of its leadership has been corrupted).

"We view communism as precisely a neo-Christian religion..."

"We count among the undoubted precursors of communism Isaiah and Jesus, Buddha and Lao Tse, Confucius and Socrates, Spinoza, and the best representative of the era of Enlightenment..."

"Tomorrow... the world will be spiritually disarmed, and the impotent muscles of amorphous democracy will not be able to repulse the onslaught of a new oligarchy which speaks on behalf of instinct and will. At present there exists no alternative to a Communist meta-religion spiritually comparable to it in might of idea. This means that by disarming, humanity is making a mistake on a scale comparable to the crucifixion of Christ..."

With a view to preventing this fatal mistake, the party should be reformed urgently and harshly, its demons should be exorcised, control over our society should be regained, and a dash should be made toward communism by means of "a great leap" of a new, information industrialization. The proponents of the "Red religion"

honestly warn us that certain hardship for the population of the country, extreme strain, and the concentration of forces and resources are necessary but... there is no choice. The future of all of humanity is at stake, no more and no less.

"The supreme mission of the great country agreeing to extraordinary tension, which is unavoidable given the present-day turn of events, should be to embark on a trajectory of historic development after breaking through into the leadership zone, instead of heading the movement in the direction of the 'black hole' (the consumer society and the neofascism which follows it—A. P.)."

So, here it is for you—a new great mission, the renaissance of the idea of "the Third Rome" and our people being chosen by God. More precisely, this is the brilliant assignment of a super-task by a director in order to justify forthcoming mobilizations and the hardening of the current regime.

[Podkopalov] Sergey Yervandovich, are you indeed convinced that the current extensive democratic movement is being steered by someone?

[Kurginyan] Of course. If you are not stupid, this should be obvious to you too. It could not be any clearer what all of this is coming to, and what democratic structures stand for. All of them have been monstrously corrupted.

[Podkopalov] By whom?

[Kurginyan] By the mafia. Look at this—they are rolling in dirty money everywhere, there is the corrupt smell of purchasing, repurchasing, and selling everywhere. These democrats need to be fed all the time; after all, they are hungry and fussy. At any rate, a kind of esthetics, scale, and circumspection in taking bribes were characteristic of previous party bosses. There was the general feeling of a full stomach and patience. They knew that they occupied these positions, and should occupy them quietly. Meanwhile, all of the frenzied ones are like all nouveau riche. What democracy, where is it? What we have is plutocracy.

[Podkopalov] Pardon me, but there are things which are not bought or sold. Personally, I am convinced that honest people of integrity working for an idea account for a large segment of the democratic movement.

[Kurginyan] There is no need to bribe everyone. Indeed, there is an idea, there are people who, failing to figure it out, sincerely believe that it will be better the "democratic" way. Why bribe people when they work for an idea? They always work better for an idea. They should not be bribed; they should be manipulated and pointed in the direction needed. For example, knowing you and your convictions well, and knowing what you are going to say, I put you on the air and broadcast you. Why should the nice guys from "Vzglyad" be bribed to do this? They should be found and given a green light and a free hand. Indeed, a tremendous number of people will

act in the name of their ideological convictions. Some people are going to understand these convictions and despise them endlessly. They will calculate their goals precisely. They are a minuscule minority. I believe that 100 to 150 people will suffice. You should not ascribe this process of management to the Experimental Creative Center. We would have dragged this entire endeavor onto a shore long ago had we been able to, an uncomfortable shore of clay, but a shore nonetheless, instead of being tossed about by a ferocious storm. Unfortunately, others rule. This is why it is necessary to act, but act primarily by means of persuasion—we need to draw a substantial mass of lost but in principle honest people of integrity away from the national-democrats and pseudodemocrats. It is necessary to unleash an information war.

[Podkopalov] And to close down "Vzglyad" and squeeze the left-wing press?

[Kurginyan] No, by no means. As far as "Vzglyad" is concerned, I am plain outraged—this is precisely how you can write, outraged—by the discontinuation of "Vzglyad" and restrictions on Bella Kurkova. All I am asking is to be allowed to sock it to these guys in an honest duel. If they sock it to me, so be it. However, these guys are not making contact, they are keeping their distance. They do not need any sparring.

I did not fail to notice that anti-Stalinist programs on TV were shown as massively as movies about the war had been before them. It was clear that this was a campaign aimed at stirring up a civil war. They forcibly rubbed salt into the wounds of old resentments, and they did so persistently. Those who suffered from Stalin and dissidents who were oppressed and persecuted during stagnation were the subjects of this game. Look at the Lithuanian events. Burokevicius against Landsbergis—the committee and other resolute steps, blood—is this not explained by the fact that the father of Landsbergis had the father of Burokevicius shot? Your boys from "Vzglyad" raked all of this up quite vigorously. However, everything began with Abuladze's "Repentance." Dig up the corpse of your father and throw it on a trash heap! However, whoever he might have been, he is first my father. Second, corpses should not be dumped on a trash heap, because in this case their astral bodies return to Earth. That is to say, they simply called Stalin—"...did you invite me to supper? Here I am..." All of these things are at work, and they exist, because grave-diggers have begun to work on history, and they do it magically...

[Podkopalov] Do you believe in all this mysticism?

[Kurginyan] This is not mysticism. The noosphere exists...[end Kurginyan]

As we can see, we are being intimidated professionally and on a grand scale. The astral body of Stalin is roaming the stage; a horrible fascist predator from our prehistoric past is at large; the black flag of the mafia is flying...

It is quite possible that this is merely a peculiar artistic perception of the world characteristic of S. Kurginyan personally. Well, a creative individual, a good director and actor whose imagination transforms our regular dull world into an arena for an apocalyptic clash between the forces of good and evil, into a Shakespearean drama of cosmic proportions. There are historical precedents for this, Nero, for example. However, it is bad when Nero is not on stage but rather in power, or next to power, as a consultant, expert, and theoretician.

Who needs him and why?

It becomes frightening indeed if we try to answer this question in earnest. Everything is much too familiar—playing on the wounded pride and the feeling of humility and inferiority of a once great power, betting on the military-industrial complex and the most conservative political and state structures, developing a super-goal of sorts, a super-task presented in the form of a universal mission for all humanity, and, as a counterpoint—the image of a cruel and perfidious enemy...

The friends and admirers of Sergey Kurginyan and like-minded individuals gather every week at the "Theater on the Boards" for political "Thursday sessions." For example, this is where the leader of a deputy group, the secretary of a city party committee, the leaders of intermovements from the Baltic area, and the directors of enterprises belonging to the military-industrial complex come for intellectual sustenance. This is becoming a popular place. At one "Thursday session" I saw about 10 brawny fellows wearing paratrooper uniforms with stripes on their sleeves saying "Personal Security Club. In the name of life." As it turned out, they dislike punks, "faggots," and nationalists a great deal; they like order instead...

Reasons for 'War of Laws,' Measures Cited

91UN1251A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 5 Apr 91
Union Edition p 4

[Article by Yu. Kalmykov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Legislation and Law and Order Committee: "Five Causes of the 'War of Laws'"]

[Text] Human society is based on order.... Eras change, some states have come to be replaced by others, but the goal has remained the same: assurance of order and the development of social processes within the framework of rules of law. As Thomas Hobbes, author of the celebrated "Leviathan," observed, "only in the state does there exist a universal scale for measuring virtue and vice. And only the laws of each state may serve as this scale." Deviations from these common principles are justified only in periods of wars, epidemics, and natural disasters.

What, however, is happening to our society in, it might have seemed, the most peaceful period of its development? Why are the laws not being fulfilled? Why are people's embitterment and mutual alienation and interethnic discord and conflicts growing, why is crime

growing, and why are economic ties being sundered? Why have the moral foundations of society been loosened? An extremely paradoxical situation has taken shape: Having proclaimed the building of a state based on the rule of law, we have suddenly found ourselves in such a period of lawlessness. It is now clear that the political reform which led to the creation of new state structures and democratic elections has not created the conditions for the stable development of social processes and the establishment of a regime of legality.

What is the reason?

First, having disturbed the social hibernation which had been maintained for decades, the process of perestroika engendered a tremendous wave of enthusiasm and hope. We recall the animation with which the results of the elections of people's deputies of the USSR and the business of the First Congress of People's Deputies were received. But within roughly a year interest had begun to wane, or rather, had shifted to the work of the new authorities in the republics, specifically, to the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet and the regional soviets. But that same story was repeated here also—the intensified economic crisis and the continued decline in the population's living standard against the background of endless logomachy engendered a skeptical attitude toward these structures of power also.

The effectiveness of power is evaluated by the results of its activity. The main thing with us has been the economic criterion. It is not surprising, therefore, that a syndrome of distrust of the authorities and laws has arisen under the conditions of the total economic disarray, shortage of commodities, and our general poverty. The slogans of large mass meetings may be viewed variously, but they cannot be disregarded or ignored. Law and order depends directly on trust in the authorities.

Second, the abandonment (incomplete, it is true) of administrative methods of leadership has not led to an improvement in the situation in the economy, on the contrary everything has become considerably more complex. Not having created market structures, we have found ourselves in a situation where traditional methods have ceased to work: In place of conventional settlements, barter deals are being struck. Business agreements lack the legal backing they should have under the conditions of the normal development of economic relations. The law is not keeping up with the development of events, and the regulation of economic relations is of an eclectic nature as yet. Chaos, in a word.

Third, nor has the proclamation of the supremacy of republic laws contributed to a strengthening of order in the country. This was, in fact, the reason the "war of laws" began. Despite the fact that the proposition concerning the supremacy of regional laws in the sovereignty declarations has been interpreted variously (in some cases as the operation on its own territory only of a

republic law, in others, as the possibility of the suspension of a Union law, in yet others, as the possibility of the ratification of any Union law), the result has proved the same—the undermining of trust in and respect for enactments of the highest authorities of the USSR.

Had the republics invested in the concept of supremacy of the law the priority of their enactments over Union enactments within the framework of the powers reserved to them, all would be normal and we would not be having the negative consequences we have been witnessing: the adoption at the Union and republic levels of enactments on one and the same issue; the aspiration at all costs to "score off" the Union authorities; the complete confusion of those to whom the laws are addressed—citizens and organizations—for it is difficult for them to get their bearings as to the laws by which to be guided.

Fourth, the national question has become a serious factor influencing the legal situation in the country. The growth of people's national self-awareness and the new approaches to the solution of problems of the form of government and an evaluation of the role of the republics and autonomies have created an entirely different situation and placed on the agenda the question of renewal of the federation and the creation of a union of sovereign states. This process (and it is to culminate in the signing of a Union treaty) has proven protracted. Certain republics' proclamation of state independence has been accompanied by a clash of different forces and ethnic groups and casualties among the population. Territorial disputes have intensified. The number of refugees increases daily. Constantly late with a solution of these problems or resolving them inconsistently, we have made the situation in this sphere of relations worse. All hopes are now being placed in the Union treaty.

Fifth, a characteristic feature of the present legal situation is the exceptional growth of crime, in extreme forms, what is more: mafias, gangsterism, economic sabotage, violence in serious forms, and hazing in the Army. Even recently racketeering was unknown to us, and the destruction of many tons of meat and sausage and thousands of packets of cigarettes would have seemed fantastic. And this given an acute shortage of everything! To speak of the causes, they are exceptional also. Sabotage is probably the work of those who are losing their former power and aspire to the restoration of public opinion against the new procedures. Racketeering is a creation of the shadow economy and the appearance of the "class" of underground millionaires. Our law enforcement authorities have been unable to withstand this onslaught; in a number of cases, upon contact with the "war of laws," for example, they have simply lost their heads. The absence of clear laws determining their status and also the requisite technical facilities has taken its toll also.

Pornography and videos and motion pictures preaching sex and violence have done their bit in the process of the demoralization of society. Any freedom has certain limits. The Law "On the Press and Other Mass Media,"

which created the necessary prerequisites for freedom of speech, by no means intended the possibility of the unchecked and uncontrolled corruption of the youth. It prohibits, incidentally, propaganda of violence and cruelty and racial, national, and religious intolerance and the spread of pornography. But is anyone taking any notice of this?

What are the ways out of the crisis?

A state based on the rule of law presupposes as a minimum the presence of three components: a democratic state structure; subordination to the effect of the law of all persons and organizations without exception, including the state itself; and the absolute nature of judicial protection of the rights and interests of all participants in social relations. It is necessary to have a system of organs of state power and administration that is well conceived and corresponds to the interests of broad strata of the population, and also a system of the scientifically substantiated process of legislation and, finally, independent courts. Only in a sum total of these three components bound together by legal culture may the contours of what we call a state based on the rule of law manifest themselves.

In developing political reform we have been oriented toward the experience of other countries, specifically, the United States and France. In the wake of the institution of presidential power there emerged the Security Council, a vice president, the Cabinet, the Council of the Federation, the Committee for Coordination of the Activity of the Law Enforcement Authorities, and the USSR Review Chamber. If to this is added the existing structures of the legislature and judiciary and also the republic and local authorities, a structure that is both difficult to administer and costly emerges. Nor should it be forgotten that it has not been possible to reduce the number of ministries and departments (there are approximately 50 of them) in connection with the position of the Cabinet and also the position of certain USSR people's deputies, who have with a persistence worthy of a better application pushed in the Supreme Soviet "their" ministries and departments.

It would seem that the hybrid of executive authority we have created is already in need of improvement, for it contains an attempt to combine the uncombinable. We have experimented with two systems, but it has transpired that it is mainly the French system that has predominated in our version. Its main singularity is the existence of a cabinet (together with a prime minister) subordinate to the President. The American structures are different. For example, the U.S. National Security Council incorporates the President, the vice president, the secretary of state, and the defense secretary (minister). True, there is, in addition, a military adviser—the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff—and an intelligence adviser—the chairman [as published] of the CIA. With us the Security Council incorporates not only persons ex officio but also those who do not hold official positions. This is correct, possibly, for the main thing is the

President's trust and the high competence of members of the Council. It is important merely that the number of such people not be substantial. The executive authorities should be compact. There are only 13 departments in that same United States.

We were correct to institute a presidency. But, expanding his staff and creating new structures subordinate to him, the president is gradually moving away from the USSR Supreme Soviet. The strengthening of executive authority has led, it would seem, to a weakening of the Supreme Soviet. The president should be in constant contact with the Supreme Soviet and elaborate basic strategic goals together with it.

Let us recall American practice once again. The U.S. President systematically maintains relations with Congress, and in the event of the adoption of most important decisions, consults the leaders of Congress and committee and commission chairmen. We do not have such a practice. The president of the USSR, particularly of late, visits the Supreme Soviet only when the situation becomes heated and the need arises to respond to questions put by the people's deputies or when it is necessary to have parliament pass some decision. The meetings and consultations with the Supreme Soviet should assume a permanent nature. This would balance the legislature and the executive.

In the present situation the role and prestige of the presidential structures have proven higher than the role and significance of the Supreme Soviet. And this is bad. This is testimony to the fact that the legislature is to some extent following the executive and is subordinate to it even. The Supreme Soviet should be more independent and self-sufficient. It should not be forgotten that it performs not only legislative but also supervisory functions.

The legal status of our vice president is uncertain. The constitution does not in practice reserve to him any powers: it says merely that he performs on behalf of the president in the event of his absence and it not being possible for him to exercise his duties or certain of his assignments. In a word, the vice president has no independent authority, and it would seem that this office has been instituted more for honorary and representative functions. But should the institution of vice president have been introduced only for this? In the absence of the president, his powers could perfectly well be exercised either by the chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet or the prime minister.

I would like to mention one further point—concerning an improvement in the activity of the USSR Supreme Soviet itself. The point being that some enactments regulating its activity are to a considerable extent out of date, and the adoption of others is dragging on. I am talking primarily about the standing orders of the Congress of People's Deputies and the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. The lacunas that have been revealed in them afford an opportunity for a varying interpretation of one

and the same provision, and the chair an opportunity for a subjective evaluation of controversial provisions. The standing orders are an important document, and everything needs to be done to ensure that they be perfected as soon as possible with regard both for the experience accumulated by the Supreme Soviet and the practice of foreign countries.

The basic authorities of the Supreme Soviet are the committees and commissions preparing bills. But the regulations governing the committees and commissions have still not yet been approved, and they function on the basis of outdated enactments. Yet the draft new regulations were prepared long ago, and it is incomprehensible why they have not been examined as yet. The committees and commissions must have a legal basis for their activity.

It is necessary also to dwell on the question of the correlation of the laws enacted by the USSR Supreme Soviet and the prescriptive ukases of the president of the USSR.

The point being that the president has by his ukases begun to make revisions to laws recently enacted by the Supreme Soviet which appreciably alter their content. Thus the enterprise profits tax fixed by the law at 45 percent was lowered by a presidential ukase to 35 percent. Without going into the content of the decision itself (for it is in principle sound), I would like to say that it hardly jibes with the law of 24 September 1990, which accorded the president certain legislative functions. This latter observes that the president may on a current basis issue ukases of a prescriptive nature (there follows a list of questions in respect of which this is done) "if the USSR Supreme Soviet does not deem it necessary to establish other rules or does not recommend that the president of the USSR revise or cancel a decision he has adopted."

There follows from these words and the essence of the authority granted the president just one thing—the president may adopt new decisions or decisions developing laws that have already been enacted, but does not have the right to revise or, which is quite impermissible, cancel them. If such an interpretation prevails, the president will have the right to revise any law enacted by the Supreme Soviet on the basis of clause 7 of Article 13 of the USSR Constitution. Yet the main purpose of the expansion of presidential authority lay elsewhere—to decide on a current basis questions arising on the basis of laws enacted by the Supreme Soviet and also to elaborate new prescriptive decisions not provided for by law.

Speaking of the prospects of the development of state structures under the conditions of the legal situation which has taken shape at the present time, I would like to express certain considerations concerning the future of our judiciary. Even at the present stage of society's development there has arisen, I believe, a need for the creation of a common supreme judicial authority. The

Supreme Court of Arbitration and the USSR Constitutional Court will shortly be functioning together with the USSR Supreme Court. The state arbitrator, who in the past performed essentially managerial functions and was subordinate to the Union government, will now be an independent industrial judge with all the functions and powers characteristic of judicial authorities. The Constitutional Court will have its own functions and powers: verification of conformity to the USSR Constitution of adopted laws and other enactments and also the examination of disputes arising between republics and between the Union and the republics. The functions are specific, but pertaining to judicial activity also.

The question arises: Granted all the diversity of functions, do we need to have three supreme judicial authorities? Should these bodies not be united in a single USSR Supreme Court with the preservation within it of the corresponding subdivisions? I believe that this would be the optimum solution as it would exclude duplication and would contribute to the uniform application of the law and ultimately the stabilization of the legal atmosphere in the country.

The status of the USSR Ministry of Justice needs to be altered also. In connection with the declarations on sovereignty of the republics many of the powers that previously belonged to the Union ministry have switched to the latter. The USSR Ministry of Justice is currently left in practice with just one function—registration of public associations. It is essential, given this situation, either to eliminate the said ministry (which is altogether undesirable under the conditions of the formation of state based on the rule of law) or endow it with new authority.

Much is being done currently in respect of the law enforcement authorities. Thus the Legislation and Law and Order Committee is currently preparing for the USSR Supreme Soviet a new program providing for a considerable increase in the wages of all employees of the law enforcement authorities and their better provision with equipment. But such programs will be implemented more efficiently given the existence of common and also joint structures. In a word, I agree with the legal experts who are proposing that the USSR Ministry of Justice be combined with the USSR Procuracy in order, a single, powerful ministry having been created, for the concentration in it of both supervision of legality, including certain investigatory actions, and supervision of places of confinement and certain other actions. The experience of the United States confirms the expediency of such a solution and the effectiveness of such a body.

The legal situation in the country is complex. But it is for this reason that we must at an accelerated pace solve the problems which confront us, create new and more effective state structures, boldly move to enact juridical laws, and all without exception strictly comply with adopted acts. In a word, implement the idea of a state based on the rule of law not in word but in deed.

Poll Shows Differences Over Who Has Power

91UN1245A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 9 Mar 91 p 1

[Interfax-Data report: "Question: Who Has the Power?"]

[Text] In a poll conducted in January by the All-Union Central Institute of Public Opinion the participants were asked this question: "In your opinion, who now has the real power in the country?"

Thirty percent of the respondents think that the USSR president has complete power.

Every fifth person thinks that nobody has real power anymore.

In the opinion of 42 percent of those questioned, the real power in the country is held by the mafia and bosses of the shadow economy.

Twelve percent found it difficult to give an answer.

Eleven percent were inclined to think that the real power rests with the republic leaders.

Approximately the same number of respondents think that the Communist Party has the power as before.

Equal numbers of those questioned (eight percent) think that the power is in the hands of the Army, the military-industrial complex, and the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Two percent of the participants named the USSR Council of Ministers when answering this question.

Baltics

Results of December Political Poll in Narva

91UN1232A Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA
in Russian 1 Mar 91 p 2

[Article by psychologist S. Gorokhov: "What Narva Residents Think About Politics; Public Opinion: the 1990 Results"]

[Text] On 18-20 December 1991 the Estonian Center for Public Opinion Studies of the joint-stock company EMOR conducted a poll of 400 residents of the city of Narva. Almost half of the respondents are women; 43 percent are 34 years old or younger; 51 percent have a high school or vocational high school education; 43 percent are white-collar workers, specialists in the nonproduction sphere. Almost one-third of the respondents were born in Estonia; 28 percent were born in Narva. The poll was conducted to find out the city residents' opinion of the economic and political problems in the life of the republic and the city of Narva.

In the opinion of a considerable number of respondents, a year after the elections to the local soviet the changes that have taken place in the socioeconomic situation are negative to a varying degree. Only five percent of the respondents believe that the changes that have taken place in the city are generally positive.

Out of many factors and circumstances currently existing in the republic and the country and influencing life in Narva, it is fair, however, to single out the role of the city administrative organs in the current situation. More than half of the respondents—57 percent—believe that the city soviet does not sufficiently take into account the interests of the city residents, and sometimes acts directly against their interests. Only three percent see the activity of the city soviet as totally directed toward the residents' interests. The appraisal of the work of the gorispolkom [city executive committee] brought similar results. Forty-three percent of the respondents believe that the city soviet had no right to take the position of not recognizing on the territory of the city the laws passed by the Estonian Republic Supreme Soviet. Only nine percent said the opposite.

The following poll results are more specific. Fifty-eight percent of Narva residents believe that the city soviet decision to stay within the USSR in case of Estonia seceding from the Union goes against the interests of

Narva residents, and 63 percent do not support this decision of the city soviet to a varying degree. An opposite point of view was supported by 23 and 26 percent of the respondents correspondingly.

In regard to acts and actions of the Supreme Soviet and the government of the Estonian Republic—met with furious resistance on the part of most deputies in the Narva City Soviet—the position of Narva residents who participated in the poll is as follows: those who do not approve of the establishment of the economic border—28 percent of respondents; of the intent to introduce its own currency—33 percent; and of the course toward regaining Estonian statehood and independence—25 percent.

Both individual deputies and the majority of the soviet spoke many times at sessions of the city soviet about the violation of the rights of the nonnative population or the possibility of such. What do the poll participants think about the issue of violation of the nonnative population? Fourteen percent believe that the rights of Russians are being violated in Narva today; 11 percent think so about the rights of other nonnative nationalities; and 24 percent think that it is the rights of Estonians that are being violated.

To the question "If Estonia does secede from the USSR, but Narva, in accordance with the city authorities' decision, stays within the USSR, how will it affect you (your family) personally?" only 12 percent said that the results would be mostly positive.

Sixty-two percent of polled Narva residents believe that in the case of Estonian secession from the USSR Narva should—either unconditionally or with a special national-territorial status—remain a part of Estonia. Only nine percent said that they will not refuse the opportunity to become a citizen of the Estonian Republic. One-quarter of the respondents indicated their disinterest in participating in the elections to the Estonian State Duma which is to determine the statehood status of the republic.

Only 29 percent of respondents would be most happy with Estonia signing the Union treaty and its participation in it as a regular Union republic; the necessity of gaining independent status for Estonia is the choice of 54 percent.

As to resolution of the language problem, 75 percent see it in that people of all nationalities living in Estonia should know both Estonian and Russian.

Distribution of Political Forces—Positions of Various Parties and Movements in the Narva Residents' Opinion

	Support to a varying degree (percent)	Do not support to a varying degree (percent)	Indifferent or undecided in their attitude (percent)	Not informed
Communist Party of Estonia (CPSU) gorkom	15	49	30	2
Independent Communist Party of Estonia	12	38	44	5
People's Front	19	43	32	3

Distribution of Political Forces—Positions of Various Parties and Movements in the Narva Residents' Opinion
(Continued)

	Support to a varying degree (percent)	Do not support to a varying degree (percent)	Indifferent or undecided in their attitude (percent)	Not informed
Intermovement	13	46	35	3
Democratic Party	21	13	40	21
United Council of Labor Collectives [OSTK]	30	29	26	11
Social-Democratic Party	21	9	36	29

First, the fact that attracts attention is a considerable loss of Narva residents' support—between 38 and 49 percent—for such organizations as the Communist Party of Estonia (CPSU) gorkom [city party committee], the city organization of the independent Communist Party of

Estonia, the Intermovement, and the Popular Front. The second important factor is that between 26 and 44 percent of respondents are indifferent or undecided in their attitude toward the activities of parties and public movements in the city.

Positions of Individual Deputies, City Administrative Organs, and Economic Administrators, by Results of the Public Opinion Poll of Narva Residents

	Support to a varying degree (percent)	Do not support to a varying degree (percent)	Indifferent or undecided in their attitude (percent)	Do not know these people
V. Chuykin, city soviet chairman	27	45	17	8
V. Mizhuy, city mayor	37	35	19	6
Deputies of the city soviet and Estonian Supreme Soviet:				
V. Malkovskiy	32	40	17	8
V. Kuznetsov	12	18	27	39
V. Zolin	6	13	27	51
Deputies of Estonian Supreme Soviet from the city:				
S. Sovetnikov	32	12	26	27
P. Grigoryev	15	12	22	47
V. Chetvergov—director of Baltiys Industrial Complex	22	36	25	15

As is seen from the results shown above, the share of Narva residents who appraise negatively the activities of the people on the list (with the exception of S. Sovetnikov and V. Mizhuy) is greater than the share of those who appraise their activities positively. The greatest negative rating belongs to V. Chuykin, the city soviet chairman. The Narva residents' critical attitude extended to their appraisal of the activities of the republic administrative organs. Only 28 percent give positive marks of a varying degree to the Estonian Government, and only 37 to the Estonian Supreme Soviet. About 26 percent evaluate positively the activity of the Interregional Council of People's Deputies and Delegates of Estonian Working People.

Only three percent believe that unequivocally positive changes had taken place in the sociopolitical situation in Estonia last year; 34 percent believe that the changes are mostly negative.

Seventy-eight percent believe that the opportunity for the city residents to express their opinion and to exert an

influence on the decisions of city authorities is either insufficient or nonexistent. This is cause for serious deliberation.

The material was prepared from joint-stock company EMOR data.

Results of Referendum in Estonian Cities

91UN1252A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 7 Mar 91 p 3

[Article by I. Loginov: "Who Will Get R600,000? On the Results of a Referendum in Estonia"]

[Text] The last, concluding press conference was held at the press center of a referendum on the future of Estonia. Minister of Foreign Affairs Lennart Meri responded to questions from international observers who had arrived to observe the course of the referendum. Both the expected voter turnout (83 percent compared to 75 percent) and the expected number of those who said

"yes" to a question concerning the restoration of independence (78 percent compared to 70) were exceeded during the referendum. The results of a plebiscite in Latvia were even more impressive. In response to observers' questions Mr. Meri said, "It seems that the Latvians have shown that they are better diplomats than we are. They have succeeded in explaining to people who have never lived in a democratic state and have never been abroad what a democratic, independent Latvia stands for. In 1924, a law on the protection of ethnic minorities was adopted in Toompea Palace. This was the first law of its kind in Europe. Our tragedy and yours is that Estonia disappeared from the political map for 45 years, and that things which occurred in Estonia at that early historical stage were forgotten entirely." The minister went on to state that "Estonia will not take any less care of ethnic minorities than Sweden does."

At the press conference, the observers were interested in the attitude of the Estonian leadership toward the results of the referendum in Narva, Sillamae, and Kohtla Jarve—the cities which are populated mostly by non-Estonians. In these cities, a local plebiscite was held simultaneously with the referendum during which the population was asked to answer the following question: "Would you like a sovereign Estonia to remain within the USSR?" Mr. Meri said: "We received one substantial

positive answer. The voters in these cities behaved in keeping with the law of the Republic of Estonia. As far as the results are concerned, there has always been, and there will always be, an opposition in a democratic state. The citizens of these three cities pointed out, in a normal and dignified form, the considerable shortcomings which have occurred here in the dialogue with the Russian-speaking populace."

What next? Point 20 of the resolution on holding the referendum says: "The results of the referendum are a foundation for the operation of the state organs of the Republic of Estonia during a period of transition." Deputy Speaker of the parliament Marju Lauristin believes that these results will be a strong argument in negotiations with Moscow. Meanwhile, they are discussing the following issue here in jest and in earnest: Who will get the 600,000 rubles [R] which the center has allocated for holding a Union referendum in Estonia? They will not have to wait long.

Population of the republic—1,565,662

Out of whom: Estonians—963,281 (61.5 percent);

Non-Estonians—602,381 (39.5 percent).

Number of voters on the voter rolls—1,133,100

Results of the Referendum in Some Estonian Cities

City	Number of voters	Number of Estonians, percent	Number of voters, percent	Number of those voting in favor, percent
Kohtla Jarve	67,400	23	70.26	46.11
Narva	62,300	4	70.11	25.49
Parnu	42,200	72	85.1	85.79
Sillamae	14,650	3	27.38	40.45
Tartu	86,500	72	82.88	85.61
Tallinn	373,000	47	79.95	65.75

Armed Units Within Latvian People's Front Rejected

91P50151A Riga SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH in Russian 22 Mar 91 p 5

[LETA report in the "Latvia: Chronicle" column: "The People's Front of Latvia Does Not Want To Arm Itself"]

[Text] The Board of the People's Front of Latvia considers the establishment of independent government structures to be a step toward the independence of Latvia. Therefore, it is actively participating in the discussion on the creation of a defense system. On March 19 the Board adopted a resolution which states that the creation of military, paramilitary or other armed units is the exclusive function of government institutions and that proposals for the establishment of such units within the People's Front are categorically rejected. The Board set up a working group which will enlist the help of experts in preparing an organizational concept for the Latvian army and self-defense police force. Until such

time as the government can guarantee the protection of especially important facilities, the People's Front of Latvia will continue its unarmed people's defense of these facilities.

Latvian CP Views Role in USSR Referendum

91UN1227A Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian 22 Mar 91 p 1

[Report by Latvian CP Central Committee Press Center: "In the Communist Party of Latvia Central Committee"]

[Text] A meeting of the Latvian CP Central Committee Bureau summed up the results of the preparation and organization of the USSR referendum on the question of preservation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as a renewed federation of equal sovereign republics on the territory of the Latvian SSR.

It was emphasized in the course of the discussion that, despite the atmosphere of unconcealed opposition to the referendum organized on a broad scale by various political forces under the aegis of official state structures, the referendum went ahead nonetheless, and that this should be considered a major victory for the Communist Party of Latvia and other forces of the bloc of the left in the republic. It was emphasized that the results of the referendum, and this means primarily about half a million citizens residing in the republic who supported preservation of the USSR as a renewed federation of equal sovereign republics, have induced in sober-minded people serious doubts that national separatist forces will succeed in accomplishing in full their ambitious plans based on the elimination of the working people's social gains, the breakup, contrary to the law and good sense, of age-old inter-nation ties between peoples, the revival of the former traditions of national discrimination, and the formation of a totalitarian regime proclaiming the imaginary supremacy of the nations' rights over human rights.

Numerous examples of prevention of the organization of the referendum based on the Republic of Latvia Supreme Soviet resolution "Attitude Toward Organization of the USSR Referendum on the Question of Preservation of the USSR," which was adopted just prior to this, on 6 March, were given at the Bureau meeting, in which the first secretaries of a number of rayon and city party committees took part. Thus by their decisions local authorities imposed a ban on the organization of the referendum on territories within their charge. A number of members of the government—ministers and department leaders—reacted similarly: In accordance with their personal orders, the allocation of premises at enterprises, establishments, and organizations within their jurisdiction to accommodate referendum polling stations was prohibited.

Instances of another kind of sabotage of the referendum were presented. Thus the electoral commissions' channels of communication with the Central USSR Referendum Commission were practically paralyzed; under the cover of an influenza epidemic members of the electoral commissions were prohibited from entering the grounds of medical establishments; the mass media, which are controlled by the Latvian Popular Front, encouraged one-sided propaganda aimed at a boycott of the referendum in the republic; the financing of the district commissions from the resources of the Central USSR Referendum Commission was closed off.

The participants in the Central Committee Bureau meeting observed that the preparation and organization of the referendum were a serious test of the forces of the party organizations in their resistance by practical action, not complaints, as in former times, to political opponents in their intention of disrupting the referendum. This was manifested, for example, in the prompt provision of the polling stations with tents, buses, and mobile changing rooms. High devotion to the position of the supporters of the referendum was demonstrated by

the teacher outfits of many schools, primarily their communist leaders, the majority of whom were not intimidated by the threat of the loss of position and job and who contributed actively to the organization of the ballot on school premises. The organizers of the referendum succeeding in making contact with the law enforcement authorities, thanks to which it was in fact possible to avoid mass provocations involving the destruction of the polling stations and other hooligan stunts. It was emphasized that many representatives of the militia subunits of the Latvian capital performed their duty at the time of the referendum wholeheartedly and honestly.

At the same time, the meeting observed, not all party organizations were up to the tasks that had been set in connection with organization of the referendum. This is indicated, specifically, by the fact that it was not possible to form a single precinct commission on the initiative of the work force and public organizations in Ventspilsskiy, Līepayskiy, Madonskiy, Orgskiy, Ayzkrauklskiy, and Talsinskiy Rayons. And the Bayskiy Rayon Party Committee even adopted a decision at a plenum on nonparticipation in the referendum, thereby ignoring the Communist Party of Latvia's political guidelines. There were dozens of calls on the "hot" lines installed in the Latvian CP Central Committee complaining that up to the last day it was not clear to the public in Rīzhskiy Rayon where the polls would be organized. The results of the organization of the referendum in the work force of a number of major industrial enterprises, where only half the workers, and in cases even fewer, took part in the voting, also testify to the inadequate political maturity of certain party organizations. The demoralized state of certain party organizations was manifested both in an incapacity for resisting business executives who openly opposed the organization of polling stations or adopted a "no business of mine" position, instead of their leading the workers to the polling stations, and in an inability to convey to the majority of workers the disastrous nature of the present official national-separatist policy in the republic openly geared to an infringement of the social rights and guarantees of the working man.

In this connection the decision adopted on the results of the discussion contains the following clause: to instruct each primary party organization to thoroughly analyze its specific contribution to the organization of the referendum and to draw from the discussion which has just been held lessons for the organized cohesion of the party ranks in order to successfully mount future social and political campaigns. A similar instruction was given to the city and rayon party committees: Carefully analyze the course of preparation and organization of the referendum and on the basis of mistakes and oversights which are revealed formulate practical measures for a further unification of the efforts of public organizations of a socialist orientation.

The Bureau meeting discussed the procedure of commemoration in the republic of the 121st anniversary of V.I. Lenin's birth.

It also adopted the Central Committee Bureau statement "Propaganda of Fascism and Calls for the Forcible Detachment of the Latvian SSR from the USSR at a Mass Meeting Cum Demonstration Devoted to the Anniversary of the Creation of Fascist Germany's SS Latvian Legion" (the text of the statement is published in the republic party press). In connection with the said profascist action the Central Committee Bureau has instructed the Latvian CP Central Committee Legislative Initiative and Defense of Citizens' Rights Commission to prepare material on the institution of criminal proceedings for propaganda of war and fascism against the persons and organizations party to this. It also instructed the communist deputies working in the republic parliament to forward the statement to the embassies of the states of the anti-Hitler coalition and the North European countries.

Latvian CP Protests SS Anniversary Meeting

91UN1226A Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian
22 Mar 91 p 1

["Statement of the Communist Party of Latvia Central Committee Bureau on the Propaganda of Fascism and Calls for the Forcible Detachment of the Latvian SSR From the USSR at a Mass Meeting cum Demonstration Devoted to the Anniversary of the Creation of Fascist Germany's SS Latvian Legion"—SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA headline]

[Text] A mass meeting cum demonstration devoted to the anniversary of the creation of fascist Germany's SS [Schutzstaffel] Latvian Legion was held on 16 March of this year at the Riga Communal Cemetery. An organizer of this meeting was the board of the Latvian Republic branch of the Daugavas Vanagi international emigre military-political organization, which was formed in 1945 in Belgium by former servicemen of the SS Latvian Legion who had not become reconciled to defeat in the Great Patriotic War and who had not abandoned possible revenge.

Former SS Latvian legionnaires, members of the Daugavas Vanagi organization, participants in the police battalions and reconnaissance and punitive services of fascist Germany, former members of gangster terrorist formations and other persons who had in the past acted on the side of fascist Germany with weapon in hand took part in the mass meeting.

Under the leadership of the SD [Sicherheitsdienst] police, formations of the Ayzsargi military-fascist organization torched inhabitants of the village of Audrini in Rezeknenskiy District, and hostages taken from the village were publicly executed in the city's market square. The bloody punitive expeditions of the Latvian police battalions carried out against Belorussian and Russian partisans left behind them thousands of peaceful citizens killed and villages burned. The traces of their outrages live on in the peoples' memory.

Gangster-terrorist and sabotage formations were organized on occupied Latvian SSR territory in 1944-1945 under the leadership and control of German-fascist reconnaissance and punitive organs for reconnaissance and subversion and terrorist activity both in the rear of the Soviet Army and against the peaceful population of the republic. The appropriate secret arms and explosives caches were created for them.

Disguised as "national partisans," numerous gangs of terrorists and saboteurs engaged in the postwar years, in addition to the accomplishment of their immediate assignments, in gangsterism and unleashed mass terror against the peaceful inhabitants of the republic.

All the gangster formations whose representatives took part in the mass meeting carried out in the postwar period more than 3,000 armed raids and engaged in acts of mass killing. They carried out large-scale sabotage at facilities of the national economy in a republic which had suffered from the war, inflicting on the economic system the most considerable material losses.

The participants in the meeting are responsible for these victims of fascism before history and the working people. Fascism and the crimes it perpetrated are condemned by the world community. They have also been condemned by the Republic of Latvia Supreme Soviet. But this did not prevent the organization on 16 March of this year with the participation of people's deputies of the Supreme Soviet of a mass meeting cum demonstration of active supporters of fascism. In addition, glorification of the ideas and crimes of executioner-heroes who went with weapon in hand against the countries participating in the anti-Hitler coalition and the working people of their own country was permitted at the meeting.

The Latvian People's Front's newspaper ATMODA for 13 March of this year published the article "Crown of Glory and Pain" and also photos of SS Latvian legionnaires on parade under the command of the infamous General Bangerskiy, executant of Hitler's wishes in Latvia. The above-mentioned article attempted to rehabilitate and promote "heroes" and "martyrs" of the avowed supporters of fascism.

The participation in such a meeting of people's deputies of the Republic of Latvia Supreme Soviet is astonishing.

Addressing it, Odissey Kostanda [name as transliterated], people's deputy of the Republic of Latvia Supreme Soviet, made the following statement: "Ever present in many of us today is the thought of what we, the Latvian nation, can do when our enemy is great and powerful. Will we once again count on the mercy of the enemy or will we, like Latvian fighting men, create guerrilla detachments? Let us, like the Latvian legionnaires, fight with weapon in hand."

On 15 March of this year, on the eve of the above-mentioned meeting cum demonstration, Dainis Ivans, first deputy chairman of the Republic of Latvia Supreme Soviet, quotes from the NEW YORK TIMES in the

newspaper DIYENA No 51 the following passage confirming his opinion: "Freedom cannot be won in smooth television interviews. Freedom cannot be won with the aid of flattery and requests of a tyrant. Unfortunately, the stern truth of life is that freedom is usually won at the barricades." Dainis Ivans continues in this connection: "Freedom is not bestowed. Even less in the Soviet Union."

The nature and personal composition of the participants in the meeting cum demonstration held on 16 March of this year devoted to the anniversary of the creation of fascist Germany's SS Latvian Legion and the open call at this meeting of O. Kostanda, people's deputy of the Latvian Supreme Soviet, for armed struggle against the USSR and also the opinion of a similar nature voiced by D. Ivans, first deputy chairman of the Latvian Supreme Soviet, considering that this action was mounted on the eve of the USSR referendum, forces it to be seen as destabilizing the social and political situation in the republic. In addition, the motives behind the Latvian Supreme Soviet's equating these persons with the citizens who fought on the side of the anti-Hitler coalition remain incomprehensible.

With regard for what has been said, the Latvian CP Central Committee Bureau declares a categorical protest against the propaganda and glorification in the republic of the exponents of the delirious ideas of fascism who committed serious crimes and acted with weapon in hand against the anti-Hitler coalition, their own people, and the peoples of the USSR.

The Latvian CP Central Committee Bureau emphatically condemns the attempts to portray the accomplices of fascism in the role of people whose actions are "worthy of emulation," regards this as a wholly unconcealed antipopular provocation, and calls on all honest people to emphatically and unanimously oppose propaganda of the morals and actions of the supporters of fascism in Latvia.

The Latvian CP Central Committee Bureau protests to the Supreme Soviet in connection with the statements of O. Kostanda and D. Ivans, people's deputies of the republic, which contain calls for the forcible detachment of the Latvian SSR from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and urge people on to armed struggle.

The Latvian CP Central Committee Bureau demands that the Latvian Supreme Soviet hence forward exclude revanchists' organization of similar meetings cum demonstrations extolling the supporters of fascism and also prevent any calls for the forcible armed detachment of the Latvian SSR from the Union of SSR and the exacerbation thereby of the social and political situation in the republic.

In the event of a continuation of such provocations, the Latvian CP Central Committee Bureau reserves the right in conjunction with the democratic forces to adopt

appropriate measures reliably protecting the life and rights of inhabitants of the Latvian SSR against such encroachments.

Latvia's Parliamentary Factions Negotiate

91UN0995A Riga SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH
in Russian 21 Feb 91 p 1

[Report by Alla Petropavlovskaya under the rubric "In the Latvian Republic Parliament": "The Round Ended With a Handshake"]

[Text] On Wednesday the delegations of the majority and "Equal Rights" factions, headed by J. Dinevics and S. Dimanis, conducted the first round of negotiations according to a "five plus five" formula. A number of issues related to the normalization of relations between the parliamentary factions were discussed in the negotiations. J. Dinevics told SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH that the decision was made to create a permanent interfactional bureau where most contentious issues will be discussed in a civilized manner in the future before they are brought out to the plenary sessions. "The meeting of the two factions' delegations has become an additional impetus for the "Equal Rights" to return to parliament without losing its dignity. The future will tell whether the opposition needed it, or it was simply looking for an excuse to continue the confrontation," said J. Dinevics.

The first round ended with a symbolic gesture: a handshake by the majority and opposition leaders in front of the television camera.

The delegations empowered their representatives V. Dozortsev and T. Zhdanok to work out a joint statement that will assess the January events in Riga, and also to identify priority directions in which the work of the interfaction bureau should go.

USSR Deputies Deplore Use of Force

91UN0725B Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA
in Russian No 2, 16 Jan 91 p 1

[Statement by USSR people's deputies: "Only Negotiations!"]

[Text] We are receiving with great alarm the reports of events in Lithuania in connection with the destabilization of the situation in that republic.

We categorically oppose reactionary attempts to forcibly interfere, with the participation of armed forces, in Lithuania's complex sociopolitical processes. We oppose the elimination of the legal organs of power and the creation of illegal, self-styled formations aspiring to the role of "saviors of Lithuania." The only ones who profit by this are destructive forces violating the normal contractual process and undermining the international prestige of the Union.

We believe that only by way of negotiations with regard for the interests of the various groups of the population of Lithuania, respecting human rights and international agreements signed by the USSR, can we pull ourselves from the crisis situation. Any other methods for solving the problems of Lithuania and its relations with the center will have fateful consequences both for the domestic situation as well as for international processes in Europe and in all the world.

[Signed] USSR People's Deputies V. Advadze, L. Arutyunyan, A. Bakradze, R. Bratun, M. Bronshteyn, T. Buachidze, F. Burlatskiy, Ye. Velikhov, A. Veprev, A. Viltans, V. Grishchuk, D. Guguchiya, A. Dikhtyar, A. Yemelyanov, N. Koryugin, D. Kugultinov, Yu. Levykin, N. Medvedev, N. Neyland, Ya. Peters, Yu. Ryzhov, S. Ryabchenko, N. Sazonov, G. Starovoytova, V. Chernyak, Yu. Shcherbak, A. Eyzan, A. Yablokov

RSFSR

Democratic Russia 'Instructions' Cited

91UN1207B Moscow LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian No 10, 8 Mar 91 p 4

[Excerpts from Democratic Russia "Instructions," prepared by USSR People's Deputy A.N. Murashev: "Instructions for Trouble-Makers"]

[Text] How to Participate in the Democratic Russia Movement

Hundreds of people have turned to the Interregional Group of Deputies and the Coordinating Council of the Democratic Russia movement asking how they might help, how they can join the Democratic Russia movement.

I will try to answer this question, but in order to do so it is first necessary, if but briefly,...

Bear in mind that the main political struggle will take place in the coming elections (on the local level these will most likely be elections of primary officials of executive authority—governors, mayors). The time is already upon us to be thinking over the most suitable candidates for the posts of governor and mayor. It is absolutely necessary that we know precisely which of the mass media will be ready...

A number of deputies from the Soyuz group presented a request to USSR Supreme Soviet Chairman A.I. Lukyanov that the cited "Instructions" be reproduced and distributed among members of the Union parliament—for familiarization. We believe it would not be extraneous to acquaint LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA readers with excerpts from this document as well.

...The time has come for democratic forces to openly and unambiguously declare themselves as an organized opposition to the leadership headed by M.S. Gorbachev.

The goal of acceding to power should be placed on their agenda as a political program.

It is evident that reinforcement of republic organs of power in general, and Russian ones in particular, should be considered the most logical plan for acceding to power. Important elements of this plan are the adoption of a new Russian Constitution and direct, general elections of the Russian president.

What specific steps must be taken after returning to the localities?

Collect information on the ordering of political forces in your oblast and city soviets. It would be a good idea to know the political posture of local leaders—in the soviet, the ispolkom [executive committee], the court, the procuracy, and the police, that of major economic leaders. Know who is the most "highly placed" democrat, who exerts maximum influence within the democratic community. Know which democratically oriented parties are functioning in the region and who are among the leadership of the primary organizations. Know whether or not there exist primary organizations of independent trade unions or strike committees.

Bear in mind that the main political struggle will take place in the coming elections (on the local level these will most likely be elections of primary officials of executive authority—governors, mayors). The time is already upon us to be thinking over the most suitable candidates for the posts of governor and mayor. It is absolutely necessary that we know precisely which of the mass media will be ready to participate on the side of democrats during the coming election campaign. Get answers to the following questions—what copying machines and other duplicating equipment are accessible, where and how do you obtain paper? Have some idea as to who will be able to actively participate in the election campaign.

Be well informed. Study local problems and sore points. Consult with skilled specialists to find possible solutions to these problems—all of this will prove useful in the elections and constitute a part of the election program.

Establish ties with your USSR and RSFSR people's deputies, especially if they are members of the Interregional Group of Deputies or the Democratic Russia parliamentary bloc. Do not be shy. Get them involved in resolving your problems. Coordinate your actions with neighboring regions.

It is absolutely necessary that you attempt to register a local primary organization of the Democratic Russia movement. If local authorities refuse, stir up a row, initiate court action, provide information to ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, DEMOKRATICHESKAYA ROSSIYA, ARGUMENTY I FAKTY, OGONEK, and other progressive newspapers and magazines. Seek premises for a staff headquarters.

Work on resolving the problem of financing your organization. Set up a fund for transferring financial

resources. Establish contacts with private business—with cooperatives, lessees, small enterprises. We express their interests.

You must have a clear concept of how to organize a mass rally, demonstration, and especially a strike. You must know who will heed the call, which people at the enterprises must be contacted in this regard.

By directive of the Coordinating Council of the Democratic Russia movement. Material prepared by USSR People's Deputy A.N. Murashev.

RSFSR Foreign Minister Interviewed

*91UF0615A Moscow NOVOYE VREMYA in Russian
No 9, Mar 91 pp 8-10*

[Interview with Andrey Kozyrev, RSFSR minister of foreign affairs, by Vladimir Razuvayev, NOVOYE VREMYA commentator: "The Minister's 100 Days"]

[Text] [Razuvayev] In your initial interviews as minister of foreign affairs of the RSFSR, you said that your main objective, for the foreseeable future, would be to ensure foreign political support for the "500 days" program. The program was not drafted. The discussion and ratification of the foreign policy concept of Russia, planned for January, was postponed. How do you feel being a minister without the necessary guidelines?

[Kozyrev] In exactly the same way as the other members of the Russian government. Foreign policy sovereignty always derives from domestic political sovereignty. The latter, as we know, does not exist yet.

[Razuvayev] More than 100 days have passed since you were appointed minister of foreign affairs. In politics, this period is considered sufficient for summing up initial results....

[Kozyrev] I would say that we—I am referring to the entire Russian government—together with the center have learned how effectively to block each other. The task now is to learn how to accomplish things just as efficiently. My initial impressions from my membership in the government allows me to say that the attempt on the part of the center to ignore the republic is as pernicious as the attempt on the part of some republics to pretend that the center does not exist.

[Razuvayev] These are your impressions as member of the RSFSR Council of Ministers. What can you say as minister of foreign affairs?

[Kozyrev] Only scattered bits have remained from the "500 days" program, which the government nonetheless is trying to implement. The republic's Ministry of Foreign Affairs considers it its task to ensure favorable foreign conditions for such a policy. All too frequently, however, reaching the desired target is hindered by unexpected steps taken by the union government. For example, quite recently I paid an official visit to the FRG, together with Silayev, Russia's prime minister.

The purpose of the trip was to develop a favorable atmosphere for business relations between German businessmen and our Republic. We appear to have achieved some results. However, the statement by Pavlov, the union prime minister, about a "conspiracy of bankers" cast a shadow on what we had been able to create in the course of that trip. Even the fiercest supporters of the Cold War would have been unable to achieve a more negative effect concerning our relations with Germany than Pavlov. Essentially, he questioned the possibility of trusting the Soviet Union in the economic area. In the United States, to the best of my knowledge, the reaction to his words was one of rejection. It is not merely a question that the Western bankers were precisely and conversely ready to support perestroika and the Soviet president. The essence is the threat of the revival of a caveman's way of thinking, the mentality of a besieged fortress, in which the surrounding world is seen as eminently hostile to our country. And when this is based on the government's expropriation measures, I am referring to the so-called "currency exchange," the attitude of the bankers toward the USSR becomes totally negative. The West is interested above all in whether the state respects the right of ownership and the right of owners. If there is no such respect, what kind of business with such a country could be possible?

[Razuvayev] At one point, Soviet experts included among the main obstacles to the development of Western capital the so-called "war of laws."...

[Kozyrev] I do not like this concept in the least. A discrepancy between laws and regulations exists in some foreign countries as well. However, in such countries this is never a reason for worsening social tension. They simply speak of "harmonizing the laws."... In the United States and the FRG, for example, states and provinces have their own laws which are frequently different from those of the federal governments. However, no one considers this a particular problem. Incidentally, the reason is entirely clear: not to frighten foreign capital. I would start by explaining to the business circles in the West that we have no "war of laws" in our country, for in our country there is simply a historically natural process of adopting the new rules of the game taking place. It is true that such an entirely legitimate phenomenon has a tendency to develop into some kind of internal "cold war," and not only because some people consider Yeltsin a rival in the struggle for power....

Now, however, in the West the conviction is developing that once again a return to anti-market, anti-business, and anti-Western concepts is taking place in the central power structures of the USSR. Concerning this obstacle, we cannot tell our partners that it is the result of growth and that it could be harmonized. Therefore, in the immediate future one may fear a turn toward the too-hastily forgotten times of isolation and of technological boycott of our country.

[Razuvayev] To the best of my knowledge, the likelihood exists for the government of which you are a part to

expect soon difficulties in parliament, and that one of the main targets of criticism will be you, personally. In your view, what could you be criticized for?

[Kozyrev] I indeed do not exclude the likelihood that I may become the target of attacks on the part of some legislators. In parliament, as in society at large, efforts are being made to look for "enemys." As to what they could criticize.... I do not deny that I have made many errors, for the past few months have been quite difficult and it is only he who does nothing that never makes a mistake. I believe, however, that the main reason for criticism "from the right" may be the participation of the ministry in the drafting of interrepublic treaties and organizing interrepublic relations. Some critics consider such activities a confirmation of the aspiration on the part of the Russian leadership to "break down the Union," and to convert relations among republics to international relations. I believe that the unwillingness to accept this aspect of the activities of the ministry is backed by the unwillingness to see the realities of our time. For 70 years the country suffered from an ideologized approach to foreign policy. Efforts are now being made to shift this approach to relations among republics....

The RSFSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs is not engaged in talks with similar ministries of other Union republics on concluding treaties. This is the work of the deputy groups. Our ministry only participates in drafting the treaties, seeing that they are consistent with the standards of international law. Such participation is entirely justified, for the already established standards of international law encompass the experience acquired in the course of solving many problems which are relevant to our country—social, humanitarian, economic, national, and interrepublic.... I have spent my entire professional life in settling conflicts. It would be simply criminal on my part not to try to apply my knowledge and experience in that area. Many of the known methods for resolving conflicts have proved to be the right ones in other countries and are already justifying or are about to justify their use in the USSR.

The other aspect of the problem is that I simply am unwilling to accept the "false alternative"—totalitarian unitarism. This system deprives of their share not only the Baltic or Central Asian peoples but also Russia. Let us frankly say that our country was considered a threat in the international arena largely because of its totalitarian nature. I would also classify as part of that "false alternative" the possibility of an explosion of hostility in relations among republics, for this could only lead to a future of other "Berlin walls" among republics, and endless territorial redivisions accompanied by armed clashes and wars.

[Razuvayev] As I understand it, through your activities you wish to oppose this "false alternative" with something different....

[Kozyrev] There also is a "civilized alternative." That is what our ministry has tried to work for in recent months. Frankly speaking, I am proud to have participated in this effort. We draw attention to the unification trends abroad, to the model of Western European integration. Naturally, we take into consideration the differences in the situation, but I am confident that the main "blocks" of the integration model could apply under our circumstances.

Usually, the opponents of such a solution point out that the republic boundaries do not accurately reflect the ethnic composition of the population. Even if such is the case, does this mean that now the republic must engage in endless territorial disputes? For centuries, Germany and France fought over Alsace-Lorraine, before realizing the principle of a civilized solution of this old conflict. They simply made the border conventional. We must adopt the same solutions. My activities as minister are aimed at helping, to a certain extent, the process of integration among republics and the creation of a renovated Union as a community of sovereign states.

Quite recently, an event took place in Tallinn which, from my point of view, constitutes a historical change in relations between Russia and the Baltic republics. On the basis of a treaty between Russia and Estonia, we held an international meeting of experts in human rights. Specialists from eight European countries studied Estonian legislation and practices, and met with representatives of all political trends and ethnic groups. It turned out that in Estonia there indeed exist frictions among the members of the different national and ethnic groups, but for the most part they are on the level of everyday life. The legislation is by no means perfect. As a whole, however, it is on the average European level. Possibilities for improving legal standards in Estonia were also earmarked. From my viewpoint this is precisely the civilized method of resolving conflicts. We became convinced that its application is possible even under most difficult circumstances, and even despite the fact that blood had been recently shed in neighboring republics.

[Razuvayev] For some time now a debate has been taking place in the United States on shifting the emphasis of American policy toward the USSR in the sense of developing contacts with republics and "local" democratic administrations. It is a question not of relying on forces which oppose the Kremlin but, rather, of developing parallel relations with the central leadership and with republic and local authorities.

[Kozyrev] I believe that this is the right trend. I personally, both in the USSR and abroad, have always encouraged such a "constructive parallelism." Naturally, we must not face the foreign partners with a choice which would be dangerous or difficult for them to make: either the Union or the republics. From my viewpoint, relations should develop on a parallel basis, i.e., both with the Union and the republics. Russia has an interest in having the shoots of new relations between the USSR and the West not only preserved but also strengthened.

[Razuvayev] You are just back from the United States and this was your first visit as a minister. Did you notice any sign which may lead us to hope for any progress in what you describe as "constructive parallelism?"

[Kozyrev] Great attention was paid to the Russian delegation. Naturally, I was pleased with the understanding of the new role played by republics in the USSR and their foreign policy. Nonetheless, the increased attention paid by the Americans, frankly speaking, was not entirely pleasing to me. In addition to sympathy for and interest in Russian policy, there was an entirely obvious disappointment in the prospects of relations with the Kremlin. It is feared in the United States that the Soviet leadership has begun to abandon the principles which had lifted Soviet-American relations to their present level. Naturally, this was of concern to me, for one cannot create a favorable climate for international investment in a separate republic. Our efforts can only be a supplement and development of what is achieved through the policy pursued by the union government. That is why we would not like it to slide back into its old positions. Furthermore, I would support a forward thrust, leading to a policy of common sense.

As a whole, however, I found in the United States very great promises for the development of a "constructive parallelism" or, as such a policy is described here by some, a "two-track movement." I would particularly single out the interesting opportunities for cooperation between Russian areas and American states. Incidentally, such cooperation could take place with other countries as well, such as the FRG. The concept that along with a "Europe of states" a "Europe of regions" should develop is becoming increasingly popular. It is precisely in such a case that cooperation could prove and is proving to be much more productive than along the line of intergovernmental relations.

The fact that in the USSR the independence of the regions is on a terribly low level is a different matter. It sounds funny, but the German provinces have much greater rights in resolving their problems than has the leadership of the RSFSR. For example, we have had no foreign exchange budget. When Russian delegations go abroad, they must procure their money by inconceivable methods. Meanwhile, any Western European area is autonomous in handling its expenditures. I would rather not characterize our situation....

[Razuvayev] Is it degrading to use aid?

[Kozyrev] Yes, let us be blunt, it is degrading. Looked at more broadly, however, we should not limit the discussion merely to this aspect of the problem. One must defend one's dignity mainly through other means and, above all, through a civilized policy. For 70 years Soviet diplomats themselves had to pay for their expenses, traveling from conference to conference without earning any respect. I recall the way immediately after the introduction of Soviet forces into Afghanistan, there were crowds of demonstrators chanting "murderers!" in

front of Soviet missions abroad. Incidentally, my recent trip to the United States unexpectedly reminded me of a past experience: I was asked far too many questions about the Baltic bloodshed. It is true that on that occasion I could answer with a clear conscience that both Yeltsin and the Russian leadership were in favor of talks and not of the use of tanks in the Baltic area. It seems to me that defending the dignity of the state is achieved precisely by holding such a position.

[Razuvayev] A great deal is being said about the conflict between Russia and the center. Can you tell us how you personally are interacting with the union level Ministry of Foreign Affairs?

[Kozyrev] Personally, from the very beginning, I have favored cooperation between the two ministries. In his time, Shevardnadze raised the formula of "model relations" with the republic ministries. It is true that, in practice, this was not always the case. Now, the new minister has confirmed the line of "model relations." I must say that, in principle, all problems are totally solvable, for both the Russian and the Union ministries agree that differences in views and the coordination of views are both natural.

The fact that the legacy of the totalitarian thinking has led to an improper understanding of the very concept of "coordination" is a different matter. By this, in our country, we understand leveling off, and when it becomes a question of relations among republics, "unitarism." From my viewpoint, the principle of coordination does not exclude independent actions by republics and nuances in approaches. Yet there have been strange cases.... For example, the Russian minister of foreign affairs goes to Washington where he meets with Secretary of State Baker. Naturally, he reports his impressions to Moscow. One could dispute the worth of his information, that is one thing I understand, but in any case the minister clearly relies on the fact that it will make its way not only to Union Ministry of Foreign Affairs but, above all, also to the RSFSR leadership. What happened, in fact, was that my information was received by the high Union leadership but did not reach Yeltsin.

[Razuvayev] Last autumn, a young brilliant diplomat, head of a Union Ministry administration, decided to change his complacent, tranquil and, from the viewpoint of many people, exceptionally attractive position, for the rather dangerous post in terms of his career (let us call things by their right names) of minister of foreign affairs of the RSFSR. Have you ever regretted this choice over the past months?

[Kozyrev] I did not question its rightness from the very beginning, nor do I question it now. Naturally, my preceding position had its tangible advantages. But when I think of how I would hurt had I failed to agree to switch to the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and had I refused this opportunity to make use of my professional skills to help Russia finally begin to live according to civilized standards.... No, the question is not one of the

advantages offered by one position or another. The difference between them is that in my present position my conscience bothers me less.

Yakovlev on Yeltsin's New Powers

91UN1264B Moscow *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA*
in Russian 10 Apr 91 p 3

[IAN report: "Aleksandr Yakovlev on the Situation in the USSR"]

[Text] The Paris-based LIBERATION has published an interview with Aleksandr Yakovlev, former member of the Presidential Council. Responding to a question about B. Yeltsin's extraordinary powers, he said that the situation is such that emergency measures are essential.

The main thing, A. Yakovlev believes, is how these powers will be used. If everything is directed toward an absurd struggle for power, nothing good can be expected. If, on the other hand, it serves to solve specific problems, then these kinds of powers are normal.

Talking about the contradictions between M. Gorbachev and B. Yeltsin, A. Yakovlev named three reasons for the confrontation between those leaders. Russia has passed many laws that are at variance with Union laws. The president of the Union should consider the opinions of the presidents of all the republics; he cannot harmonize his actions only with the Russian leader, which is what he is trying to do. Finally, over the last three years irritation has built up that is poisoning these relations. The leaders of the Russian Communist Party could play a positive role in this matter, but unfortunately they are not.

RSFSR Politburo Member on Party Program

91UN1212A Moscow *KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA*
in Russian 29 Mar 91 p 3

[Interview with G. Zyuganov, member of the Politburo and secretary of the Russian CP Central Committee, by A. Khokhlov; place and date not given: "...But It Will Yet Show What It Can Do"]

[Text] [Khokhlov] Much is being said and written currently about the failure of the communist idea. Not only in our overly troubled country but worldwide. Communist parties in East Europe and in West Europe have been collapsing, but with us a new one has been born—in Russia. This has puzzled many people, even Communists: for what purpose?

[Zyuganov] When there were communist parties in 14 Union republics, but not in the biggest of them, was this not grounds for perplexity? The Russian Communist Party is based on the rules and program of the CPSU. For this reason there should be no talk about the birth of a new party. It is simply that a detachment of Communists has taken shape organizationally.

As far as the idea—the socialist idea—is concerned, there are in the world, whatever parties have been created and have disappeared, two trends. One is closely linked with private-ownership enterprise, which, please note, has always and everywhere been limited in every possible way by taxes and laws. The individualist, predatory idea has for thousands of years led to endless wars and partitions of the world and only at the end of the 20th century has acquired a civilized character, and even then only in a number of countries.

The other trend comes from religion, from "love thy neighbor." The essence of the socialist idea are brotherhood, social justice and solidarity. I am absolutely certain that as long as man lives, no one will succeed in doing away with this idea. The gravitation toward justice is the basis of the moral existence of mankind as a race. When, in 1929, the market economy of the United States, incidentally, was shaken to its foundations by crisis, it was cured by socialist methods: government regulation and the social protection of the working people.

[Khokhlov] The Russian Communist Party is opposed to the introduction of private ownership, but the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, he who is president of the USSR, is leading the country toward the market. Is there not a political contradiction here?

[Zyuganov] Let us not duplicate general misconceptions! We have never opposed private ownership. But we are opposed, for example, to the selling off of land. The public mood in Russia, which had taken shape even before 1917, should be taken into account. The Russian Communist Party is for a diversity of forms of ownership, provided that they are chosen by the working people themselves. It is the farmer's personal right to say "yes" either to tenant farming or to collective farms. Is our position really contrary to the postulates of the market economy?

Still from the sphere of misconceptions: The market should not be seen as a panacea against all problems. It has been in existence 7,000 years and existed under the slave-owning system also. And? Private ownership does not guarantee unconditional success in the economy either. In the United States five to seven percent of the socialized big farms produce approximately 70 percent of the farm products. And socialized forms of the organization of production are, as you know, the basis of the socialist mode of management. For this reason the Russian Communist Party's attitude toward the market is purely realistic also: We are for its government regulation.

[Khokhlov] The leaders of the Russian Communist Party say frequently that they express the will of the people. What is the "mechanism" of consideration of the mood of the masses?

[Zyuganov] Members of the Russian CP Central Committee Politburo have in the past three months visited 63 of Russia's 72 regional party organizations. They have

met not only with party members but with the work-force, the intelligentsia, and soldiers. The feedback convinces us that people understand us. The intelligentsia espousing positions of patriotism and statehood have been reaching out to us of late. The social base of the Russian Communist Party among the workers and peasants is expanding. People are tired of the "infinity" of sham democracy, which our name for stirring up the country and "talking to death" good initiatives. The people are crying out: Let's have order and stability!

[Khokhlov] And how, in your opinion, may the situation in the country be stabilized today?

[Zyuganov] In Russia there may be either strong authority or none at all. With us the system of administration has primordially been strictly centralized: monarchist, then semidictatorial. If an attempt is made, everything having been pulled to pieces, to make something new all at once, this will not work in Russia. This is clearly inscribed in the law of systemization, incidentally: Complex systems may be modernized bit by bit. If, however, the entire mechanism is taken apart, the parts will develop in an unpredictable direction...

And, generally: Let us have done with putting emphasis on revolutionary "leaps forward" and carrying out experiments on the people and let us begin to implement an evolutionary program of the country's salvation. Task No. 1 is to restore its manageability and to strive for compliance with the laws.

It is both the problem and the fault of the party that it lacks a precise economic program as yet. The cabinet has now embarked on this. I believe that we will bring order to bear in the economy if the changes in the economic mechanism are accompanied by a search for civil harmony in society. If, however, we look for new enemies, we will inevitably come to blows. They have already been sought twice in Russia in the 20th century. It resulted in the country losing many millions of its citizens...

[Khokhlov] Why, then, are the leaders of the Russian Communist Party calling on the Communists to leave the "trenches" and give "battle" to their political opponents?

[Zyuganov] Clause 1 of our "Guidelines" records: peace and constructive cooperation with all political currents. The "frontline" phrase-mongering in the political vocabulary of perestroika was introduced first not by us but turncoats from the CPSU who were founding new parties. Our people never having believed in those who have once committed an act of betrayal, the former are now attempting to "touch up" their image with ultrarevolutionary phrases. It is we Communists who could tomorrow find ourselves in the role of the "guilty." Some people would like to drag to the "court of history" 16 millions defendants all at one time. Is this democracy? Or neo-Stalinism? The Communists could really be guilty before history unless today they save our long-suffering fatherland from the impending fascism and if

they allow the country to be plunged into civil war. Russia has already used up its revolution quota.

[Khokhlov] Other forces cannot prevent fratricidal strife?

[Zyuganov] Party registration is under way currently. As far as I know, many of them cannot in the purses of their supporters rub together the few thousand rubles needed to pay the tax. This is a force?! But 108,000 persons joined the CPSU last year—more than all the other parties put together. It is too early, way too early, to put the Communist Party among the politically deceased! It will continue to bear responsibility for the fate of society.

[Khokhlov] And following the replacement of Article 6?

[Zyuganov] I attended the Moscow party conference. Gavriil Popov declared there that the majority of leaders in the capital were members of the Communist Party and would not escape their responsibility. I fully agree. Every Communist is responsible not only as a worker but also as a member of the party. We do not have the right to divest ourselves of the burden of responsibility for the motherland.

[Khokhlov] But how can the party call people to account for their mistakes?

[Zyuganov] There are the rules. It is all down in writing there. This is also, incidentally, the way to stabilize the situation in the country: for all public institutions to demand of their wards strict compliance with their official duties and laws.

[Khokhlov] And if a Communist is the president?

[Zyuganov] Complaints have been expressed about Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev regularly of late. He agrees with them to a large extent. At the last plenum, when the situation in the country and the party's tasks were thoroughly examined, both reprimands and expectations were expressed to him, as a Communist. This is a natural process. Do you think that practices are different in the U.S. Democratic or Republican parties?

[Khokhlov] The Russian Communist Party is operating under the flag of Russia's revival. Is a merger of the socialist idea with the national idea possible?

[Zyuganov] Our state is 1,000 years old. It has for 900 of them taken shape on the ideas of patriotism and civicism. The basis thereof has been primarily Orthodoxy. If the "moral code of the builder of communism," which has been forgotten today by many people, and the commandments of Christianity are compared, in terms of their moral essence they coincide almost fully. It is just that they are written differently: one text is in ecclesiastical language, the other, in secular language. The socialist idea took hold so easily in Russian soil because the basis of the people's existence is a collectivist, communal way of thinking. Russians have a distinctive character, and it is essential that this be taken into consideration when all transformations are being

pondered. I believe that Russia had unique conditions making it possible to blend together in the public consciousness two polar-different, at first—superficial—sight, ideas.

[Khokhlov] And, having blended, they led Russia to tragedy, to the position of the greatest of indigent states?

[Zyuganov] It is not the ideas that are to blame! The concept of equality, which led to universal wage-leveling, was interpreted wrongly and perversely primarily. Have you never wondered why the bicentenary of the Great French Revolution was so widely celebrated in prosperous France, and throughout the world, come to that? Justice, equality, fraternity—these are the highest goals of mankind.

[Khokhlov] Your forecast: Can the Communist Party in our country radically renew itself and restore its shaken authority?

[Zyuganov] We have no alternative. Unless we are reborn on a new, higher level, we will be pushed to the sidelines of political life. For this reason all the best forces of the party have now been thrown into the renewal of its program goals and their collation with present-day realities.

[Khokhlov] Do you think people are today awaiting the appearance of new "fateful" documents?

[Zyuganov] You are right: They are not. The people's trust will be obtained today only by the party that formulates and is able in practice to accomplish a minimum program of positive changes.

[Khokhlov] Do you have such a program?

[Zyuganov] Yes. We have only to infuse it with specific practical steps. Via the people's deputies, communist leaders and the party committees we have already begun to act in the economy, in the social sphere, and in the fight against crime. We need only prove this to the people in practice.

Rutskoy on Split With Communists of Russia

91UN1260A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA
in Russian No 14, 10 Apr 91 p 2

[Interview with Hero of the Soviet Union Aleksandr Rutskoy, member of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Presidium and member of the Russian CP Central Committee, by Vladislav Yanelis; place and date not given: "A Divorce in the Party Family"]

[Text] [Yanelis] It was unexpected for millions of Russian voters and evidently also for the party apparatus when at the culminating moment of the congress you forced a split in the well-formed ranks of the Communist Party of Russia. How and when did the idea of breaking with the "Communists of Russia" group come about?

[Rutskoy] Perhaps way back during the second congress, when engaged in the struggle to pass the laws on land and ownership, and in general all the more or less progressive decrees and documents, we sensed the blank opposition of the orthodox members of the CPSU. While declaring itself the defender of the interests of the working people, the Polozkov group sabotaged any step aimed at easing the lives of the people themselves. It was then that we decided to state our disagreement with the party conservatives.

[Yanelis] Who is "we"?

[Rutskoy] At that time there were several of us: communist deputies who really wanted real changes in Russia. But at first we thought suddenly that we had a mistake, that perhaps the party really should block the market, privatization, the land reform. We looked at the materials from the 19th All-Union Party Conference and the 28th CPSU Congress: Well yes, it was all there—what the radical part of the congress had said. That meant that the party was saying one thing but doing something else.

Then there is the story of the convening of the extraordinary congress. In secret from most members of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet Presidium, the six leaders plotted a palace coup. And this is taking place in the name of all the Communists, which means us also.

Moreover, people who are dealing dishonorably are being given first chance on the radio and television channels, and their appeals are being published in the central newspapers. Something that was never offered to the RSFSR Supreme Soviet chairman himself. In short, behind the "six" we sense the firm guiding hand of Staraya Ploshchad, at whose throat Russian democracy has been for a long time.

[Yanelis] Aleksandr Vladimirovich, this can be described as normal political struggle. Does the conservative part of the CPSU not have a right to its own position?

[Rutskoy] It does. But it should express it through civilized, parliamentary means, not by plotting and intrigue. And it should offer an alternative program. But there are no such programs. Instead there is aplomb: there are 16 million of us, and we are the strength.

Yes, there is strength, but not because there are 16 million of them but because the party apparatus has retained enormous powers. I am convinced that most communists do not share the destructive position that Polozkov's apparatus has taken, nor sympathize with him.

[Yanelis] Polozkov's people have described your departure from the general line as a stab in the back.

[Rutskoy] They are masters at pinning labels on people; they would do better to think about why it happened. Why the vanguard became the rearguard, why the primary party organizations are not operating anywhere,

why the CPSU has in the consciousness of millions become the main brake on perestroika.

[Yanelis] Well, and why?

[Rutskoy] There are many reasons. Because in its present form the CPSU is essentially nondemocratic. It is reminiscent rather of a military organization in which the orders are issued from the top and obeyed at bottom. Because the party, or, more accurately, its apparatus, has different goals from those of the people and is trying to hang onto power while the people want changes. And it is fatal at this time for the party to oppose these changes.

Having declared ourselves a parliamentary group we want to go the Communists of Russia with a charter and program, and in time become a mass sociopolitical organization.

[Yanelis] You are not discountenanced by the example of the quiet demise of the Democratic Platform in the CPSU?

[Rutskoy] No. The spiritually fine idea of the Democratic Platform did not find support among the masses; they did not understand it and so it was extinguished. We are trying to bring our ideas to the awareness of all rank-and-file Communists, and we are counting on their support. The goals during the first stage are to extricate us from crisis through the implementation of radical economic reform based on the Yavlinskiy-Shatalin program.

[Yanelis] Let us assume that you succeed at the next party congress in offering yourself as an alternative public organization. But you will have to define yourself with respect to the leader and express your attitude toward the present general secretary and his position. So what is this?

[Rutskoy] Gorbachev's weakness is his indecisiveness and inconsistency. He vacillates, and instead of relying on the masses he relies on the apparatus. The people sense this. I think that Gorbachev will understand this and at the critical moment make the correct choice. He cannot ignore his political feeling, and right now that feeling should be prompting the general secretary to sense that the aggressive opposition to the reforms from the CPSU is bringing it closer to its demise.

[Yanelis] It cannot be ruled out that an attempt to resuscitate the CPSU may be considered destructive, and that you will be forced to surrender your party card at the next Russian CP Central Committee plenum. Are you reconciled to this?

[Rutskoy] Not at all. I have been in the party 21 years. It was not the Communist Party of Russia that I joined. I had my party card with me in Afghanistan and I preserved it against the encroachments of enemies, and I hope that I shall preserve it against so-called like-thinkers.

Russian Front Leader Splits With Centrists

91UN1239A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 9 Mar 91 p 2

[Article by Andrey Sorokin, Moscow correspondent of SOVETSKIY MOLODEZH (Riga), specially for NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA: "Russian People's Front Quits Center Bloc": "Valeriy Skurlatov Believes That the Bloc Is Sliding to Reactionary-Right Positions" with a post-script entitled "From the 'Diplomatic Life' of the Centrists"]

[Text] Scandal

On 6 March Valeriy Skurlatov, leader of the Russian People's Front, undertook a bold maneuver against his Center Bloc associates. His complaints amount to the following:

"It has regrettably to be acknowledged that the Center Bloc has accomplished hardly any of the political tasks confronting it. The attempt to consolidate the healthy forces of society has foundered—the bloc's organizational potential leaves much to be desired. The idea of a coalition government has remained unrealized. Nor has the creation of the USSR Committee for National Salvation led to anything. In addition, a number of ill-considered harsh pronouncements by our leaders (Zhirinovskiy, in particular) has repelled from the bloc many possible allies. In our (Russian People's Front—A.S.) special statement we express concern at the bloc's slide from center to reactionary-right positions."

According to Skurlatov, the harsh statement will be followed by an organizational break—the departure of the Russian People's Front from the Center Bloc. Its plans include also the development of assertive activity for the cohesion of center forces—around the Russian People's Front this time. Skurlatov views the prospects of such activity with optimism: "In terms of its organizational potential and ability to work with the masses the Russian People's Front is not inferior to the democrats." Skurlatov hopes to find future allies, incidentally, on both flanks of the political spectrum: "They all have sufficient sober-minded figures, with whom common cause could be made on a center platform." This platform, according to V. Skurlatov, amounts to a "neo-Stolypin" economic reform, the "induction of Western civilization via communications facilities," the establishment of civil peace, and the preservation of a single state on the territory of the USSR.

In a telephone conversation with me Vladimir Voronin, chairman of the Center Bloc, declared that the situation should not be dramatized nor should Skurlatov's statements be taken too seriously.

"We have heard his complaints, but have not yet made a final evaluation. It may be said definitely merely that neither Skurlatov's action nor the departure of the Russian People's Front could seriously influence the power of the Center Bloc. What the Center Bloc is and what its

political influence is are well known to all. As far as Skurlatov is concerned, he would do well to remember the fate of such people as Ubozhko and Brumel expelled from the Center Bloc."

...Even while experiencing hard times the Center Bloc is continuing to accomplish its noble mission—diverting the venerable public from worldly concerns. On 11 March its leaders intend to hold a "roundtable" with invitations to all presidents of the country, not excluding, naturally, the main one—Mikhail Gorbachev. News of whether the invitation has been accepted by any of the presidents or other leaders of the republics and the Union has not yet been received.

P.S.

Center Bloc Chairman Vladimir Voronin maintained in one of his public speeches and in an interview with V. Gontarski, Moscow correspondent of the newspaper RZECZPOSPOLITA, that he has firm working contacts with the embassy of the Republic of Poland.

The NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA editorial office has received the following letter in this connection:

"In connection with the interview given to the newspaper RZECZPOSPOLITA by Mr. V. Voronin, chairman of the USSR Committee for National Salvation, the embassy of the Republic of Poland in Moscow declares that no employee of the embassy of the Republic of Poland has had nor has any working contacts either with Mr. V. Voronin or the Committee of National Salvation.

[signed] "Magdziak-Miszewska, counselor of the embassy of the Republic of Poland."

'Communists for Democracy' Goals Explained

91UN1264A Moscow *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA*
in Russian 10 Apr 91 p 2

[Interview with B.M. Pugachev, leader of the Russian parliamentary group "Communists for Democracy," doctor of philosophical sciences and professor at the CPSU Central Committee Academy of Social Sciences, by TASS correspondent G. Zverev in Moscow; date not given: "The Opposition in the Russian Communist Party"]

[Text] Moscow—Leaders of the Russian parliamentary group "Communists for Democracy" are making no secret of their intention to initiate a struggle against the leadership of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Communist Party. One of the authors of its program documents, B.M. Pugachev, doctor of philosophical sciences and professor at the CPSU Central Committee Academy of Social Sciences, talked about the aims and future tactics of the new-born opposition.

[Correspondent] What caused the opposition to come into being?

[Pugachev] In our view the party leadership has no effective program for extricating us from the crisis. The reason is the defeat of the creative intellectual forces in the CPSU since the 28th CPSU Congress and the entry of conservatives into the leadership of the RCP. At the last several plenums of the "big" and Russian Communist Party Central Committees there has been a retreat from the decisions of principle reached at the party congress. Let me remind you that then it was a question of the bureaucratic stratum being the main opponent of the reform initiated in society, the necessity of transferring power to the people, and the party abandoning command administrative methods in its activity.

And what has happened? Part of the party leadership has "come out of the trenches." What we have now is a neoconservative revanche.

The "Communists for Democracy" group believes that it is necessary to initiate an all-party debate regarding trust in the party leadership, and also to try to have a new CPSU congress convened, electing delegates on a democratic basis and reelecting the present Russian Communist Party leadership. A conference of communists who support the platform of the program statement of the 28th CPSU Congress will probably be held in May in Moscow. We do not intend to go down the same path as the "Democratic Platform," and we do not intend to resign from the CPSU; let the conservatives resign.

[Correspondent] Why was the opposition formed organizationally only in the Russian Congress of People's Deputies?

[Pugachev] One of our aims is to ensure firm support for communists elected legally through the republic organs of power. I note that the "Communists for Democracy" group is already quite influential: It has more than 170 RSFSR people's deputies—military people, managers of industrial enterprises, scholars, workers in the organs of internal affairs and state security. We are counting on support from several million communists, and we believe that our opposition will be especially popular among the labor collectives at industrial enterprises and among the intelligentsia.

It is very likely that the top party people will try to expel us from the CPSU, but we are acting strictly in accordance with the CPSU Rules.

United Workers Front Congress Reported

91UN1235A Moscow *NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA*
in Russian 7 Mar 91 p 2

[Article by Anna Krayevskaya and Yuliy Lebedev: "If the CPSU Falls Apart, We Will Form a Party": The Third RSFSR OFT Congress Was Held"]

[Text] On 2 and 3 March, the Third Congress of the United Workers Front (OFT) of the RSFSR was held in the holiday home Lesnye Polyany near Moscow. This is an organization that considers "advocacy of the ideals of

socialism and the interests of the working masses in our country" to be its goal. One hundred and twenty-four delegates representing 39 cities in which there are OFT chapters attended the congress.

Cochairman of the RSFSR OFT Vladimir Yakushev told a NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA correspondent: "Our congress was held against the background of a very complex, explosive situation in our country. According to the information we have, a command has been given from the West to speed up the civil war in the USSR before the 'democrats' ultimately lose influence."

However, the delegates did not see the actions of the Russian radical democrats as the only reason for a crisis which has now set in in the USSR. By a majority vote, the congress adopted a resolution demanding that both Chairman of the Russian parliament Boris Yeltsin and USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev resign. In the opinion of a number of delegates, these two leaders represent two sides of the same coin, whereas actual policy is made by the people standing behind their backs: Leonid Abalkin, Stanislav Shatalin, Pavel Bunich, and many others. In a specially adopted resolution, the delegates called for trying them before the public for letting the economy collapse, reducing the living standard of the workers, and using their official positions in order to smuggle recommendations developed by the IMF and the CIA into state programs.

Vladimir Yakushev communicated to a NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA correspondent: "I can see right through many of them. I had to deal with Yuriy Afanasyev, Vladimir Tikhonov, and Gavriil Popov in the line of duty. In this case, we will not restrict ourselves to a trial by the public only. We have enough material for a people's court as well."

By all signs, the mood of the OFT members is very resolute. While discussing a resolution on the attitude toward the 17 March referendum, many of the delegates stated that submitting a question concerning the preservation of unity of the Union is a provocation, an attempt to get the people used to the idea of the downfall of the state. However, most of the participants voted in favor of calling on the like-minded people to say "yes" to a unified Soviet state.

A special resolution of the congress envisaged setting up a "foundation for aid to the persecuted members of the OFT." As the delegates assured us, they already have such people. Yakushev declared: "Personally, I was fired from the Academy of National Economy. The situation of our organization is quite difficult. There is no money; there is no support 'from the top.' However, the people do come to us. If the CPSU ultimately falls apart, we will transform ourselves into a political party."

Indeed, after the Third OFT Congress we may say with confidence that this organization intends to ultimately break with the supreme party leadership, including the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee,

USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev himself, because he follows "an opportunistic, degenerative course."

It appears that the CPSU leaders and the "orthodox communists" belonging to the OFT have weighty reasons for being unhappy with each other. Many party leaders who are carried away by, in part, parliamentary and, in part, commercial activities have expressed repeatedly their dissatisfaction with the OFT and related organizations which noisily advocate the ideals of communism. As OFT members maintain, they were precisely the ones to come up with the initiative to hold a rally with slogans in defense of the Army and the Union in Manezh Square in Moscow on 23 February, in conjunction with which First Secretary of the CPSU Moscow City Committee Yuriy Prokofyev was forced to give up his initial proposal to hold "something in the nature of popular festivities" on that day.

At present, the OFT caters wholly to the orthodox wing of the CPSU—the movement of "communist initiative" created last year in Leningrad. However, this movement does not have sufficient funds and is hardly in a position to seriously help the OFT.

In the one and a half years of its existence, the OFT has still failed to accomplish its main task—to become a mass communist organization of workers. The number of OFT members is quite small, despite the fact that at present its chapters exist in more than 70 cities of Russia. Recently, the OFT structures have actually become increasingly intertwined with those of the "communist initiative" movement. The latter intends to hold its second congress in Leningrad in April. By all signs, at present Soviet conservatives may only count on a certain segment of the CPSU in their struggle to defend socialist ideals. So far, all attempts to create new communist public organizations have failed.

Chechen-Ingush Russian Speakers Protest

91US0440A Moscow TRUD in Russian 10 Apr 91 p 3

[Unattributed article: "They Demand Security"]

[Text] Groznyy—Against the general background of a stable sociopolitical situation in Checheno-Ingushetia, events in the Sunzhenskiy Rayon of the republic stood out in sudden relief. In the city of Karabulak and several villages there were rallies and assemblies of the Russian-speaking population. Work was halted at individual enterprises. A strike committee was formed.

The reason for the agitation was an incident that took place in Karabulak on 7 April. A. Podkolzin, inspector of the state committee for security in mining matters and ataman of the Sunzhenskiy District of the Terskiy Cosacks, died of knife wounds incurred on the street. I. Batyrov, his attacker, was arrested by law enforcement agencies.

The law enforcement agencies are refraining from commenting on events until all the circumstances are

revealed. However, representatives of the local Cossacks are inclined to see an interethnic motive in the tragic incident. They stated this to the leadership of Checheno-Ingushetia at a rally held in the city. A package of the demands of the Sunzhenskiy Cossacks was presented to the Supreme Soviet of the republic. The substance of the package was a requirement that their security be guaranteed.

By evening today passions had abated.

"The motives for the crime are being investigated by law enforcement agencies," said A. Bugayev, member of the Chechen-Ingush Supreme Soviet Presidium and chairman of the deputies commission on ethnic policy and interethnic relations, having traveled to the local area, in a conversation with a TASS correspondent, "but even now one can definitely say that this tragic event has no political or interethnic causes."

As a result of an explanatory effort, people have been convinced that it is a question of a criminal offense.

Bank Official Dismissed Over Ekho Deal

91UN1135B Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 20 Mar 91 First Edition p 3

[Article by Ya. Dubenetskiy, chairman of the board of the USSR Promstroybank: "Banker Fired for Forgery"]

[Text] According to reports by the newspaper SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA on 24 and 29 January and 19 February 1991, A.N. Shalashov, head of the Moscow Oblast administration of the USSR Promstroybank [Industrial Construction Bank], who issued an official financial guarantee in the name of the State Bank to the British company Dove Trading International, took part in the transaction between the Chelyabinsk ecological firm Ekho under the international nongovernmental fund Eternal Memory of Soldiers and the British company to sell 140 billion Soviet rubles [R] for dollars.

In fact A. N. Shalashov committed forgery. As of this moment he can no longer represent the USSR Promstroybank inasmuch as back in October 1990 he left its jurisdiction without authorization, having transferred to the RSFSR State Bank the assets, liabilities, and property of the Moscow Oblast administration pertaining to all-Union property and registered the Interregional Commercial Bank.

Such actions by A.N. Shalashov became possible in a situation of complete lack of control over the actions of commercial banks which was created at the initiative of the RSFSR State Bank on the basis of the illegal transfer of the property of state banks. Since July 1990 the RSFSR State Bank has been conducting a campaign to destroy the network of the country's large specialized banks, including Promstroybank, by way of the forced seizure of the property, capital, valuables, and documents of its branches under the appearance of transforming them into small commercial banks. In the

process it pays no attention to the Constitutions of the USSR and the RSFSR, laws of the USSR and RSFSR on property, banks, and banking activities, and the ukases of the president of the USSR dated 29 July and 12 October 1990 on the inadmissibility of destroying existing bank structures and the need to preserve all-Union state property.

This has given an opportunity to branches of Promstroybank that are not corporate bodies and do not have the right to independently dispose of state capital to consider themselves free of any control and in fact to become uncontrollable. One such example is the Moscow Oblast Promstroybank which, carrying out registration of the branch as an independent commercial bank under pressure by the RSFSR State Bank, has completely pulled itself out from under the control of Promstroybank. Having illegally disposed of all-Union property and using the forms and official seal of the Moscow Oblast administration of the USSR Promstroybank, A.N. Shalashov began to organize work at the bank according to the principle of complete license, which also led to his committing actions that clearly go beyond the bounds of the rights and powers granted to him by law. By order of Promstroybank, A.N. Shalashov is dismissed from the post he occupies.

It is troubling that such cases, which damage the national economy, may be occurring regularly under conditions of the destruction of the country's credit system and may lead to increasingly uncontrolled and inefficient use of the capital of the state and the people.

Promstroybank has repeatedly reported its position on this issue to the president of the USSR, the Supreme Soviets of the USSR and the RSFSR, and the government, and it has also resorted to the organs of the procuracy and arbitration at all levels.

Tarasov Account of Istok Raid Disputed

91UF0446A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 6 Feb 91 First Edition p 2

[Article by A. Kovalev: "A Morning and Day from the Life of Entrepreneur Artem Tarasov"]

[Text] In Saturday's issue of IZVESTIYA, A. Tarasov, manager of the foreign economic association Istok—he is also a deputy of the RSFSR and a member of the Executive Committee of the Moscow City Soviet—loudly and valiantly told us about a new offensive reaction in the country.

Starting on the morning of 27 January, law enforcement organs began to show an interest in the activity of the association that he heads. This was done, asserts A. Tarasov, in response to his bold denunciation of the insidious plans of the higher leadership of the country. The denunciations, it is true, were made a little later, during the day of 27 January. But the insidious empire delivered a retaliatory strike beforehand!

An extremely curious "report" was promulgated by our entrepreneur! And it is presented in such a way that the reader who does not compare the dates, events, and people could easily be led to the conclusion that the Kremlin is persecuting Tarasov for his civic and political courage, and because he opened the public's eyes.

However, the reader who compares the dates and facts of the "special report" will find that the actions of the law enforcement organs in the verification of certain aspects of Istok's activity began before and not after A. Tarasov's denunciation! Taking this into account, the firm house of cards carefully constructed in the "report" falls apart completely. It is not possible to refrain from citing this pearl of political misrepresentation of the chronicle of current events.

"All these actions (which began on the morning of 27 January, according to the statement by Tarasov himself—A.K.) are nothing other than a reaction (why reaction?—A.K.) to my speech of 27 January, which exposed the plans of the country's leadership to eliminate the free market economy (How is it possible to eliminate something that does not yet exist?—A.K.) and democracy in Russia."

Thus, all it took, neither more nor less, was for the law enforcement organs to become interested in Istok's affairs and democracy fell under a threat! You read such a universal accusation, which was disseminated with fantastic newspaper speed across the country by an organ of that very same "reactionary leadership"—the newspaper IZVESTIYA—and you begin to sympathize with the fighters for national prosperity. But when you compare dates, the simple question arises: But where is there in this story whose reaction it is? If the militia appeared at the Istok establishment on the morning of 27 January, but Tarasov made his "denunciations" during the day, then who is reacting to whom: The leadership of the country to Tarasov's denunciation, or Tarasov to the appearance of the militia?

Moreover, A. Tarasov's reaction is exceptional. As if, among other things (A. Tarasov writes "incidentally"), Istok's central office closed down, its employees took to their heels, and scattered briskly "by a decision of the management" on a regular winter vacation. "We practice this in our office," Tarasov explains. And, apparently, always "incidentally." In an extremely well-coordinated way the employees in the office refuse any contacts with law enforcement organs. All of this is being done despite the fact that Istok's manager received from highly-placed militia chiefs, to whom he appealed, confirmation of the authority of the militia employees.

Finally, the last thing. "You need not consider the fact that I am a people's deputy of the RSFSR," A. Tarasov says with distress in the final part of his statement. Why "need not?" The militia is obliged to consider this, and it is considering it—the statement does not cite any facts that the immunity of a deputy was violated.

The militia is checking up on the firm and its business, and it is making, or more accurately it is trying to make contact with its employees, presenting in the process properly drawn-up documents and authorizations. But A. Tarasov, it seems, believes (and this is where the main pathos of the letter is) that the right of immunity also applies to the organization he heads and to all subordinates! Thus, who is not taking whom into consideration? A militia that is not taking the immunity of the deputy into account (it has not even gone to him yet), or A. Tarasov, the manager of the foreign economic association Istok, who is not allowing any of the procedures provided for by the law?

Western Republics

Belorussian Reaction to Gorbachev Visit

Writer Pens 'Subjective' Observations

91UN1240A Minsk ZNAMYA YUNOSTI in Russian
5 Mar 91 p 1

[Article by Semen Bukchin: "We're a Fine People, Brothers...: Subjective Observations Inspired by the Meetings Between the President and Our Fellow-Countrymen"]

[Text] And so Belorussia is the most reliable bulwark of the Union. It has not yet collapsed, although it is already threatening to "renovate" itself. And, in general, we ourselves had already figured out that Belorussians are patient, industrious, wise.... But the main thing is that long ago we assimilated the values of that system which, with the solid joys of life, presented us with the unforgettable gift of—Chernobyl. Belorussia is different from the other republics. They have troubles, shootings, as well as national and ethnic conflicts. But here it is quiet. And thank God!

To be sure, the people grumble; they run around like madmen with coupons and cards. But, you know, they are getting used to it. One can get used to anything. And here it wound up with the President himself praising us for our peaceful behavior. And Comrade Dementey, sitting in the presidiums, nodded his head in agreement: "That is all true...we will not let you down...and the referendum will turn out fine here." But the comrades speaking from the rostrum each reported about things in his own bailiwick. The physician spoke about how bad matters were in the medical field, the baker—about complications with regard to rolls, and the worker...O, our worker! With proletarian determination he demands clarity: Where are our ideals? What are we to believe in? Where is the main line? Where has it suddenly gone off and hidden itself? And although he stands solid as a mountain for socialism, he nonetheless humbly makes the following request: Leave 10 percent of an enterprise's income for us; this, of course, amounts to the same thing as pilfering because a box of radio parts cannot be left unguarded for a minute.... Give us 10 percent, for Christ's sake! And perhaps you would like us to give you

the whole enterprise, brother. No, that would be impossible because that would be capitalism. And back when we were in school, we were taught about man's exploitation by man....

Their poor heads, troubled by ideological phantoms! Capitalism, socialism.... And people were not allowed to understand that these phantoms had been invented by the ruling bureaucracy in order to keep them—the plodding workers—tightly reined. When in the liberal fumes of the early period of perestroika we reveled in the thought that common human values were being placed—officially placed—above class values, ideology seemed to fade just a wee bit. But, of course, it did not depart; it merely hid in the corner and bided its time. And when it became clear that a normal life could not be constructed by means of liberal speeches and words had to be followed by real deeds, deeds which would threaten the very existence of our own bureaucracy, that's when the latter squared its shoulders.

And it was not in Moscow, nor in Vilnius, nor Tbilisi, but rather in devoted and peaceful Belorussia—amid circumstances reminiscent of the “best” hours of Brezhnev's ideological triumphs—that the President delivered his testamentary words regarding the democrats: “They reject the socialist idea, and they advocate converting society to capitalism.” And no one asked the President why it is when he goes abroad—specifically to these capitalist societies—that he asks for billions in credits and loans, why it is that it is precisely from there that we are importing products into our own poverty-stricken regions, and why it is that the citizens of these “unfortunate,” capitalistic countries are sending us packages containing meat and canned goods.

However, is it really a matter of hunger and a lack of clothing? Do we really live just to be well-fed and well-clothed? There are, after all, ideas. It is these ideas which are dearest of all because we were brought up on them. Was it not indeed in the name of an idea that Pavlik Morozov turned in his father, “who had been aiding the kulaks?” And was it not in the name of this idea that our lads perished in Afghanistan?

We can understand when a writer who has enjoyed the good things of the system, in speaking out at a meeting with the President, creates the following impressive image: Somebody's grandson breaks a toy, but is it really necessary for someone to fix it? It's time to fix the socialist toy! We can understand this writer....

But what about you, the proletarian who tore the shirt he was wearing, who did this to the approving applause of his comrades and the condescendingly satisfied smiles of the solidly reliable peasants from the presidium? Is everything already clear to you? Because, after all, you have not lived under socialism or capitalism. Neither have I. All of us have been bound by a miserable, wretched system of distribution and coupons. But we both know that things are bad **here**, and good **there**. Because nobody is in any hurry to rush to our country

from there, whereas if the border were opened **from here to there**, millions of people would rush over. Although, of course, life is far from simple there either.... But at least no one is calling upon them as follows: “Forward, to the victory of capitalism!”

And people are always frightening you and me with the following thought: You will fall into the paws of “private capital,” the grasp of the “shadowy world” of the “underground entrepreneur,” and then you will howl in pain. My dear friend! We have long been in the grasp of these very “paws.” Both our “private capital” and our “underground entrepreneur” are constituted by our very own state system, one which keeps us at low wages, in the midst of empty stores and embittered, resentful crowds. But tell me in good conscience, you young worker who has demanded that some sort of precise ideological line be promulgated, do you really and truly believe that Gavril Popov, a world-class economist, a genuine member of the Russian intelligentsia, who has been elevated to the post of chairman of the Moscow City Soviet by a democratic wave (rather than by apparatchik-type ploys), wants to establish some kind of “wolfish capitalism” in our country? And does he believe that Yeltsin also thirsts after this—Yeltsin who gave up his party card, Yeltsin who could have fully enjoyed all the good things of the party's bureaucratic “Olympus,” and not literally risk his own life?

In 1917 a successful attempt was made to set the workers against the nation's brains—the intelligentsia, the democratic intelligentsia. Well now, what are we going to do now that “these blabbers and demagogues” have shown up again? All the more so in that these “reptiles” in eyeglasses and caps are receiving salaries for studying where “a” instead of “o” should be written in Belorussian....

But we cannot yet completely “squash” these “four-eyed” types if we wish to survive. Because the people's age-old belief in the following saying is still strong:

Here comes the master;

The master will judge between us....

And we continue to weep and wail. The medical man complains about his own bailiwick, the baker about his, and the lathe-operator about his. And the President writes everything down in his notebook. How could he fail to help such a peaceful people? So much radiation is pouring into his head that he suffers. But is he not a fine young fellow? Here now, some five years later we can begin to think about some genuine aid, to assemble a cabinet of ministers and to consult with the comrades....

Moreover, the people may be able to provide some helpful hints. Ilich, after all, taught us that we should consult with the people. Peasant men and women crowded around the President on the streets of some village; they would make such a racket that they could not understand him. And he would lecture them strictly in something like the following way: You have to decide

whether you can continue to live here or not. It would be as if the people were struck dumb for a couple of seconds. They, the people, thought that the President knew everything. But it turns out that "Uncle Antos" himself must determine how best to cope with the problem of radiation....

But, in general, it is simple to solve problems. The main thing is to have a presidium with important comrades dressed in nice suits and wearing deputies' badges. Standing at the rostrum should be a wrathful speaker demonstrating the top-priority truth as to how badly things are going with regard to nuts and bolts in his production area. The auditorium, naturally, is filled with members of the apparat. Located on the other side of the walls are the people, paying attention to the loudspeaker. May glasnost proceed full-speed ahead....

People listen.... The President notes things down.... And life is almost boiling! And the people are fine, good-natured, and industrious. They do not construct barricades, nor do they fight against the OMON [special purpose militia detachments]. It would be a sin not to help such a people....

Article Draws Readers' Response

91UN1240B Minsk ZNAMYA YUNOSTI in Russian
30 Mar 91 p 2

[Letters to the Editor: "Just What of a People Are We?: Responses to Semen Bukchin's Article, 'We're a Fine People, Brothers...' (ZNAMYA YUNOSTI, 5 March 1991)"]

[Text] Dear ZNAMYA YUNOSTI Editors!

Thank you, thank you, thank you!!! My thanks are for Semen Bukchin's article entitled "We're a Fine People, Brothers..." And, in general, thanks that your newspaper exists and that you exist. Good health and courage to you. Right on, brothers! We need you.

One of your constant women readers, Z. PETROVICH

Minsk

Hello, Editor Aleksandr Klaskovskiy!

Just a few lines from the boondocks, from the lowest strata of the common people, from a simple woman on a pension. I have subscribed to the newspaper ZNAMYA YUNOSTI for many years now; I subscribe to many publications. I have considered your newspaper (Do not be insulted now) as very average or run-of-the-mill. But today I wept for a long time, and I decided to write to you concerning the issue of 5 March 1991. I have a "complaint" against Semen Bukchin, the author of the article entitled "We're a Fine People, Brothers..." He has copied my thoughts word for word, and he is simply a "plagiarist." Well, never mind, even though they are my thoughts, my thanks go to him and a deep bow to you.

You should know how the intelligentsia and the common people wept while watching Gorbachev's arrival and visit on television. We who were not killed off or utterly smashed by the Fascists, stupefied by ideology, corrupted by the powers that be, hungry, and ill.... In the West they write about us as follows: steel teeth, stooped backs, protruding bellies—the portrait of people building communism. We who have lost our own language and culture, as well as culture in general, we who were not killed off by the Chernobyl disaster met the President. For what purpose? In order to be able to "threaten our foes from here." It is safe from here because there is no longer anyone left to revolt; everything has been utterly smashed. And the people of my native republic were asked about their attitudes toward Yeltsin, Popov, and other "so-called" leaders.

But who is inquiring here in our republic as to how we regard the mostly ALIEN Belorussian Supreme Soviet? Some of them sit and dream various things, while others smirk behind their moustaches. Come on, come on, Poznyak, seek out the truth, we will give you liberty and land.... And here we have a scene staged for the people: The President lands from his airplane. There is an assembly of like-minded persons (virtually everyone in the auditorium looks the same).... By means of deception—just as in the all the previous 73 years of the Soviet regime—they want to obtain a "Yes" vote for the regime in power, for the "feeding-trough," i.e., for sinecures, for missiles, as well as for the struggle against "capitalism and imperialism."

That is what people are thinking and talking about. And for the first time we have seen an expression of human pain in the human article printed in your issue of 5 March. Thank you.

GETMANCHUK

Drogichin.

Esteemed Comrades!

I have read through Semen Bukchin's repulsive and libellous lampoon (it cannot be called anything else).... Its author suffers greatly from a nostalgia for extremism. For example, he says: "Belorussia differs from the other republics. The latter have troubles, shootings, as well as national and ethnic conflicts. But here in Belorussia things are quiet." And it may be seen that the author would like things here in our republic to resemble the state of affairs in the Baltic region, or Georgia, etc. It may be seen that Semen is a lover of trouble, of the people's wrath, and generally of destructive manifestations in society. That is to say, he has a Yeltsin-like nature! Because, after all, it is not without reason that he complains about N.I. Dementey for not being as bold as Yersh, the Russian adventurer.... This author's endeavor has absolutely no connection with the tasks confronting the entire Soviet people with regard to bringing about the necessary order, peace, tranquility, and consolidation.

Veteran of the Great Patriotic War and Labor, still working-pensioner VOLKOV, Ignatiy Dementyevich

Brest.

Hello, Semen Bukchin!

I have just finished reading your article, and I am writing to you immediately. I fully support your evaluation of the President's visit to Belorussia.... I am ashamed of our Belorussian leaders, if they can be termed that at all. I rely very much of the prediction of Globa—who is well-known to you—that our own Belorussian leader will appear, albeit only after three years. I am not opposed to living together in a union with Russians, Ukrainians, Lithuanians, and other peoples, but it would have to be a union whereby each people or nation would dispose of its own good things and resources as it saw fit and would be the master of its own land. I do not believe that an easily or superficially "renovated" Union would be of this type.... And so we must choose: Either split up into separate republics or return to slavery under a "master." There is no third course. Just what shall we do?

DENISHCKIK, Sergey

Novolukoml.

Dear Young People!

It was with enormous interest that I read through Semen Bukchin's article on the "fine brothers." As a worker myself, I am ashamed of certain "Stakhanovites" and "pacemakers." We have had enough grief from such "conscientious workers." But it seems that they do not have much time left in which to help certain "servants of the people" to control the ball.

P.S. I am going to subscribe to ZNAMYA YUNOSTI.

V.A. GAVRILYUK

Minsk.

Hello, Comrade Journalists!

Or are you no longer our comrades? Perhaps the word "lords" or "masters" would be more pleasing to your ears. Semen Bukchin tried his best. And just where did Klaskovskiy pick up such a staff member? I glanced through your newspaper during Gorbachev's visit to Belorussia. I glanced through it and was amazed: There was no boorishness, everything was accurate and worthy of note. Well now, I thought to myself, a miracle has occurred: ZNAMYA YUNOSTI has been reborn. But no, I had rejoiced too prematurely.... Bukchin's idea had finished baking. And this idea was so hateful to him that he has even dragged in a child [Pavlik Morozov] whose little bones turned to dust a long time ago. And this

child's own father betrayed him at a certain point in time. But in Bukchin's article everything was turned upside down. But perhaps he has not read enough in his own life or, in general, was poor in his studies. Somehow poor Bukchin's logic is deficient.

P. PROKOPENKO

Gomel.

Esteemed ZNAMYA YUNOSTI Editors!

Thank you very much for Semen Bukchin's article. I am delighted with this man; he is bold, truthful, just, and decisive. At the present time, when the apparat has raised its head again, and the censorship is closing mouths, this article is timely.... Order in our country's Union will come about when the Supreme Soviet's deputies comprise 70 percent workers and kolkhoz members and 30 percent members of the apparat. And then the people's laws will be adopted.

With a worker's greeting, V. SHAKOVSKIY

P.S. I am 53 years of age.

Gomel.

"Mister" Semen Bukchin!

I do not know who your ancestors were, but the fact that you are a lousy piece of filth is patently obvious from your libellous lampoon.... Ivan Chigrinov is paid quite well for his work because he is a famous writer. But you, you wretched scribbler, obviously could not earn more than 300 rubles for your stinking notes. And so it is really envy that is driving you. What are you calling for, you Judas? The time will come when this peaceful people will settle accounts with you and people like you, no matter where you hide or what you do. You will not be able to go anywhere because talentless people such as you are not needed abroad either.

With a pavagay, [?]

Yazep PADGORNYY

Osipovich.

Esteemed Editors!

Many thanks to you for publishing the article entitled "We're a Fine People, Brothers..." I understand why these observations were termed "subjective." Until quite recently they would have forced their author to take a long trip and without any comforts. Even now, it seems to me, you will have some unpleasantness.

Yes, the USSR President has found yet another highly placed rostrum or forum in this declining Union from

which he can again fearlessly threaten the democrats with his fists. It is bitter and insulting, painful and shameful for us all and for our much-suffering nation. And, at the same time, however, I would like to state the following: we actually need such a thing in order to prevent a feeling of quietude and gratitude from being created in our Belorussian bogs. All the more so in that promises have been made to "take another look" and providing us with aid. But we really do not need aid. Word of honor. Because, of course, we still have some bread here. And Belorussians do not need much more. They will applaud even this. After all, they applaud even those political leaders of our republic who have not taken the trouble to learn their own native language in order to speak it at sessions of the Supreme Soviet....

To tell the truth, it is difficult to believe that there can be any profound changes. For centuries Belorussia's oppressed people have not known any better life, and the most dreadful thing is that they do not want to struggle for it. Just remember such sayings as the following: "But who would want to go there....," "I am a Belorussian peasant," etc. The only salvation for us is the example of Russia and the Ukraine. If the cause starts moving there, then there will be no place for us to hide from it either.

Excuse my bitterness.

V. KOZLOVSKIY

Pinsk.

Of course, S. Bukchin has the right to his own opinion and to his own observations. But if they are permeated with a feeling of hatred for humanity, a scorn for the Belorussian people and its history, and if they are "ornamented" with sensationalistic outbursts of a completely discernible ethnic nature, then their place is on the pages of a Zionist publication rather than in a Belorussian newspaper for young persons.

G.A. SANKO

Minsk.

You know how to get precisely to the point without necessarily conveying it in so many words. That is the way it is written in this article, and you could not have stated it better or more intelligently. Many thanks to the author for stating our thoughts on the pages of a popular newspaper. Having read through this article in our collective, all of us—even the Communists—support what was written in it 100 percent.... Good gracious, dear young journalists, all our hopes in this life reside in you, and we will support you. We must somehow remake our life.

With respect for your newspaper,

ZHIGLINA, I.N.

Minsk.

Poor, Poor Comrade Bukchin!

Have you not fallen ill from grief? We should have a score of corpses, just as they do in dear Lithuania! We should be like Russia's parliament, where Boris [Yeltsin's] hangers-on scold and curse the USSR President. That is the way it should be in Belorussia too! It would be balm for your heart. Oh, you! Say a good word for the President—you bureaucrat, you partocrat.... Yes, Mikhail Sergeyevich when he considered us as people. But he forgot that no good deed remains unpunished, and this is clearly attested by the behavior of Boris's poor fellow and by your utterances.... Yes, I regret that I subscribed to ZNAMYA YUNOSTI. It would not be such a bad idea to be more objective, just, and equitable. We are indeed a fine people. It is just that you are a typical representative of the past, ready to spit upon anything that does not suit you. Such a bold fellow; one reads your article and is nauseated. Well, you have chosen your Gavriils and Borises; what now? Cite just one useful deed that they have accomplished! Who is hindering them from doing what they want? And Belorussia, of course, is the most reliable bulwark supporting the Union because, fortunately, there are no more people like you here.

A.I. DOMORATSKAYA

Vitebsk.

Esteemed Editors!

I want very much to express my heartfelt gratitude to Semen Bukchin for his article. It contains essential truth, justice, honesty, honor, and objectivity. My wife and I—old people living on pensions—read it over several times and wept bitterly. How could it happen that in 1991 there are severe shortages of pearl-barley, shorts, socks, etc., that there are no available mugs, spoons, basins, tureens, and everything without which we cannot live? Just who is to blame? When reading this article we recalled how we used to dream when we were with the partisans, and then in Austria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, liberating the peoples of these countries from Fascism. Our only dream was how happy life would be for those who remained alive. Almost 50 years have elapsed. What can we brag about to our children and grandchildren? Poverty, degradation.... We certainly do not agree with Bukchin that his observations are subjective. No! These are the thoughts of the absolute majority of all honest and honorable persons. If you asked them, 95 percent of the population would affix their own signatures to this article. It is just a great pity that nobody has reacted to your newspaper's honest materials. Or are the top brass to blame, and are they spitting on all the people's sufferings and misfortunes?

M.G. BRITAN

Vitebsk.

* * *

After the war things were difficult: There were people without clothes or shoes, and they were hungry. But their spirits did not droop; they worked, sang, laughed—and they built cities, plants, and factories. They did not weep, nor did they ask for handouts; they were proud people. Perhaps they did not build too well, but there was a great scarcity of scientists and trained engineers after the war. Most of the people working in this area were practical employees—trained on the job. Everybody lived in friendship and helped each other. But nowadays.... I observed people standing in line for sheets and nightgowns. I saw an acquaintance of mine and asked her why she was standing there. Because, after all, she already had 20 new sheets (she herself had boasted to me about it). And, you know, one sheet lasts six years, so even for two beds that's enough for 60 years.... And with regard to foodstuffs too: Where are there so many fat persons as here in our republic? People do not eat enough vegetables; they eat just meat and sausage. No one anywhere eats as much meat as we do here (just like wolves). And it is for that reason that the organism wears out rapidly.... My 100-year-old neighbor stated the following: "The mistake that the Bolsheviks made was to teach people how to read, chatter, and write, but they failed to teach them to be responsible for their own actions, to work well, and to be worthy masters of their own state."

Signature illegible

Molodechno.

* * *

Esteemed Editors!

I read through S. Bukchin's article in your newspaper, and I was stupefied: These are my own thoughts! Only they lie deep within me; they are not something that one shares with just anyone, even though most people also think and discuss things among themselves. Still, it is somewhat frightening; authorities do not take jokes lightly....

Some persons would even like to return to the period of stagnation. But they do not know that that the "poverty level" has been reached by the sale of our country's extremely abundant (but not infinite) resources, that our non-reimbursable foreign aid has gone to support dictatorial regimes—those that hamper the backward countries from moving forward along the highway of civilization which our President is fond of mentioning. I am a Russian who has been living in Belorussia for approximately 20 years. I feel sorry for Belorussia. When tourists arrive here from other republics or countries with their eyes closed, they cannot always figure out where they are—in Ryazan or Ufa....

And, finally, something about the working class. Workers should know that their well-being and prosperity, as well as the upgrading of their living standards,

depends upon the work of the intelligentsia, the sensible and intelligent organizers of production (they themselves are certainly not capitalists), rather than on political babblers.

Thank you for the fine article!

V.I. BEREZIKOV

Minsk.

...And a Commentary by the Author of the Original Article

Well now, all this is normal and as it should be.... As a certain party intellectual once expressed it, "an incoherence of opinions is present." Some readers understood and shared the bitter irony of my observations. Others viewed them as a "slandorous lampoon of our people" and even a "call for civil war." Some saw the author as a fellow-conversationalist "who had guessed" their own thoughts. Others demand that the newspaper continue the usual style of ideological instructions which have been dinned into our brains for decades. A third group, following this same habit, scold me and attempt to enroll me in the well-known group of "enemies." From one and the same city I was reviled and approved of.... This is a mirror of our society. Shall we look at it or turn away in dissatisfaction?

In any case, my duty as a writer is to look at it somewhat more attentively. And here is what I see in this reflection. I see a normal human being who—with difficulty—is piercing through the ideological stupefaction, through the dense layers of slogan-type cliches which have poisoned the mind for many long years. He does not yet completely trust himself, this person of ours; he is afraid of admitting even to himself that he thinks this way. Nevertheless, he takes out a sheet of paper and writes to the editors. Because it is unbearable, because it is hard to remain alone with his own uneasy thoughts. And problems, problems.... And how did life get to be like this? And what will happen next? Let us try to provide some answers....

Hundreds of causes form the answer to the first question. Yes, it was convenient to have History at our disposal in our land, History, which does not know the subjunctive mood. Quite a bit is being written about this nowadays by intelligent journalists, philosophers, and historians. It is something for the thinking person to take seriously.... But within this ganglion of causes I would like to single out one factor—the elimination of private property—something which led to the elimination of the human being as a creator. More than one Western country has known totalitarian regimes, but non-eliminated private property placed France on democratic rails during the 19th century, as well as Germany, Greece, and Chile during the 20th century. Property ownership, by safeguarding, preserving, and developing itself, creates laws which, albeit not ideal, are, in any case, acceptable for human existence (here, as elsewhere, the legislators and the employees manifested themselves). But in our

country the so-called nationwide, state-type of property ownership became the property ownership of the "new class," i.e., the bureaucracy, which, naturally, does not wish to give up its own rights to such property. These rights are essentially its guarantors of power and authority. It is understood that the "rights to possess property" here are not formulated directly; they are provided and ensured by a distinctive cadre-type system, a bureaucratic hierarchy which has enmeshed, entangled, and permeated all cells of the country. And, of course, the ideological stupefaction and intimidation has not ceased for a single day. Just as before, the old, class-type clichés are "on the march"....

So what should we do? How are we to break away from or disrupt this hellish, whirling spiral with its Chernobyls, injustices, diseases, poverty, coupons, and shortages?

In his own time Georgiy Plekhanov said that a socialist revolution in Russia would be possible only when the proletariat became the majority of the population in this country. Otherwise, the revolution would be premature. By paraphrasing this first Russian Marxist, we may say that changes for the better in our country are now possible only when the majority of the population analyzes its dead-end situation and ceases to be the object of ideological manipulations. When our people learn how to vote—and not just thoughtlessly—in elections.... Perhaps then we will be able to form a Supreme Soviet which is not mostly alien to us. In short, the democratic movement, a movement for genuine changes, needs organization.

Read through the letters printed above once again. People are drawn to each other. They are tormented by loneliness and a feeling of defenselessness, i.e., of being without protection. And even those persons who furiously scold me and call for "instituting the necessary order"—even these persons, by their own malice and longing for the "correct" past, essentially reveal their own isolation and unhappiness. Only, in contrast to the others, they hide their unhappiness either behind scolding and cursing or behind the "mole" of ideological instructions. However, the latter sometimes produce a "reverse effect." The reader from Molodechno cites the interesting testimony of his 100-year-old acquaintance: It turns out that the Bolsheviks failed to teach the people how to work, how to be a master or owner.... Perhaps we can understand each other. I think that even Yazep Podgorny from Osipovich, a person who scolded me so severely, is still not without hope of redemption. After a stream of abuse he nevertheless writes: "Z pavagay" [?]. It is completely possible that even G.A. Sanko, the person from Minsk who suffered from fears of Zionist intrigues, has been relieved....

I think that that stiff ideological gruel which is now boiling in our heads is already the remnants of that mixture which was poured into us when we were of Pioneer age. It is a serious disease but not fatal. Therefore, let us not give in to the provocations of those

persons who frighten us with the specter of a civil war. There is really nothing for us to fight about or over, workers against engineers, students against officers.... The television tower in Vilnius was assaulted not by workers or students, but rather by military servicemen. They were the victims of the political machinations of all those defenders of the decayed and thoroughly rotten System. And if something more still happens, it will not be a civil war, but rather a military suppression of the people by the regime. It is a common story.... Gavriil Popov spoke about this in a recent interview published in KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA.

...Our common path to enlightenment is a difficult one. But we must traverse it. There is no other way out or solution here in our country.

Semen BUKCHIN

Belorussian Constitutional Changes Intended To Promote Economic Reform

91UN1155A Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA
in Russian 14 Mar 91 p 1

[Law of the Belorussian SSR: "Revisions and Additions to the Belorussian SSR Constitution (Basic Law)"]

[Text] For the purpose of supporting the further development of the economic transformations being implemented in the republic the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet resolves:

To make to the Belorussian SSR Constitution (Basic Law) the following revisions and additions:

1. In Section 2 "Economic System":

—to make the paragraph three of Article 10 read:

"The land, its interior, waters, the vegetable and animal worlds in their natural state and the air space over the territory of the republic are the property of the Belorussian SSR, are within the jurisdiction of the soviets of people's deputies and are made available for use by the citizens and enterprises, establishments and organizations.

"The possession, use and disposal of the said natural resources are regulated by laws of the Belorussian SSR and may not be realized to the detriment of the Belorussian people";

—to make paragraphs one and two of Article 11 read:

"Private property is the personal property of the citizens and is used for the satisfaction of material and spiritual requirements and the independent exercise of economic and other activity not prohibited by law.

"Any property of a consumer and production purpose acquired with earned income and on other legitimate grounds, except for the types of property whose ownership by the citizens is prohibited, may be privately owned";

—to make Articles 12, 13 and 17 read:

“Article 12. The property of leased enterprises, collective enterprises, cooperatives, joint-stock companies, economic organizations and other associations is collective property.

“Grounds for the emergence of collective property are determined by laws of the Belorussian SSR.”

“Article 13. Property of the Belorussian SSR and the property of administrative-territorial formations (communal property) is state property in the Belorussian SSR.”

“Article 17. Economic and other activity based on the personal labor of the citizens and members of their families and also on the use of the labor of other citizens are permitted in the Belorussian SSR in accordance with the law.”

II. In Section 7 “The Belorussian SSR—Union Republic Within the USSR” to make Clause 12 of Article 70 read:

“12) representation of the Belorussian SSR in international relations; the Belorussian SSR’s relations with foreign states and international organizations; foreign economic activity based on a single currency and monetary system.”

III. In Section 12 “Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet”:

—to supplement Clause II of Article 97 after the words “Chief state arbitrator of the Belorussian SSR” with the words “Chairman of the board of the Belorussian SSR National Bank”;

—in Article 102:

—to supplement paragraph one with the words “National Bank of the Belorussian SSR”;

—to make paragraph two read:

“The right of legislative initiative in the person of republic bodies is enjoyed by unions and associations of commercial banks and public associations and also the Belorussian SSR Academy of Sciences”;

—to supplement Article 105 with Clause 8¹, reading as follows:

“8¹) confirms the deputy chairmen and members of the board of the National Bank of the Belorussian SSR”;

—to supplement Clause 4 of Article 108 with the words “Chairman of the board of the National Bank of the Belorussian SSR”;

—to supplement paragraph two of Article 110 after the words “board of the State Arbitration Tribunal of the Belorussian SSR” with the words “and the board of the National Bank of the Belorussian SSR.”

N. Dementey, chairman,
Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet.
Minsk, 27 February 1991.

Kravchuk on Leadership Role, Parliament, Yeltsin

91UN1153A Kiev KOMSOMOLSKOYE ZNAMYA
in Russian 2 Mar 91 pp 4-5, 5 Mar 91 pp 4-5

[Interview with L.M. Kravchuk, chairman of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet, by V. Dolganov and I. Pogorelova: “I Will Not Abandon My Convictions”—Two Meetings With the Chairman”; place and date not given]

[2 Mar 91, pp 4-5]

[Text] Discussion concerning an interview for our newspaper with Chairman of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet L.M. Kravchuk went on for a long time. But first Leonid Makarovich was very busy, and then we published an extensive account of the republic leader’s press conference... All in all, it just did not come about. For that reason, therefore, when our discussion did take place it was thorough and covered diverse topics.

[KOMSOMOLSKOYE ZNAMYA] On the day the parliament was discussing the problem of conducting the referendum on the Union treaty, you proposed your own alternative version, a measure many people did not anticipate. Did this concept emerge spontaneously during the course of discussion, or was it worked out beforehand?

[Kravchuk] It was impromptu. The fact is, (as you are probably aware) the opinions of the deputies were divided. Most of them advocated either supporting the resolution of the Supreme Soviet Presidium that two questions be presented, or proposing that the referendum not be conducted at all. This is the first point. Secondly, in analyzing the situation I understood that a confrontation could arise. We had to look for another way of resolving the problem. I felt intuitively that the deputies would vote neither for one resolution nor the other. And as things turned out, there were 135 votes for the resolution of the Presidium and 181 for the resolution of the majority. In other words, neither version was adopted. People began to doubt whether the Supreme Soviet was capable of making serious decisions.

[KOMSOMOLSKOYE ZNAMYA] So all the time you were thinking about how to escape this dilemma?

[Kravchuk] Absolutely. About how to find a compromise decision. I believed now was not the time to get into a conflict with the USSR Supreme Soviet. Especially since it would be a useless conflict. After all, it would be necessary to assemble the USSR Supreme Soviet in order to repeal that decision. And if they put this to a vote, you would have the same spread of deputies you see everywhere nowadays—those on the right, those on the left, and a certain segment in the center. And it would all turn into a long and unnecessary political game. The result would be unpredictable, or more accurately, we could say that everything would remain as it had been. I therefore introduced my own proposal which, I believe, is quite well-founded. We are not interfering in the jurisdiction of the USSR Supreme Soviet, but at the

same time we are expressing our will, our sovereign right to have our own text, which we will present to the Ukrainian people. Thirdly, both texts support the Union. It is just that one version reflects one form of Union, our text reflects another. We are asserting our right to build a Union as we understand the concept, so that all of our rights will be preserved and all these rights will be respected. What we are talking about is the right to structure a Union according to our vision, not to tear the Union apart.

[KOMSOMOLSKOYE ZNAMYA] Leonid Makarovich, can you predict right now in some way the results of the referendum?

[Kravchuk] Yes, why not. The majority will support the Union. But I cannot say right now what kind of Union. Because the level of legal expertise of our people is not yet adequate. People are indeed in favor of the Union, but to get into the specifics of whether it will be a confederation, federation... This is something for the legal, political, and sociological experts. But we see an additional nuance here—that the form of Union we propose springs from our right and opens up opportunities for parties to conduct their own propaganda work, elaborate their own positions. I would expect there will be competition, alternative courses, but in principle discussion will center around the Union and people will end up voting for the Union.

[KOMSOMOLSKOYE ZNAMYA] You touched on this problem somewhat at your recent press conference. But you did not state what kind of future Union you foresaw. We titled our report "The Union. But What Kind?" Can you name those functions right now which you personally would delegate in the name of the republic to the center?

[Kravchuk] Well, these functions have already been identified. We discussed this question in the Supreme Soviet. The Council of Ministers presented its concept, its vision of which powers we would be able to delegate to the center. This discussion took place at the end of the last session.

[KOMSOMOLSKOYE ZNAMYA] Yes, but heated discussion arose here as you recall. Concerning transportation in particular. What would you do personally as a political figure?

[Kravchuk] We must distribute and delegate what is possible. But there are thorny issues—transportation, for example. We have transportation by rail, air, and sea, and we have the pipelines. All of this must be studied and specific solutions found.

[KOMSOMOLSKOYE ZNAMYA] But distribution can be effected in various ways. You can transfer to the center for exercising authority, or you can transfer altogether. The railroads can be put under the direction of the center, or they can be handed over altogether. One is

a matter of the main line belonging to the Ukraine, the other—to the center. In the second instance, they could simply close it off.

[Kravchuk] Well, no. Another question must be taken into consideration here. The railroad runs to us from across Russia. How will Russia act? If our neighbors say that the rail communications and pipelines belong to them, then it is clear we are not even dealing with the center, but rather with Russia, in that sphere where communications runs across its territory. If the Belorussians say that transportation is theirs, we develop reciprocal relations with the Belorussians. In other words, until such time as we reach an agreement of principle in Moscow and work out an overall approach, nothing will develop. Each entity will pursue its own policy. But the principle must be—what is in our land is ours. Therefore, a transfer to the center does not by any means entail a loss of the right of ownership.

[KOMSOMOLSKOYE ZNAMYA] Yes, you emphasized this at the press conference as well...

[Kravchuk] And I emphasize it again. Rights are not given away in their entirety, especially if this were to deny a republic the right of ownership. They are delegated. It is stated precisely in our Declaration on State Sovereignty and on Priority of Republic Laws that the land, the depths of the earth, and all the wealth of the Ukraine belong to the Ukrainian people. And so discussion centers around the matter of delegating. And delegating (what you were speaking about) presupposes a transfer of directive rights to the center for action within its authority. We already see this today. If the Cabinet of Ministers adopts one resolution or another, it stipulates: "Within the framework of our authority." The mechanism of interaction is beginning to function. But this question has not yet been conclusively resolved. Efforts are presently underway here. Although I would emphasize that the Supreme Soviet already has an approach. And our Council of Ministers has taken up a position which I support—that authority be transferred proceeding from expediency considerations. We must also take processes of integration into account.

[KOMSOMOLSKOYE ZNAMYA] On the other hand, on the day we had our discussion with you, Central Television reported that agreement had already been reached in the talks on drawing up a Union treaty as to which powers the republics would transfer to the center. To be quite honest about it, this was quite a blow to us. It seems to us that the Union treaty, in the version which was proposed by the president, completely abrogates the idea of Ukrainian state sovereignty.

[Kravchuk] I would put it this way. As civilized people, we read newspapers and watch television, but only take resolutions seriously. So if there is a resolution of the USSR Supreme Soviet or the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet on these issues—that alone can be considered documentary, a position proper. All the rest is supposition. You must take into account a peculiarity of our times—

that the newspapers will try to provide timely information. And this is only proper. But they are in too much of a hurry in a number of instances and present an issue as being decided when it is not. For example, A. Shulga, who is in Moscow on behalf of the Ukraine, cannot decide issues for the republic.

[KOMSOMOLSKOYE ZNAMYA] No one has given him such powers...

[Kravchuk] Absolutely not. Even the chairman of the Supreme Soviet (although the Constitution states that his signature ratifies treaties and agreements with other states) would not be able to assume such responsibility. I personally would not assume it. I myself would not sign a document of such scope when we are talking about the Ukraine and its people. Not because of some fear on my part, but simply because I understand the significance of this question. I want the Supreme Soviet, the Ukrainian people themselves, to decide it. Even if it were entirely within my rights to decide the document, I would again request authority from the people.

[KOMSOMOLSKOYE ZNAMYA] Can what you have just said be considered a response to the question as to why you have so seldom been in Moscow for talks on the Union treaty?

[Kravchuk] I want the professionals to do this work, the people who must tally everything up during the preliminary stage from the legal, political, and economic points of view. For no single individual is a specialist in all spheres, whose word can be considered the final say in all areas. There was a time when the chairman or first secretary could speak "in the name of the people" and would have his own point of view respecting all issues. And this was the single correct point of view—in the sphere of linguistics, in the sphere of law, in the cultural sphere, in the sphere of literature... No one reckoned with the laws at that time. And a decision was taken which was to the liking of just one individual. I do not want this to be repeated. I assert, not merely in words but in actions as well, that I am against such a style and method. If I say one thing but do another—you yourself understand...

[KOMSOMOLSKOYE ZNAMYA] Of course. You are presently in the public eye across the entire republic. By the way, will the Fifth Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet resolve anything?

[Kravchuk] I do not relate to those who advocate dissolution of the congress, of the session. These are the extremists. But I do take into account the particular features of the period. Until such time as a Union treaty is concluded and authority is precisely demarcated, I would not be in any rush to generate all-Union laws or resolutions. The fact of the matter is—and M.S. Gorbachev spoke about this at the Council of the Federation—when we decide the question of separation of powers, that is when the question of implementation of laws will be decided. This is an issue of principle. Only our laws are valid in the Ukraine. But within the

framework of powers which are transferred or delegated, Union laws are in effect. In that case, the USSR Supreme Soviet must adopt laws for the appropriate spheres of jurisdiction. At present this body is adopting them for the entire country. Republic parliaments are doing so for their peoples, guided by their declarations. Herein lies the essence of the "war of laws." They do not take account of the fact that there are republic parliaments which have the right to adopt their own laws. In response to this, republics do not reckon with the USSR Supreme Soviet. Therefore, we must not rush into things. We must stop and think, develop principles. For after a Union treaty is signed, if we reach precise agreement on powers, a great deal will have to be reviewed.

[KOMSOMOLSKOYE ZNAMYA] The "bundle" of laws adopted over the previous four sessions shows clearly that the majority of these are simply pieces of paper...

[Kravchuk] And we should not assume that deputies elected from the Ukraine are representing the interests of the Ukrainian people. That would be a mistake, one we often repeat—"our" deputies there in Moscow have voted, as it were, and this is the position of the people.

[KOMSOMOLSKOYE ZNAMYA] Leonid Makarovich, you have anticipated our question. But we will ask it all the same. Do USSR people's deputies from the Ukraine represent our republic?

[Kravchuk] By no means. They represent the interests of the organ to which they were elected. They are all together there, there in the Congress and Supreme Soviet. This is a unified organ of the country. Only the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet represents the Ukraine. It is a delusion that "our" deputies were there, voted there, and that this is the opinion of the Ukrainian people.

[KOMSOMOLSKOYE ZNAMYA] You know, we had occasion to speak with a deputy from the Ukraine in the Kremlin when the situation in the country had gotten particularly bad. We will not divulge his name. We found out he was absolutely convinced it would only be necessary to "arrest" certain regions (having in mind the Baltics in this instance, and the Western Ukraine)—and everything would be fine. Introduce troops there and everything would fit into place. It also seems to us that these individuals have been to a great extent cut off from the Ukraine, cut off from our problems. They live there in Moscow basically. In addition, many of them represent their own social organizations.

[Kravchuk] Yes. Working within the framework of this organ, they close ranks somehow and operate in the framework of their authority and that of the particular organ of power.

[KOMSOMOLSKOYE ZNAMYA] So do you get a collective of sorts?

[Kravchuk] Yes, a collective. Certain general interests appear, certain characteristic functions. They live their

own internal political life. You have the family, and you have the community—and these do not always jell. Thus, the Ukrainian parliament represents our republic; and not individual oblasts. We have to find interaction in this regard. Interaction can be effected on the basis of precise laws and treaties, of separation of powers. Otherwise, the “war of laws” will never end.

[KOMSOMOLSKOYE ZNAMYA] But aren't you afraid the “war of laws” might grow into a civil war?

[Kravchuk] If we pursue foolish policies it might. But if we find compromises, conduct ourselves as guided by higher interests as opposed to ambitions, and refrain from putting national interests above common democratic ones (there is, after all, a democratic process)—then something will come of it. National revival has today strongly confirmed the importance of this problem, and we must find a mechanism of interaction with the common democratic process. Consider the Ukraine. If we are going to stress national considerations over general democratic ones, we will see the emergence of ethnic problems...

[KOMSOMOLSKOYE ZNAMYA] Roy Medvedev recently gave an interview to the IMA Press Agency in which he stated that the newly emerged democrats are dictators. And he mentioned specific names. What do you think? If the minority in our parliament became the majority, would they continue the “administrative command line during the new phase”?

[Kravchuk] I think with time they would simply “purge” from the Supreme Soviet and from all structures of authority the people who are there, and would bring in “their own.” This is inevitable. It cannot be otherwise. Political struggle is a struggle of people. Along with the victory of new forces comes new people.

[KOMSOMOLSKOYE ZNAMYA] All the same, using what methods? Administrative command or common democratic?

[Kravchuk] I think various methods would be used. But I would not want to accuse all the new democrats to a man of dictatorial ways.

[KOMSOMOLSKOYE ZNAMYA] That is why we mentioned Roy Medvedev...

[Kravchuk] This is our misfortune, the fact that we always generalize. I see “democrats” in the hall—they are a diverse group. There are true democrats by nature and there are people who masquerade. When one of the latter states his views, it is a terrible thing to hear. I was in the Crimea and spoke with people there—they simply fear these “democrats.” If such an individual were to accede to power, he would do everything in his power to see to it that there was no sign of life. This is what we must fear. But we should not generalize. Unfortunately, we see a nostalgia for the “iron hand” in all structures of

power, in all political forces. When people see that certain forms of power do not work, they begin to look for others.

[KOMSOMOLSKOYE ZNAMYA] Many people are demanding everything right away, today—and this is simply not possible...

[Kravchuk] Under pressure of the situation, therefore, a leader is often required to make decisions that do not always correspond with democratic forms and methods.

[KOMSOMOLSKOYE ZNAMYA] All the same, do we not now have the problem of protecting the minority in our parliament?

[Kravchuk] Yes. This problem is treated in our new regulations, discussion of which has already taken place. We are proceeding from the premise that real democracy has two features—individual freedom and limitation of the rights of the majority while protecting the minority.

[KOMSOMOLSKOYE ZNAMYA] But presently our minority is not protected.

[Kravchuk] This has to be done through regulation, not through the demarches we often see.

[KOMSOMOLSKOYE ZNAMYA] How do you view the concept of a quadrilateral “Ukraine-Russia-Belorussia-Kazakhstan” treaty?

[Kravchuk] Until the major issues are resolved, nothing will come of it. To date I know nothing about such a treaty. Nor do other republic leaders, I believe. We are only talking about intentions. Moreover, I have not yet even seen the text of a new treaty. And there is another problem—what kind of Union should this be? A Union of equals? Or is some kind of axis required, some sort of center? A commotion may arise as to who has seniority. And things come around in full circle. Until principles are drawn up, until we consult with the deputies and political parties, with the people, we cannot sign treaties of alliance of any sort. And this applies as well to a quadrilateral treaty. I do not wish to enact any measures behind the back of the president. If I have certain intentions, I must meet with him and lay everything out in the open. Political activity cannot be void of morality. For me the most important thing in political activity is the interests of the Ukrainian people. I think about this all the time. Right now we must be contemplating a Union which would afford the Ukraine a path to sovereignty. The determination is being made today as to what we will leave our children, what contribution we make to Ukrainian sovereignty. This then is true political activity.

[KOMSOMOLSKOYE ZNAMYA] Experience shows us that political activity is not carried out by cavalry raids.

[Kravchuk] Of course not. Precisely for that reason, the most important thing for a politician is the interests of the Ukrainian people.

[KOMSOMOLSKOYE ZNAMYA] Political ambitions, aspirations to power—these are the realities of our present day. But a person cannot be engaged in something he is not interested in. What is your own attitude towards such concepts as “power,” “leadership”?

[Kravchuk] Power is primarily knowledge, professionalism, responsibility. If an individual has only the aspiration to power, if he is not prepared for this by virtue of his entire life but is swept to the top on the crest of a wave, he will not be able to cope with power. If an individual relates irresponsibly to power, if he is inconsistent in his actions—this too will lead to nothing good. One cannot be in a position of power and not have character. In that case, he will stop short in midstream and be doubting himself all the time. Don't forget—it is after all (no matter what they say) the leader who makes the decision. He must confirm through his actions his capability for exercising power.

[KOMSOMOLSKOYE ZNAMYA] In other words, someone in a position of power may turn out to be a plaything in another's hands?

[Kravchuk] Quite right. I am often told—you are a member of the Politburo, you are a member of the Central Committee and must fulfill those decisions which are made by the Politburo. If these decisions coincide with my point of view—absolutely. But if they do not? If I have another opinion which corresponds to my convictions? I may stand alone, but I will follow my convictions. I say this honestly, and I hope I am understood. One need not make a fuss over this, draw conclusions, or dramatize the situation.

[KOMSOMOLSKOYE ZNAMYA] Ivan Stepanovich Plyushch mentioned at a press conference in the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet that he was feeling pressure from certain functionaries in the apparatus of the Ukrainian CP Central Committee. Are you feeling such pressure?

[Kravchuk] Well, the apparatus cannot exert pressure on me. Look at how many telephones I have (L.M. Kravchuk pointed out the abundance of different-colored phones on the desk to his left). No one calls me on them to exert any pressure. I might surmise that in the Central Committee Plenum (this conversation took place on the eve of the Plenum of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee) there might be certain personal opinions. But they have theirs, and I have mine. Why should I immediately perceive varying opinions as pressure? One person expresses his point of view, I express mine. This is a natural political process.

[KOMSOMOLSKOYE ZNAMYA] (Allow me here to make a slight digression. Chairman Kravchuk predicted things exactly as they were to take place at the Central Committee Plenum of the Ukrainian Communist Party. He stood up for his positions. But—we will not rush ahead. Our second conversation with Leonid Makarovich took place after the Plenum. Now to return to our previous topic.)

[Kravchuk] I am the chairman of the Supreme Soviet. I therefore operate proceeding from this fact, listening attentively to the opinions of the Presidium, of deputies. Nor does my point of view always coincide with theirs. And even if there were such “pressure,” or if it comes to bear, it will not exert any influence on me. Because I see this as the point of view of a single individual or group of people. The chairman of the Supreme Soviet makes decisions taking all opinions into account. Open discussion of the most complex problems takes place among us in the Central Committee Secretariat, in the Politburo, and every individual expresses his own point of view. I am telling you quite candidly that there is no such thing as a proposal by the first secretary of the Central Committee at which point everyone votes for it immediately. Nor does this take place at plenums of the CPSU Central Committee. We are living in a different time. Ivan Stepanovich most likely had something else in mind. Perhaps certain information is reaching him, certain judgments are being made. Or something else. I spoke with him following that press conference. Maybe this pressure is being sensed through the majority of deputies. I can only surmise. But I do not feel such an attitude, such pressure. And if it were sent in my direction I would not complain about it in the press—I would be able to argue my point of view, justify the correctness of my stand.

[KOMSOMOLSKOYE ZNAMYA] Do you feel that, in the moral and psychological frame of things, you have yet become the leader of the republic?

[Kravchuk] I haven't even thought about that. I have only one desire—to do everything I can to bring stability to the Ukraine, to ensure that people have confidence that our authority is in control, that before the world and before our country we represent a great people, a civilized people with a rich history and culture, that we are respected and reckoned with. Incidentally, I noted when I was in Switzerland that foreigners are following very attentively what is going on in our republic. They want us to have stable, permanent relations, that our policy not fluctuate. This is the main thing. In order to be a leader one needs time, one must get something done. You can see for yourself how many people we have who have emerged in the political arena thanks to slogans alone.

[5 Mar 91, pp 4-5]

[Excerpts] [KOMSOMOLSKOYE ZNAMYA] It is difficult not to agree with you here. An entire conglomerate of figures has emerged, many of whom unfortunately are far removed from political activity.

[Kravchuk] I look at it this way—time will put everything in its place. The dust will settle and people will decide who's who. In determining a leader, the people will have to vote for him.

[KOMSOMOLSKOYE ZNAMYA] Are you alluding to direct presidential elections?

[Kravchuk] Absolutely. An individual elected by the people will be truly independent. From the left, from the right, or from the center. He will function based on the mandate of the people. He may make mistakes—and they will correct him. But he will be independent. And nowadays no matter what he might do, a certain segment may demand his recall. In such a situation every individual ponders the distribution of forces. Take M.S. Gorbachev, for example. A proposal for his recall was introduced at the Congress of People's Deputies—he cannot fail to react to this. There was such talk in the Supreme Soviet with regard to myself in October—about recall. And people are talking now. If an individual has been elected by direct vote, he can nurse himself back to health. But there is another danger. A person's character is at work here. If he has dictatorial tendencies, an inability to listen to others, here too one can expect nothing good. Politics is a complicated matter—I became convinced of this back during the debates with Rukh.

[KOMSOMOLSKOYE ZNAMYA] We remember those very well. How do you view the fairly widespread belief that it is these debates which predetermined to a great extent your political career? At that time, in contrast to many party functionaries who simply operated according to the "absolutely not" principle, you entered into open dialogue with the opposition.

[Kravchuk] It was not a predetermining factor, but it did play a role. That is for sure. When V.A. Ivashko left, the radio program "Mayak" was the first to talk about possible contenders. I do not think my name figured into it—it seemed they didn't know me. I appeared at Rukh meetings and writers' gatherings. We debated. Thus I was noted and they came to recognize me.

[KOMSOMOLSKOYE ZNAMYA] In other words, your image was established. The Ukraine recognized you...

[Kravchuk] But this was not a predetermining factor either—other factors were necessary as well. All my conscious life I have been engaged in politics and ideology.

[KOMSOMOLSKOYE ZNAMYA] Do you have any role models in politics?

[Kravchuk] I have the greatest respect for Vladimir Ilyich Lenin. No matter what they may say today, they are forgetting one simple thing—Lenin was there prior to 1917, and Lenin has been there since 1917. Twice I had the opportunity to study his works. I read all of Plekhanov. For me he is an individual imbued with the highest culture and democracy. In the Louvre and other Paris art museums, by the way, Plekhanov is considered to be the greatest connoisseur.

[KOMSOMOLSKOYE ZNAMYA] Forgive us, but you are to be envied. To this day we are unable to read all of Plekhanov.

[Kravchuk] I worked with his writings in the Lenin Library. I also read a great deal of Bukharin there. These people impress me with their views, their actions. But when Lenin became a state figure and power fell upon him, the civil war began. A humanist and intellectual, he either had to leave or exercise the power. Otherwise this great country would simply disintegrate. There began an everyday reality of exercising power which required the use of force. After all, this was a conflict. It was civil war.

[KOMSOMOLSKOYE ZNAMYA] But is such bloodshed justified?

[Kravchuk] Bloodshed is never justified unless it occurs in a struggle with an attacking enemy, an enemy who wants to take away your freedom. In that case you are talking about defending your homeland. If your freedom and your sovereignty are built at the expense of another, they are not justified. That is nonsense.

[KOMSOMOLSKOYE ZNAMYA] And in your opinion is the triumph of class principles of one kind or another justified, when general human principles and principles of humanity are trampled?

[Kravchuk] It is not justified. Class principles are first of all a variety of corporate principles. We are talking about the interests of a group of people. During certain historical periods, when a class was constantly being oppressed and deprived of any and all rights, it would straighten out just like a spring. And the triumph of class interests acquired special significance for a certain period. But when we stand on a common democratic platform, it is general human principles, principles of mankind which begin to operate.

[KOMSOMOLSKOYE ZNAMYA] Leonid Makarovich, how would you appraise the current situation in the Ukraine with respect to glasnost and our press?

[Kravchuk] Glasnost moves in spurts. There was a time when people understood glasnost as being everything "drastic" which was reported. If it was "drastic," it was glasnost. If it was tranquil, we were talking about the old days. There is a certain raw truth here because people want the harsh words and unbiased facts. They grew tired of empty discussion during the stagnation years. The important thing in glasnost is the truth, and only the truth. If one goes overboard, this is not glasnost. What makes things complicated for all journalists is the fact that the truth is sometimes boring. Even the truth uttered today in defense of the CPSU is not accepted, because people say—"Where have the communists led us?" We see a definite stereotyped thinking—"Where have they led us?" The truth about the CPSU, that the party is trying to extricate itself from a difficult situation, that it is taking steps to satisfy the interests of people, is not accepted. This too is the truth—bitter, but the truth.

[KOMSOMOLSKOYE ZNAMYA] It was stated in the IZVESTIYA report of our colleague S. Tsikora from the Ukrainian CP Central Committee Plenum that your point of view diverged in many respects from that of the

majority of plenum participants. Is this so? Why was no resolution adopted regarding your report?

[Kravchuk] I do not believe I had a divergence of opinion with the majority. I simply had my own point of view. We are talking about the fact that I was convinced that the referendum, which was planned for 17 March, was not well timed. I am not against the referendum. I believed and continue to believe that it is not the proper time. Secondly, the ballot is worded in such a way that it is very difficult to respond unambiguously. I proposed that our Plenum appeal to the CPSU Central Committee, and it accordingly introduced a legislative initiative on moving the referendum. And on thinking more about the wording. Many people today—under pressure of the current economic situation, aggravated by price increases, under the pressures of life and their emotions—could vote against it. And I would not want this.

[KOMSOMOLSKOYE ZNAMYA] A few days ago in the Kremlin we saw a draft resolution of the USSR Supreme Soviet prepared by the Presidium on the referendum. It contains sharp accusations directed towards "certain republics" for boycotting the referendum and parallel republic plebiscites. Although the Ukraine is not specifically mentioned in the draft document, this is what is implied. What is your attitude towards the adoption of such a resolution?

[Kravchuk] I have not seen any such document. I do not believe the USSR Supreme Soviet has to move towards exacerbating relations with the republics. In my view this is the thinking of times gone by. Moreover, the Ukraine is not abrogating the all-Union referendum. We posed the issue so that it would be perfectly clear—conduct the referendum, do not change the text of the ballot, insofar as this was adopted by the USSR Supreme Soviet, and parallel to this action conduct a Ukrainian plebiscite with its own wording. In order to find out the opinion of the people, what kind of a Union they support. Nowhere do we say that we are against the Union. What is illegal here, or unnatural? We support a new Union in which everyone is free and equal.

[KOMSOMOLSKOYE ZNAMYA] Nonetheless, the wording of this draft resolution was quite sharp. If we can return to the problem of glasnost, how did you see Gorbachev's proposal on suspending the Law on the Press? What newspapers do you view most favorably?

[Kravchuk] I read a great many newspapers. Including KOMSOMOLSKOYE ZNAMYA, which has recently become sharper and more interesting. Many people read it for that reason. It has its own view of things, its own position. What I like about KOMSOMOLSKOYE ZNAMYA is the fact that it provides diametrically opposed points of view. It does not stand on one particular position and fight for it. Your newspaper publishes one view today, another tomorrow on one problem or another. Such a comparison of various viewpoints in my opinion constitutes true pluralism. It is another matter as to how realistic is the understanding of events as

reported in the newspaper. But this does not depend so much on the newspaper itself as on who gives the interview, who writes the article. After all, the person who is writing bears no less responsibility for his material than the editorial board. We are often disposed to piling the blame for all the controversial and conflicting views on the editorial board. That should not be the case. If it were, the editorial board would have to rewrite a great deal. Or print nothing. The personage of the author, his position, must be included in all material.

[KOMSOMOLSKOYE ZNAMYA] Thank you for your assessment of our newspaper. We are striving to do just this—to present the entire spectrum of opinions of the Ukrainian people.

[Kravchuk] Yes, yes. I have noted this.

[KOMSOMOLSKOYE ZNAMYA] But let us return to the first part of the question, with respect to your attitude towards Gorbachev's proposal...

[Kravchuk] If I had to make an official comment on the Law on the Press, I would reflect on the various trends which have begun to be seen in society. Indeed, some of the mass media have begun to be guided not by the interests of the people, but by those of certain groups. We should think about how to augment the influence of government and the public on the mass media. For in any civilized society, a newspaper strives to reflect all the processes which are taking place in that society. But we have certain newspapers today which...

[KOMSOMOLSKOYE ZNAMYA] Are you referring to samizdat?

[Kravchuk] No. The informal newspapers are not samizdat. According to the Law on the Press, every individual can today publish what he wishes. Some of these newspapers literally slight public opinion or treat it poorly. We must think about how we will regulate all these problems. But to suspend the law in general? I do not think society would comprehend this.

[KOMSOMOLSKOYE ZNAMYA] Doesn't it seem to you that distorted information about certain people, a one-sided depiction of their activity is often related to the fact that for a long time they found themselves "out of the limelight"?

[Kravchuk] Yes, without a doubt.

[KOMSOMOLSKOYE ZNAMYA] But our readers do not even know very much about the chairman of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet. What can you tell us about yourself? As a political figure? As an individual?

[Kravchuk] I can say that I was born under capitalism, in 1934 in Rovno Oblast, which was then in Poland, under Plisudskiy. We remained under Poland until 1939. My parents belonged to the "nezamozhnyi" group, in other words they were poor village people. Therefore, they immediately went into a kolkhoz. The war began. My father went off to the front and was killed there. I was

raised in my mother's village, went to school there and then to the trade tekhnikum. Following this I attended Kiev University, in the political economics section of the economics faculty. Upon graduation I was sent to work in Chernovtsy Oblast. At first I lectured in political economics at a finance tekhnikum, then worked in the party obkom [oblast committee]. I worked my way up, as they say, to chief of the section for propaganda and agitation. In those days this was a fairly high position, especially since I was just 29 years old. Then I went off to study at the political economics faculty of the Academy of Social Sciences of the CPSU Central Committee. I wrote my dissertation, a rather complex subject for that time—"The Role of Profit Under Socialism." This was 1970. This concept of profit is accepted today, but then... I was advised not to get involved in this. Things became fairly complicated, but I was able to defend my dissertation. Unfortunately, I was unable to work in this sphere. I was already working in Kiev as a chief of section in the Central Committee. Again I worked my way up (Leonid Makarovich smiles)—to second secretary in the Central Committee.

[passages omitted]

[KOMSOMOLSKOYE ZNAMYA] Our conversation has acquired such a pleasant nature, one might almost say a homelike nature. But the jitteriness and adversity in our lives force us to conclude this interview with political questions. Following Yeltsin's appearance on the "Vremya" program of Central Television, we have heard two commentaries—Nazarbayev's and yours. We get the impression that what was broadcast in no way covers everything you said. We make this judgment on a purely professional basis. It was evident that a pair of scissors was used on the tape.

[Kravchuk] Naturally not everything was shown. This was a press conference. I had more to say than what was broadcast. I said that every individual, including Yeltsin, has the right to his own point of view.

[KOMSOMOLSKOYE ZNAMYA] Well, this idea was not presented.

[Kravchuk] I did not exclude his points of view—otherwise this is not glasnost, not democracy. What if for example I were to prohibit B.N. Yeltsin from speaking? Or he were to prohibit me? This is my first point. Secondly, I felt that what we are doing with Russia, Kazakhstan, Belorussia—this is in fact development of the Union, regardless of what they are doing in the center. I thought the important thing today is to concentrate our efforts on this. Here we have concluded treaties with republics and are developing them. We must make every effort to get things going, so that people see that something new is being created regarding interrelationships among republics. Horizontal ties are coming into existence, the Union is being strengthened. We have

again forgotten about economic processes, and enterprises are standing still, raw materials are not being delivered. Again we have come into conflict with political ambitions.

From this point of view, in my opinion, Yeltsin's appearance does not help in the formation of such ties. Because he has backed away from this and intensified his conflict with M.S. Gorbachev. And the following thought—I said that Yeltsin's statement on the resignation of Gorbachev must not be taken so seriously or harshly. He was speaking for himself, not for the Presidium of the Russian Supreme Soviet or on behalf of the session. And another consideration—he did not speak at the session, but in front of a TV camera during a televised broadcast. This was a television interview! But taking into account the fact that we are going through such a difficult period, what can happen is unpredictable. I thought Boris Nikolayevich should thoughtfully consider and pose this matter on a constructive basis. The Council of the Federation cannot govern the country according to the constitution. We must not depart from constitutional procedure.

[KOMSOMOLSKOYE ZNAMYA] Quite likely he also understood this. And for precisely that reason spoke in front of the TV camera and not at the session. On the other hand, however, what you are presently saying differs sharply from what we heard on the "Vremya" program.

[Kravchuk] They did not concoct anything. We spoke for an hour and they extracted what they wished. I gave the interview. And everything is accurate there. If they used everything, they would have had to spend an entire "Vremya" program on me. I can only repeat that in the current situation every leader must behave quite correctly. Because any step taken can lead to confrontation.

When we met with B.N. Yeltsin in Moscow, we put economic questions at the top of the list for discussion. We talked about how to adjust control of economic ties, how to prevent collectives from standing still. Otherwise people will stop listening to Yeltsin and Kravchuk, and others as well, and there will be complete chaos in the country. This is what we talked about. He never raised the issue of the president's resignation during our discussion.

[KOMSOMOLSKOYE ZNAMYA] It seems to us in Moscow that the city's population is divided right now...

[Kravchuk] I would not wish to discuss who has more and who has less support. But Yeltsin has an advantage—he often meets with people and travels around Russia. And during the course of this, people do not throw rotten eggs and tomatoes at him. Right now all leaders must travel and meet with the people, no matter how difficult it might be. Thus, Yeltsin is accumulating popular understanding. I do not wish to say that Yeltsin is Russia's enemy. I have never said this and will not say it. He has his concepts, his position. He wants to do something for Russia. As to whether he is acting properly

or improperly in one situation or another—this is something entirely different. But it is also impossible to relate unequivocally to Boris Nikolayevich. To say that he is acting without error and that Gorbachev is always making mistakes would be untrue. The misfortune here lies in the fact that (and this is not restricted to Gorbachev and Yeltsin) people these days consider one political figure a saint, and defame another. Everyone makes mistakes—Gorbachev, Yeltsin, as well as we. If we did not make mistakes, we would not find ourselves in this situation. We must not heap blame on one another. We must avoid confrontation.

[KOMSOMOLSKOYE ZNAMYA] Do you believe that your education in economics helps you in today's complex situation?

[Kravchuk] It helps a little, as does my political education. But I sense a lack of practical knowledge and skills. When I visit a plant, a great intellectual effort is required on my part in order to interpret the processes which are going on there. Not just I, but any practical person must study every day under today's conditions. Our times are such. We are creating a new life. We have to comprehend everything anew.

[KOMSOMOLSKOYE ZNAMYA] It would probably be appropriate to organize a "school for illiterates" of sorts, to instruct parliamentarians in the economic and political sphere.

[Kravchuk] Yes, of course. We are presently actively engaged in this. We are getting specialists involved in the effort—including people from other regions and abroad. We are continuously working to adapt ourselves to the market economy.

Hurenko Assesses Ukrainian Referendum Results

91UN1199A Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian
21 Mar 91 pp 1, 2

[Press conference held by First Secretary of the Ukrainian CP Central Committee S.I. Hurenko and reported by Vadim Fomenko: "The Will of the People—A Law for the Party"]

[Text] How does the leadership of the Ukrainian CP Central Committee view the results of the referendum? What conclusions have been drawn and what is to be done proceeding from the voting results? These questions were at the center of attention for a meeting held on Tuesday between S.I. Hurenko and the journalists.

In his introductory comments the first secretary of the Central Committee recalled the preliminary voting results in the Ukraine: some 70.5 percent of the citizens participating in the voting favored the maintaining of the Union, while 80.16 percent voiced the desire that the Ukraine be part of an Union of Soviet sovereign states following the principles set out in the Declaration on the republic's state sovereignty.

"We should note," emphasized S.I. Hurenko, "the significant difference in the voting results on both ballots. This shows the failure of putting one ballot in opposition to the other, one survey to the other. Let me recall that the Ukrainian CP Central Committee came out for an affirmative answer to both questions and urged the referendum participants to do this. The fact that our appeals were heard is viewed by us as the correctness of our political line. This is also the result of the work which was done to prepare for the referendum.

"For various reasons, the people voted against the Union. Without any doubt there were convinced opponents of it. But there were also many persons who up to the very last day had not decided their position. Unfortunately, there were also instances when agitation was also carried out directly during the voting in individual districts.

"I would also like to say that on the eve of the referendum, there was also massed working over of the public mind by various sorts of newspapers, by pamphlets and posters. The amount of these products was significantly greater than we put out. It must be emphasized that the Communist Party showed itself to be the sole organization among the political, public and state organizations which in an organized manner, from beginning to end, came out with a consistent, clear position.

"In a word, regardless of the desperate attempts by the opposition by fair means and foul to deflect the Ukrainian population from the solely correct path and regardless of the brazen propaganda, the demonstrations, maneuvers and door-to-door canvassing, the reason of the people prevailed: only together, they affirmed, was it possible to overcome all the hardships."

Then S.I. Hurenko answered numerous questions from the journalists. Here are these answers in a condensed form.

[Journalist] Did the party Central Committee anticipate the results of the referendum and from what did it proceed in its suppositions?

[Hurenko] Of course it did anticipate them. First of all, we have, albeit not a very perfect one, a sociological service. Moreover, at numerous meetings the workers everywhere voiced their attitude toward the referendum. Personal meetings between the Central Committee leaders and numerous labor collectives made it possible to also clarify the situation.

[Journalist] At a session of the Supreme Soviet after the referendum, someone complained that the opposition had not had access to the mass information media and that the opposition, they said, had been stifled. Was this the case?

[Hurenko] This, of course, is far from the truth. Our opponents have so many printed publications that it would even be hard to count them. In addition, the so-called independent newspapers generously made

space available to them. Was it true that they were not given an opportunity to appear on our television? As for all sorts of leaflets and posters, the opposition put them out in many millions.

[Journalist] At the 38th Electoral District in Zhotnevyy Rayon of Kiev the commission chairman did not allow observers from the party raykom, stating that the Ukrainian Communist Party was not officially registered. Was this not a mere pretext and how long will the Communist Party be in the role of "unofficial"?

[Hurenko] Of course this was a mere pretext, merely one of the numerous intrigues by our opponents. For scores of years our party has been active and now, don't you see, it is not recognized. As for an official registration, we are completely ready and merely waiting until the republic parliament adopts a law on public organizations.

[Journalist] At a press conference held by Rukh before the referendum, it was stated that differences of opinion are growing stronger and stronger between the leaders of the Ukrainian Parliament and the secretaries of the Ukrainian CP Central Committee. Is this the case?

[Hurenko] I know about such rumors. Although there is no basis to them, they are being intensely spread about, including, unfortunately, in the parliament. But this merely shows that our opponents do not shy away from any means.

[Journalist] Does it not seem to you that the republic press, including the party, pushed more strongly for the main question of the referendum and less for the republic question?

[Hurenko] Yes, I do feel that here there was a fault. However, in recent days the examples of both ballots were published and this somewhat rectified the situation.

[Journalist] What is your opinion on the third question of the so-called Galichina?

[Hurenko] In principle, there is nothing seditious in this. In truth, it somewhat leads people away from the mark. I, as you obviously know, was even against the second question out of such considerations. But this is not the main thing. As for these three oblasts—Lvov, Ivano-Frankovskiy and Ternopol—what is most disconcerting is that the Communist Party which on a legitimate basis is the ruling one in the republic, in this large region is, in essence, in the opposition. This is nonsense, this does not fit in any framework, but this is the case. Hence, it is essential to seek out some way out and some points of convergence in order to discharge the situation by political means.

[Journalist] After the referendum, will not a more active search begin for seeking consolidation with other republic parties?

[Hurenko] The doors of our Communist Party are always open for those who are seeking a path of collaboration. The problem is that they can be counted on the fingers of your hand. A predominant majority of the parties recently established in the republic has an outright anticommunist focus and of course we cannot join with them. But generally the referendum is over, the political battles must stop and we must set to work.

[Journalist] As the results indicate, the various oblasts have voted differently. Will not the attitude of the Central Committee to them change in accord with this?

[Hurenko] In no way. Although lessons will be drawn from the propaganda work, it would scarcely be correct to deduce a direct dependence between this work and the voting results.

[Journalist] What is your opinion of the fact that Kiev, the most intellectual center of the republic with the most highly educated intelligentsia, has in its majority said "no" to the Union?

[Hurenko] First of all, I would not rush to make any assessments of the "most of the most." I could name four other centers in the Ukraine which could also claim this. But as for Kiev, here it must be honestly admitted that our opponents did a better job.

[Journalist] Why did none of the party leaders speak at the Rukh meeting in Kiev on Saturday?

[Hurenko] First of all, we were not invited to speak as the program here had been scheduled ahead of time. But if they had permitted us to do so, as practice has shown, in such meetings we would not have been listened to as they would whistle and shout.

[Journalist] The referendum is over. What does the Communist Party intend to do now?

[Hurenko] I can say right off that the will of the people is a law for our party. We should see to it that the Union Treaty is actually organized on the basis of the Declaration of Independence, and we should undertake everything possible for the social protection of the public and in this regard settle the most pressing tasks.

As for the Union Treaty, as I said at the Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee in Moscow, it will be difficult to sign it in the near future. Yes, the published draft can now be discussed, it does not require as much fundamental reworking as the first one, but it will be difficult to do this quickly. Possibly, a signing could occur only in the second half of this year and at the end of it. Nevertheless, the republic parliament, in my view, should take up its discussion without delay.

[Journalist] What about a new republic constitution? Certainly before they wanted to adopt a constitution and then raise the question of a treaty.

[Hurenko] I cannot and do not want to speak on behalf of the republic Supreme Soviet. But as a deputy I personally feel that it can and should begin to work on the Union Treaty.

[Journalist] But coming back to the results of the referendum. The opposition has stated that it has won a victory as the second question was passed with flying colors. The Communist Party feels that it has emerged on top as a majority voted for the Union. Who has really won?

[Hurenko] There should not be any issue of victories. Only a shortsighted politician in such a situation could wrap himself in a victor's toga. As for the Communist Party, I repeat, we have simply chosen the correct direction in the fight to preserve the Union. And we are very pleased that the common sense of the Ukrainian workers has prevailed.

Ukrainian Opposition Figure Comments on Sovereignty Issues

91UN1191A Kiev LITERATURNIA UKRAYINA
in Ukrainian 7 Mar 91 p 2

[Interview with Oleksandr Yemets, chairman of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet Commission on Human Rights, co-chairman of the Party of Democratic Rebirth of the Ukraine, by Heorhiy Bursov, LITERATURNIA UKRAYINA correspondent: "Our position is clearly defined: To the question proposed by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the answer is to be - no!"]

[Text] **Biographical data:** Oleksandr Yemets', born in Khmelnychchyna. Age 31. Father - a village history teacher, mother - a medical assistant. Career highlights: school, kolhosp, studies in philosophy at the Kiev State University; after hours - the advanced school of the MVS, the student of an individual whose responsibility was the reception and guidance of minors; instructor in the center for education of inspectors in matters dealing with minors; research fellow of the criminological laboratory of the Kiev advanced institute of the MVS. Today - chairman of the commission on human rights of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet, co-chairman of the Party for the Democratic Rebirth of the Ukraine.

[Bursov] Tell us about your family.

[Yemets] I have two sons. The younger one is almost six, the older one is eleven. Both of them enjoy drawing. They spend some time playing sports, but of course since their father hasn't the time to be with them, and being educated by a woman does not encourage such activity. This is a painful matter. I always feel this debt following me, that lately I have not been able to repay to my children. My wife is truly my best friend, my first advisor following my mother and father.

[Bursov] Who considers you to be the enemy?

[Yemets] You have probably noticed that several times already very bold lies have been printed about me in the press, and stated from the podium of the Supreme Soviet's session, where Prosecutor Potebenko thought it permissible to read the accusation that I supposedly publicly opposed the November 7 demonstration, whereas at the time I was not even present on Khreshchatyk Avenue.

[Bursov] Following the ratification of the Declaration of Sovereignty, even to today, everyone has but one question: when will the Ukraine truly become an independent state, as they said previously - autonomous, as they now say - sovereign?

[Yemets] Despite the importance of all the culturological and political aspects of achieving sovereignty, I would still prefer to address the economic aspects. This question is being discussed heatedly by various avid groups. The counterarguments of those opposing sovereignty are basically grounded on the theory that we already have a well integrated, cooperative, civilized economic system, and that we do not need to form sovereign states. They point their fingers at Europe: look, they are uniting, and here you want to separate.

The concept of integrating economic subjects is overly complex. Take a look at Spain, for example. It spent many years preparing to join the European cooperative community. The Common Market. This resulted from the fact that the structure of its economy, the level of its economic development was such that it would not have been able to integrate into the total economy of the European system without endangering itself. That is why the countries which are a part of the European Common Market targeted aid to Spain for quite a long time.

Only after it had reached the necessary level of development was it accepted into the Common Market.

Let me quote some figures from the LONDON GUARDIAN, which printed the results of an analysis performed by the "Deutsche Bank". We look upon banks as repositories of money, whereas they also fulfill the role of economic prognosticators. Before a bank will lend money for some venture, it must determine if that business, if that COUNTRY, is sound and it is worth putting money into it, so they do not lose out in the end. This bank analyzed the market potential, the ability to swiftly convert to a market economy, to intensively develop its economy, of all the Soviet Unions's republics.

According to their system, the Ukraine came out first, with 51 points. Second were the Baltic republics - 49. Third was Russia - 45. Last place was taken by Kirgiziya - 10.

With such differences, it is not likely that the republics can be easily integrated into a common economic system. In other words, there can only be degrees of

integration. Republics which are close together in economic potential will be able to integrate their economic systems more quickly and to maintain stronger economic ties.

Today there is much discussion: Who is taking advantage of whom? Each republic complains that it is the one being victimized. Yet without normalized MARKET relationships, it will not be possible to clearly define who is indebted to whom.

The first step in combating the economic crisis is the attainment of AUTONOMY for the ECONOMIC ENTITIES. And, probably, in the first stage it would be best if the autonomy were to formalize at the republican level. If some normal advances are not made in the form of privatization, then it is unlikely that the autonomization of the republics (economic independence) can proceed and pull the economy of the republics out of the present crisis.

The Ukraine has significant potential for becoming an independent state. The republic produces 44 percent of the Soviet Union's steel, 52 percent of its cast iron, 96 percent of its locomotives, 50 percent of its iron ore, and so on. It has the potential to produce more food products.

[Bursov] Can the Ukraine survive on its own resources, not in comparison to the other republics, but when compared to the highly developed nations of the world?

[Yemets] Statistics give the best answer to such a question.

Grain: England produces, per capita, in kilograms - 405, Italy - 295, Germany - 445, the Ukraine - 1,333 kilograms. Iron ore: per capita, in England - 4 kilograms, Italy - 0, Japan - 2.8, Germany - 2, the Ukraine - 2,126 kilograms.

Looking at many various types of basic products, the Ukraine is in first place or one of the first in terms of per capita production.

It is said that we are not well off as far as quantity of petroleum supplies. When comparing us with England, Italy, Japan, and Germany - the Ukraine is in second place in petroleum and natural gas production. But a low indicator in the production of one individual product, which is connected with a natural resource, does not indicate a generally low living standard. Japan is an example of this, since it is in last place in petroleum production.

Therefore, it is our economy today which is ineffective: we produce much and have nothing. It would not be fair to claim that all of this is simply distributed to other republics. This is all a matter of the ineffectiveness of the existing economic system.

We could say: let us raise the effectiveness of this system throughout the Soviet Union. Specialists in the field of government (without going into theoretical detail) have

stated that based on today's conditions within the Soviet Union, from both political and economic aspects, it would be *impossible* to guarantee a way out of the economic crisis for the Soviet Union as a whole.

Considering the above-mentioned economic potential and, most importantly, an autonomous economic system in the Ukraine, we would be able to get out of the economic crisis fairly quickly.

The second condition which would have to be met would be economic reform within the Ukraine itself. But until we have achieved sovereignty, we will not be able to even begin to work on that.

Third - we must reform the Ukrainian political system.

[Bursov] The political leaders and the fate of the Ukraine. Who do you think is more important today - Plyushch or Kravchuk?

[Yemets] Both of them, having achieved positions of leadership in parliament, became more sympathetic toward the concept of sovereignty for the Ukraine. The sharper step in this direction was taken (although perhaps he had previously held such views) by Ivan Stepanovich Plyushch. Bit by bit, I sense, the feeling of national self-awareness is awakening in both of them, as it is in each one of us.

Plyushch has long impressed me with his natural sincerity. The fact that he values events and processes taking place in the republic objectively appeals to me. Ivan Stepanovich is able to avoid excessive ideological statements. At the Presidium meeting he criticized those political leaders who allow themselves to speak of one or another part of the Ukraine as something foreign, only because their leadership is held by political forces of which they do not approve. But no matter what kind of processes are taking place, say in the Crimea, which do not please some people, or in Galicia, which do not please others, in both places the leadership was elected by the people. These are citizens of one republic, and we must seek common understanding with them, to bring our positions into agreement.

Leonid Makarovych Kravchuk was a product of the ideological front, and this was more apparent in the early stages. Yet he also took the step in that direction. He is trying to step away from purely ideological positions. He is not able to do this as easily as Plyushch.

[Bursov] When will the CPSU finally free itself from all that which gives the radical democrats a basis to set up the Communists for merciless criticism?

[Yemets] Lately, within the Ukrainian Communist Party, apparently for the second time, there is a process of differentiation. First it was the Democratic Platform, which in time left the party. "Ideologically" it seemed the ranks had cleansed themselves. But recent events have shown that today there is no complete agreement within the ranks of the party. A group has appeared

which I would call the sovereign-Communists. It is these who support the idea of Ukrainian sovereignty.

There is a group of Communists who oppose the hard-line sector of the partocracy... I believe the Communist Party will be able to cleanse itself not by its words, admitting what was done wrong in the past, but only when it proves by concrete actions that the cleansing has taken place.

The first of these would be the question of party ownership of property. Most of this property was acquired by government usurpation. In other words, illegally. As soon as the party solves this problem, the attitude towards it will, I think, change sharply.

Then the inter-party conflicts will take on a normal course, with all of them on a more or less equal footing.

[Bursov] Does the Ukraine need to have its own president?

[Yemets] Yes, I consider it a necessity. But again - only for a sovereign Ukraine. To elect a president who would be a vassal would be not only comical, but also degrading. Within the concept of the new constitution which we are developing, a presidential form of government is proposed. In order to come out of the crisis, strong executive leadership is needed. But not one which in its "strength" chokes the sovereignty of the republic, but strong so that it can lead the Ukrainian economy out of its state of crisis.

It is doubtful if we will be able to elect a new parliament on the basis of a true multi-party system in the near future. The election of a president by all the Ukrainian people themselves would in and of itself ease the transition to a new, essentially higher quality level of government. Direct election of a president would have significant positive effect on the Ukraine's future.

[Bursov] I understand that solving the problems of government in the Ukraine is very important for our future. Let us return to the question of land ownership - what are the prospects in this matter?

[Yemets] Recently we have heard the news that we have our own gold. Large deposits of gold-bearing ore have been found in the Carpathians. Thank God, this was not found earlier, because then we would not have been able to get it back to the Ukraine. I believe that with time we will solve our own problems of currency. The Ukraine's export potential is fairly good. In the opinion of specialists, if there were sovereignty today already, export of products would bring 30-34 billion dollars.

We should not forget that the main petroleum pipelines to the West are laid through the Ukrainian territory. If we were to apply the generally accepted forms of payment for use of our land, we would to a great extent be guaranteed the petroleum and natural gas we need as payment for the exploitation of our territory with these petroleum and natural gas pipelines.

[Bursov] What can you tell us about one of the attributes of a sovereign state - an independent armed force?

[Yemets] The question of an independent armed force is directly related to sovereignty. Recently I received the news that the Prykarpatsky (Near-Carpathian) army unit came out best regarding their recruitment. After it had been decided that recruited personnel would serve in the territory of the Ukraine - the problem of recruitment effectively disappeared, whereas until that time it had been quite acute. Citizens recruited in the Ukraine want to defend the Ukraine - unless we accept this as a fact, we will never have an army ready to wage war. We will never rid ourselves of the hateful dedovshchina within the army. The concept of cooperation implies a need for common strategic forces for a certain time. Alongside the national guard and the republic's national army, which, incidentally, will not have nuclear weapons, there will be strategic armed forces. In order to guarantee the safety of the cooperating republics and states, which are united in cooperative friendship.

To the point, the existence of a national army - is a guarantee against a takeover by the armed forces.

Probably many people have noticed: in all the scenarios of recent army actions (in Tbilisi, in Baku, in Lithuania) the action was undertaken not by those units stationed on these territories, but army divisions transferred there literally at the last minute.

Let us examine the last bloody encounter - Vilnius. We heard a lot about the fact that the soldiers' "nerves could not take it, the people insulted them, and that is why they conducted themselves in this manner." There is a small untold nuance here. Those divisions which were stationed in Lithuania were not involved in these events. That bloody mess against unarmed Lithuanians was caused by a regiment brought in from Pskov. It is possible that this regiment had been insulted, but that took place in Pskov. The Lithuanians ended up paying for it.

[Bursov] I recently returned from Lithuania, where, as a correspondent, I spoke with many eyewitnesses. Those who saw the armed attackers from close-up spoke of their unnatural brutality: they paid no heed to women or small children. This created the impression that such an aggressively aroused state of the soldiers was brought about with psychotropic or narcotic methods.

[Yemets] I have a different opinion... In order for a soldier to defend something, he must have a feeling of patriotism. To a great extent this is connected with the attitudes of youth today. In order to become a Ukrainian citizen, a youngster should be educated in a certain way. Only then will he know that he does not counter the interests of the Ukraine.

About a year ago the decision was reached to eliminate political organs within the army... Recently the president has declared them reinstated. In which direction are these political organs molding the awareness of these

young people? Could not excessive idealization of the awareness of individuals who have weapons in their arms be the reason why they would commit atrocities against their own nation?

I paid close attention to the events in Tbilisi, and just recently received news of the events in Lithuania...

In Tbilisi the boys in bullet-proof vests behaved as if they were pumped up with narcotics. It was suspected that since this division had been transferred from Afghanistan, their behavior may have actually been caused by bad habits picked up in Afghanistan.

But more detailed analysis showed this to be an ideological narcotic. This has reminded me of the events in Minsk, in the Kuropaty, where people in the armed formations proclaimed: "We will show them, these separatists, who want an independent Belorussia, who want to pull us away from the Soviet fatherland," and the like...

If people are "pumped up" only ideologically, and they spend all their time in the barracks, without any wider access to realistic, objective information, - it could be said that they cannot be held entirely accountable for their actions.

The accountability for their actions (and we see truly anti-humanistic, anti-national crimes) lies with those who formulated their awareness in just that spirit. They are told: "You see criminals before you!... You must defend the populace from these criminals!" - and they begin to act in the prescribed manner... That is why I believe the republican, territorial principle of forming a national army would ensure constant contact between the soldiers and the populace. This would guarantee the inability to set the armed forces against the legally elected leadership of the state.

Recently I had a conversation with representatives of the western regions. They declared: "We do not believe that the soldiers who live among us, those divisions who are part of the Prykarpatsky (Near-Carpathian) army region, could raise their arms against the peaceful residents of the area."

[Bursov] What is the difference between Kiev and Vilnius?

[Yemets] The difference is primarily in the fact that Vilnius showed itself to be the more proud city. This pride was awakened earlier there, or perhaps it has always existed. This process is currently taking place in Kiev, but more slowly and painfully. After all, in Vilnius they still remember freedom, whereas Kiev forgot that freedom long ago, because they have been poisoned for ages, not just decades. There is the feeling of individual dignity, the feeling of freedom, the feeling of independence. These are normal feelings for separate individuals, for the state, and for the capital of that state.

Yet there is one item which unites Vilnius and Kiev. In Vilnius there were massive demonstrations, practically

without any incidents. And in Kiev, one could say, all the largest demonstrations took place without incident. This attests to our fairly high level of culture, that we can calmly solve our problems, without conflict.

[Bursov] When the armed forces sent to Vilnius captured the Press Building, the militia took up positions between the invaders and the citizens, who were picketing the building. The militia stood facing the armed invaders. If a similar event were to take place in Kiev, which way would the Ukrainian militia be facing?

[Yemets] I often met with the workers of the militia after the events in Tbilisi. The first thing they told me was that the Tbilisi militia took a position defending the people. I cannot speak for all the militiamen in Kiev, but I not only believe, I am convinced, that there is a part of the militia that would stand with their backs to the people, facing those who would attack them.

[Bursov] After the bloody events of April 9 in Tbilisi, all of Georgia united behind the idea of independence. After the bloody events of January 13 in Vilnius, all of Lithuania gathered around its parliament, which ratified the referendum of February 9. Is it only such tragedies that can bring the people together? Are there any other decisive steps that a nation can take towards independence?

[Yemets] Probably there are no easy and ready recipes. Although this is tragic, it is true that such events often bring the people together. Unfortunately, this is the worst means, and even if our consolidation is to take longer, I would like it to proceed peacefully. So that in place of a speedy decision brought by tanks, we should have the work of horsemen. I am very pleased that lately this has been accepted even by those parties which, in the initial stages of their creation, stood in more extreme positions. In particular, this is characteristic of the Republican Party.

[Bursov] You are co-chairman of the Party of Democratic Rebirth of the Ukraine, but recently you were also elected, on a non-partisan basis, as the chairman of the committee "Referendum for a Sovereign Ukraine." Please explain this committee, who created it, what is its function?

[Yemets] Yes, I am chairman of this committee, created at the initiative of the Ukrainian Democratic Party, and it is at the suggestion of its representatives that I was elected chairman. I emphasize this point, because I have often been asked whether there are not any conflicts between these two parties. I must say that our viewpoints are growing closer, and I think this will end with the combining of these two parties. We do not find any differentiation in the positions of these parties.

The committee was created for the time of preparation for the referendum, to provide explanations to the people of the questions posed in the ballot. The committee consists essentially of all the basic political forces which exist in the Ukraine and support the principles put

forth in the Declaration of Ukrainian State Sovereignty. In addition, its work is individually supported by well-known individuals in the republic, among them Yuchnovskyy, Shyshkin, Yavorivskyy, Pravdenko, and other Peoples Deputies of the Supreme Soviet. Our position is clear - on the question proposed by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, answer - "no!"

We believe the continuation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as a renewed federation is essentially the maintenance of the current "equal rights" of republics which have no rights. They were called sovereign in Stalin's, and in Brezhnev's constitutions. This is the continuation of a somewhat renewed totalitarian administrative - authoritarian system, which has already led the country into ruin, to economic and spiritual failure, this is the maintenance of current production conditions, in which the republics make the products, and the center, personified by its functionaries, distributes them. This is the use of armed forces against the republics, which in keeping with the desires of their own people and governments, do not wish to be part of the USSR.

This is the preservation of the miserable conditions in the Ukraine, when 50 percent of the villages do not have schools, and 35 percent of the villages do not have medical clinics, only five percent of Ukrainian villages have natural gas, despite the fact that the Soviet Union, with 45 percent of the world's natural gas reserves, sells it to tens of countries. The Ukraine holds first place in the world in child mortality. The Ukraine is also first in oncologic illnesses.

We cannot solve any of these problems, unless we first achieve Ukrainian sovereignty. Not just for seventy years, but for centuries we have tried one variation, let us now try another.

Cooperative friendship of sovereign countries...

I do not wish to heap too much praise on those who now hold the leadership positions in the various republics - their are many variables. But there is one thing they have in common. Whereas in the beginning stages of the political and economic reforms, as the republics leaned away from the center, representatives of the democratic forces supported tighter relations with the center, because at the time the center was pushing forward toward reform - for about a year now something else is happening. Today the center is obstructing and overthrowing all the reform programs which it has previously proposed. Conflict has arisen between methods of maintaining the Soviet Union in its present-day status.

The "500 day" program was destroyed by the Soviet Union, and its author Yavlynskyy is now working in Kazakhstan. I can see that we will be shamed in the future, when Kazakhstan leaps ahead of us in those economic and political reforms which are already being introduced there.

It is this reality which confirms the fact that the center, obviously, is not capable of formulating economic policy for the Soviet Union as a whole.

While I was part of the first and so far only delegation of Ukrainians in Moscow, I heard the following phrase from one of the leaders of the Soviet government: "Excuse me, but you are adopting so much legislation that we have not the time to even read all of it." It became apparent that he was not even aware of legislation we had enacted three months earlier! This is a very dangerous situation: this causes crisis conditions and can lead to catastrophic consequences for the republic's economy.

One last example: the central powers raised wholesale prices, and "allowed" the governments of the republics to set the selling prices. One government (in Lithuania) decided to raise the prices - and failed on the day after the price increase.

In this way the central government hopes to maintain its power, and place the blame of higher prices on the republic's governments.

I believe this policy is dishonest: to maintain their own power at all costs, instead of trying to solve real economic problems.

The Ukrainian Supreme Soviet had just declared that it would try to work out the problems in the metallurgical and coal industries, when right away we hear: metallurgy will remain as the only Soviet industry to be directly controlled by Moscow. Obviously, this will not allow us to solve the critical problems facing this industry.

[Bursov] The referendum question for maintaining the Soviet Union has been formulated in very pretty language...

[Yemets] Yes, it is said, the bed is soft... Covering themselves demagogically with the assertion that this referendum is meant to show respect for the citizens of the Soviet Union, for the sovereignty of the republics ("we are not forcing this on anyone"), but to put it mildly, this is a lie (as is everything that has come out of the center lately). The fact that they did not consult the republics on the wording of the referendum question shows the complete disregard of their sovereignty even as it appears today... How can we expect this respect to appear in the future? That would be very naive.

[Bursov] Do you sympathize with Peoples Deputy Stepan Khmara?

[Yemets] Of course I do, I have said this many times. I was not always in complete agreement with Stepan Ilkovych's position, with his methods of behavior in the parliament. I discussed this with him privately and at Supreme Soviet sessions. But I did not see and still do not perceive any basis for the insinuations which have been spread in connection with the name of Stepan Khmara.

It is my view that he has been incarcerated behind prison bars without cause, and for much too long a time already.

[Bursov] Will the West help and support the Ukraine?

[Yemets] There is a change in orientation taking place in the West today among politicians and businessmen, from the center into the individual republics. Recently I met with representatives of a Spanish firm which has opened a stock company called "Trans Ukraine".

Recently several Ukrainian cities were targeted to receive shipments of medicine, at a cost of 10 million franks. This was achieved through the actions of the French Consul to Kiev, Mr. Perne. Each new consulate in Kiev is a great contribution to development of Ukrainian economy. We, the Peoples Deputies, were truly pleased when we heard L. M. Kravchuk's speech in Switzerland. The interest on the part of businessmen, of the government officials of various countries towards the Ukraine, was evident. I think this orientation must be developed actively, and it will, to a great extent, help in solving our economic problems, but only on the condition that they will see in us a viable partner, not one that will always succumb to outside directives, and therefore totally unpredictable.

Who knows what new commands are being prepared in the Kremlin's rooms, if tomorrow it will not annihilate all our attempts to establish economic contacts with foreign countries?

Ukrainian UN Representative Interviewed

91UF0600A Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian
14 Mar 91 p 3

[Interview with Ukrainian SSR Permanent UN Representative Gennadiy Iosifovich Udovenko by Ukrinform Correspondent N. Maslov, under the rubric: "Ukrainian SSR Permanent Representative to the UN": "A New Period of Activity"]

[Text] The Ukrainian SSR Permanent Mission to the United Nations issued a proclamation of the Declaration on State Sovereignty of the Ukraine in a qualitatively new period of its activity. Ukrinform Correspondent N. Maslov talked with Ukrainian SSR Permanent UN Representative G.I. Udovenko on the specific features of the work of Ukrainian diplomats in this largest international organization and also in the country where it is located—the United States of America.

[Maslov] First of all, I would like to take advantage of this moment to congratulate you on your new post, Gennadiy Iosifovich. In accordance with the Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers resolution, the ample and responsible rank of Republic Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs has been added to your title of Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary. What does this fact represent?

[Udovenko] First of all, this signifies an increase of the status of the Ukrainian SSR permanent UN representative. It provides greater independence in the resolution of issues that are connected with our republic's interests in the community of nations and expands the capabilities for action of its diplomatic mission abroad. The rank of deputy minister permits me to make decisions locally, independently and, therefore, more efficiently on issues that previously had to be mandatorily coordinated with the center. Naturally, this does not exclude mutual coordination and also the provision of detailed information to the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the steps taken.

So, let us say, if an urgent session of the Security Council is convened at which the interests of the Ukrainian SSR may be directly affected, then in the new capacity of deputy minister I can locally decide about Ukraine's participation in the session of this main UN organ. Furthermore, one of our mission's most important tasks consists of rendering comprehensive assistance to the expansion of trade and economic cooperation between Ukraine and the United States. I often have to deal with representatives of U.S. business circles. Now, when they learn that the meeting will occur on the deputy minister of foreign affairs level, this immediately eliminates a multitude of problems.

I also want to stress this nuance: The designation of Ukraine's permanent representative as deputy minister of foreign affairs occurred at the initiative of the Republic Ministry of Foreign Affairs and is evidence that our government intends to pay particular attention to participation in the United Nations in light of the Declaration of State Sovereignty of the Ukraine. This document, along with the recently adopted Republic Supreme Soviet resolution on Ukraine's foreign policy activities is a very important directive for our activities at the UN.

Clearly the work of the permanent mission is carried out under the direct guidance of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, however, we maintain broad contacts with other Republic ministries and departments, submit our proposals to the government and Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet, and promote the establishment of business contacts of individual Ukrainian and U.S. organizations in the sphere of trade-economic and scientific-technical cooperation and also to expand cultural ties with our fellow countrymen abroad.

For several years now, the republic's permanent mission has been actively participating in the practical implementation of a very important project. The question is one of rendering assistance to children who are victims of the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant. The latest meeting just took place between representatives of the leadership of the American Aid to the Children of Chernobyl Fund and Zenon and Nadezhda Matkivkiy. With them, I looked into the issues of future development of cooperation with the Ukrainian Diaspora to render assistance to the victims of Chernobyl,

first of all to the children, and also into the solution of problems to improve our population's medical service. One more example of specific cooperation with sector departments is aid to the "Krasnyy rezinshchik" Plant leadership on the establishment of a joint venture for production of surgical gloves in the United States.

There are also completely new directions in the mission's activities. So, Mstislav, Patriarch of Kiev and all Rus and Metropolitan of the Autocephalic Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the United States, requested that we assist him to consolidate the church's position. For our part, we are submitting a series of proposals on this issue to the republic government.

Naturally, our most important mission is to defend Ukraine's political, economic, and ecological interests in the main forum of international society, in the General Assembly, and in other UN organs. Meanwhile, few people know that today we are actually simultaneously fulfilling the functions of the Ukrainian Embassy to the United States. In this role, right now we are working on how to insure the greatest effectiveness of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet Chairman's visit to the United States.

[Maslov] How did the proclamation of the Ukrainian Declaration on its state sovereignty and the change of status of its permanent UN representative affect mutual relations with the USSR and Belorussian representatives and what new things have appeared in relations with them?

[Udovenko] Relations with the Soviet missions and, in particular, with my colleagues Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and Permanent USSR Representative to the UN Vorontsov and with Belorussian SSR Permanent Representative G. Buravkin are very trusting and amicable. Immediately after adoption of the Declaration by the republic parliament, I officially handed them copies of the document and proposed that we be guided by its provisions in our future relations. They perceived this proposal with complete understanding.

We are continuing to work together in many directions. This concerns first of all the problems of Chernobyl. Recently the three of us paid a visit to the UN Secretary General during the course of which we informed him about the steps being taken to implement the General Assembly decision on overcoming the consequences of the accident at the ChAES [Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant] and exchanged thoughts on the community of nations' future steps in this direction. After the meeting, we sent the appropriate proposals for review in Moscow, Kiev, and Minsk.

The question is often heard in our Supreme Soviet and also during the course of meetings with Ukrainian parliamentarians and representatives of society who have visited the United States: "What does Ukraine have from membership in the UN?" To be perfectly frank, it discourages me. On the one hand, the Declaration on State Sovereignty states the aspiration to establish direct

diplomatic relations with foreign countries and for participation in the Helsinki All-European process. On the other hand, doubt about the benefit of our participation in the community of nations arises among some people.

Membership in the UN serves as the most authoritative confirmation that international society recognizes us as a sovereign state. While using the rostrum of the UN, we can defend our own national interests or strive to get these interests considered in international affairs. For example, the permanent mission became the initiator of the review of the issue on ecological safety and to increase cooperation of countries in the sphere of ecology at the UN General Assembly session. This is an example of how we use the UN rostrum for a comprehensive solution of not only our own but also of the most urgent global problems.

[Maslov] How do you assess the recent decision of the U.S. Administration to render direct assistance to the Baltic republics and Ukraine in the form of shipments of medical supplies?

[Udovenko] Any aid must be purposeful. And I advocate that aid not be some sort of amorphous thing so that it is sent not just anywhere, but to a specific republic. Moreover, we have now received lists of orphanages and hospitals which indicate what specific equipment and medicines they need. Now, when we turn to U.S. social organizations, we suggest that they make direct contact. That is why President G. Bush's decision is, to some degree, a response to our having posed the question. During official meetings in Washington, we talked about the desirability of direct contacts.

I think it is not worth excessively politicizing this issue. On the contrary, we must encourage a differentiated approach with the understanding that this is not promoting the disintegration of the union but it is permitting more effective use of the assistance being offered.

In this regard, I would like to point out that the American press has now begun a wave of sharp criticism as a result of the decision of the USSR Ministry of Public Health and the World Health Organization [WHO] to establish a center in Obninsk to study the aftereffects of the accident at the Chernobyl AES [nuclear power plant]. We are receiving dozens of letters with protests which are also directed to all countries who are members of the UN. The general director of WHO received a similar message. It raises the question: Why is the scientific center to study the aftereffects of the Chernobyl accident being established near Moscow and not near Chernobyl? In the opinions of the letters authors, this fact is evidence that the center is making decisions while being guided by some reason of its own that far from everyone understands. It is no coincidence that, at meetings with us, representatives of the Ukrainian Diaspora express strong concern with regard to the fact that the aid they are rendering is not going where it has been designated to go. We are not bypassing this wave of protest and we are

striving to disseminate our own point of view to the appropriate union ministries and departments.

[Maslov] Recently, signals have begun to arrive from American subscribers to Ukrainian newspapers and magazines that they are receiving practically none of the publications they subscribe to. They say that this is the result of difficulties that have arisen with paper and also with postal deliveries, whose cost recently sharply increased in the United States. However, Ukrainian Americans want to know more about events in the Ukraine in greater detail. What is being done to fill this information shortage?

[Udoenko] The Ukrainian permanent mission regularly sends out its own press releases to public organizations and to the mass media which have expressed the desire to receive them. We maintain contacts with a number of new publications, for example, such as UKRAINIAN DIGEST REVIEW, a commercial bulletin that is published at the facilities of the Ukrainian Institute of America.

For now unfortunately we do not have the facilities for broad dissemination of our own articles in the American mass press. This is one of the reasons why people know so little about Ukraine in the United States.

[Maslov] Today, many people are talking and writing about consolidating the healthy forces of the Ukrainian nation. Unfortunately, the facts are evidence that our fellow countrymen and blood brothers do not always turn out to be persons holding similar views and frequently they also simply harm the cause of the restoration of the Ukraine. How do you see this problem from the position of a veteran of the Ukrainian diplomatic service?

[Udoenko] We are actively participating in the processes of expanding contacts with the Ukrainian Diaspora. Just several days ago, I met with its representatives at the Scientific Society imeni Taras Shevchenko. A day earlier, we had a conversation with Vasiliy Losten, bishop of the Ukrainian Greco-Catholic Church. Syracuse University Professor Doctor Gvozda, president of the Worldwide Association of Ukrainian Peoples, visited the permanent mission for the first time. Just this one short list talks not only about the full activities of the Ukrainian SSR mission but also about the fact that increasingly broad strata of the Ukrainian Diaspora are turning to us.

There certainly are other circles that openly oppose cooperation with Soviet Ukraine, especially with its state representatives. Nevertheless, we are observing the enormous interest of the overwhelming majority of American Ukrainians in the events which are occurring in the land of their ancestors. They are expressing a burning desire to help us in our current difficult time. There are also major entrepreneurs among them, such as Georgiy Yurchishin, former vice-president of Boston Bank and currently head of a major trading company. He is traveling to Ukraine in the next few days where he will meet

with members of our government. He intends to discuss issues associated with large-scale investments in Ukraine's economy. An agreement was recently signed on cooperation to train specialists in the area of management between Kiev International Institute of Management and Fordham University, New York.

The first meeting between the official representatives of Ukraine with Yuriy Shimko, president of the World Congress of Free Ukrainians (SKVU), recently took place. We are moving toward such contacts. Regular meetings with Patriarch Mstislav, dean of the Greco-Catholic Cathedral of St. Yuriy by Father Pashchak, and with other religious figures recently became traditional. This is graphic evidence that we are directing our efforts toward consolidating Ukrainian forces for the sake of promoting positive processes.

Caucasus

Georgian Law on New Ministries, Departments

91US0436A Tbilisi VESTNIK GRUZII in Russian
12 Mar 91 p 2

[Law of the Republic of Georgia "On the Formation and Transformation of Certain Administrative Organs of the Republic of Georgia"]

[Text] The Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Georgia resolves:

To form:

The Ministry of Economics of the Republic of Georgia—on the basis of the State Planning Committee of the Republic of Georgia and the State Committee on Prices of the Republic of Georgia;

The Ministry of Material and Technical Supply and State Reserves of the Republic of Georgia—on the basis of the Republic of Georgia State Committee on Technical and Material Supply, the Republic of Georgia State Planning Committee (partially) and the Georgian Territorial Administration for Material Reserves;

The Ministry for Labor, Social Protection, and Demographics of the Republic of Georgia—on the basis of the Republic of Georgia State Committee for Labor and Social Problems;

The Ministry for Agriculture and Forestry of the Republic of Georgia—on the basis of the Republic of Georgia State Agroindustrial Committee, the Republic of Georgia State Committee for the Protection of Nature and Forestry (partially), and the Main Administration for Land Management and Land Use;

The Ministry for the Food and Processing Industry of the Republic of Georgia—on the basis of Ministry for Bakery Products of the Republic of Georgia and the State Agroindustrial Committee of the Republic of Georgia (the industrial segment);

The Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Georgia—on the basis of the Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Georgia and the Main Scientific-Production Administration for the Protection and Use of Historic and Cultural Artifacts;

The Ministry of Industry of the Republic of Georgia—on the basis of the Ministry of Light Industry of the Republic of Georgia and the Ministry of Local Industries of the Republic of Georgia;

The Ministry for Architecture and Construction of the Republic of Georgia—on the basis of the State Construction Committee of the Republic of Georgia and the Ministry for Housing, Municipal Services, and Consumer Services of the Republic of Georgia;

The Ministry for Ecology and Use of Natural Resources of the Republic of Georgia—on the basis of corresponding administrations of the Republic of Georgia State Committee on Protection of Nature and the Forestry, the Georgian Republic Administration for Hydrometeorology, and the Gruzbergozashchita [Protection of the Georgian Shore Zone] scientific-production association;

The Republic of Georgia Department of Geology, Land Surveying, and Mapping—on the basis of the Gruzgeologia [Georgian Geological Trust] production association.

To transform:

The State Committee on Television and Radio Broadcasting of the Republic of Georgia into the Republic of Georgia Department for Television and Radio Broadcasting;

The State Committee on Physical Culture and Sports of the Republic of Georgia into the Republic of Georgia Department for sports;

The State Committee of the Republic of Georgia on Publishing, Printing, and the Book Trade into the Republic of Georgia Department of the Press.

Z. GAMSAKHURDIYA, chairman,
Republic of Georgia Supreme Soviet
Tbilisi, 28 February 1991.

Georgian Law on Partial Abolition of Death Penalty

AU1104144891 Tbilisi VESTNIK GRUZII in Russian
23 Mar 91 p 2

[Law of the Republic of Georgia on the Abolition of the Exceptional Measure of Punishment, the Death Penalty, for Certain Crimes]

[Text] Being guided by humanitarian and philanthropic principles and also by the demands of citizens and labor collectives and organizations that, as a temporary and necessary measure, the exceptional measure of punishment, the death penalty, should not be applied in the

case of certain crimes, the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Georgia resolves:

I. to abolish the exceptional measure of punishment, the death penalty, for those crimes stipulated in Article 88 (the manufacture or sale of counterfeit money or securities), Article 89 (infringing the rules of hard currency transactions), Article 96 (theft of state or public property on a particularly large scale), and Article 189 (taking bribes) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Georgia.

II. in connection with this, to introduce into the Criminal Code of the Republic of Georgia that has been ratified by the Law of the Republic of Georgia of 30 December 1960 (Proceedings of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Georgia, 1961, No. 1, p 10) the following changes:

1. To change the wording of the first part of Article 24 as follows:

"As the exceptional measure of punishment, until it has been fully abolished, the death penalty—execution by shooting—is to be applied in cases of crimes against the state as stipulated in the present code, premeditated murder with aggravating circumstances as indicated in the articles of the present code which establish responsibility for premeditated murder, and also in the case of certain other crimes specified in the legislation of the Republic of Georgia."

2. To remove the words "or punishable by death with confiscation of property" from the second part of Article 88.

3. To remove the words "or punishable by death with confiscation of property" from the second part of Article 89.

4. To remove the words "or punishable by death with confiscation of property" from Article 96 (1).

5. To remove the words "In the event of especially mitigating circumstances—punishable by death with confiscation of property" from the third part of Article 189.

III. In those sentences in which the exceptional measure of punishment, the death penalty for crimes stipulated in Article 1 of the present code, has not been implemented prior to the enactment of the present law, it is to be replaced in a higher court by the deprivation of freedom for a period up to 15 years.

IV. To bring the present law into force as soon as it has been adopted.

Z. Gamsakhurdia, chairman,
Republic of Georgia Supreme Soviet.
Tbilisi. 20 March 1991.

**Extracts From Official Documents on April 1989
Tbilisi Events**

91US0375A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 15 Mar 91 First Edition pp 3-4

[Article by Yu. Nikolayev under the rubric: "Who Is Demolishing the Union and How": "Tbilisi, April 1989: 140 Volumes Against the Versions"]

[Text] A few days ago, the USSR Procuracy turned over to the USSR Supreme Soviet an "Information Report" on the results of an investigation of the criminal case involving officials and military personnel of the internal forces of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs and Soviet Army who took part in stopping the unsanctioned mass meeting in Tbilisi on 9 April 1989. This imposing document of almost 40 type-written pages contains many reports on the tragedy that either were not made public or were quite deliberately covered up to hide from the public the truth about those responsible for the bloodshed in the streets of the Georgian capital.

A group of people's deputies of the USSR proposed to SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA that it publish the text of the "Information Report." This was motivated not only by the need to reestablish the truth on the events of two years ago, which in and of itself is extremely important, but also by the most current tasks of today. Without understanding the reasons in effect in April 1989, one cannot draw dependable conclusions about what is now taking place in South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and Adzharia and why the torrents of blood inundated the cities and villages of the peaceful people's of the Georgian autonomies.

One could agree with the proposal of the deputies but here another idea came to us. The editor's office turned to the USSR Procuracy with the request that it be allowed to inform the readers of the documentary evidence revealed by the investigation. We received such permission. Even after this, however, it turned out to be no easy job to select the most characteristic and capacious documents. The materials of the case constitute 140 volumes. With the help of forensic medical experts, the investigators interrogated 32 persons from among the citizens on the circumstances of the injuries and poisoning. Locally they carried out 48 forensic medical examinations, questioned more than 100 witnesses and medical specialists, and examined the events and material evidence.

Besides the Research Institute for Forensic Medicine of the USSR Ministry of Health, many oblast, city, and kray bureaus for forensic medical examinations were involved, as were leading toxicologists of various medical institutions. More than 1,000 medical histories and outpatient charts as well as 50 protocols of interviews of suffering persons were prepared and presented to the experts. As a result of this, 2,500 expert's opinions were completed.

The investigative team carefully studied the materials of the commissions of the USSR Supreme Soviet and Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR headed by comrades Tarazavich and Sobchak, respectively. They analyzed materials from the USSR KGB and Ministry of Internal Affairs and from the international organization of the Red Cross.

Of course it is impossible to reproduce such a gigantic volume of information in the pages of a newspaper. Only individual documents or fragments from them are presented for the attention of readers. But even on the basis of them it is possible to make a judgment on the nature of the processes leading to the fatal consequences and on the amount of tension in the Georgian society that lead to unavoidable victims.

"The commission establishes the lack of facts confirming the assertion of General Rodionov at the first Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR to the effect that by 9 April a real threat had arisen of the seizure of vitally important facilities in the republic."—from the report of the commission of A.A. Sobchak to the second Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR.

As we see, the experienced jurist and head of the commission Anatoliy Alexsandrovich Sobchak as well as its members, the well-known people's deputies G.A. Borovik, V.L. Vasilyev, R.A. Sagdeyev, S.V. Stankevich, and others, did not uncover a real threat during the days preceding the appearance of military and police subunits in the square at the Government House and Shota Rustaveli Avenue. By the way, it was not only from the rostrum of parliament that statements were heard to the effect that there was no need for intervention in the natural flow of the passions of the mass meeting. Many newspapers also came out with similar assertions. What took place at the walls of the Government House was presented as something like an innocent folklore festival, the natural companion of the increase in national self-awareness. But here is what the investigation found.

On 27 March 1989, Gamsakhurdia, Tsereteli, and Batiashvili organized an unsanctioned mass public meeting near the university in Tbilisi, where Tsereteli announced the establishment of a new party—a "party for the national independence of Georgia," the goal of which is:

- the fight for the full political independence of Georgia;
- the abolition of Soviet authority in Georgia with the elimination of the Abkhazskaya, Adzharskaya, and Yuzhno-Osetinskaya autonomous republics, the withdrawal of Soviet forces from the territory of the republic, and the secession of Georgia from the USSR;
- declaration of Georgia as an independent state;
- introduction of foreign troops into Georgia; Georgia's joining of the military bloc of NATO;
- establishment of a national army;

—introduction of a Georgian monetary unit and establishment of a national bank with its own currency fund;

—return of Georgian lands annexed after Sovietization and turned over to Turkey, Russia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia, that is, the increase of the territory of Georgia by more than one-third.

An analogous meeting took place on 28 March 1989 with the participation of Gamsakhurdia, Kostava, and others in the assembly hall of the State Polytechnical Institute, where they announced and passed a resolution on the secession of Georgia from the USSR. Gamsakhurdia called for the continuation of acts of protest and for a general refusal to obey authority. In connection with these appeals, there were confrontations and clashes on the 27th and 28th of March between persons of the Georgian and Abkhazian nationalities in the town of Gagra and in Gudautskiy Rayon.

On 1 April 1989, the situation became more complex in Abkhazskaya ASSR. On that day in the village of Leselidze, there was an unsanctioned mass meeting of the Georgian population of the autonomous republic organized by Gamsakhurdia, Kostava, Chkheidze, Chavchavadze, and others, which condemned the appeal of the Abkhazian people to the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers.

In his appearance, Gamsakhurdia asserted that the interethnic conflicts "are organized by Moscow and directed against the entire population of Georgia and the national movement" and he called for a general strike and participation in a mass meeting in Sukhumi on 9 April.

The leaders of the "informals" at the mass meeting also presented demands for the appointment of only Georgian nationals to leading positions in Abkhazia and for the abolition of autonomy. They formulated a declaration to the United Nations asking that it "protect Georgia against Russian imperialism" and achieve its secession from the USSR.

Shocked by this, the Abkhazian part of the population, especially the activists of the "People's Front," demanded the cessation of the mass meetings, demonstrations, and strikes being carried out by the "I. Chavchavadze Society," declaring that the "Abkhazian population is in a resolute and aggressive mood and will not permit the next mass meeting of Georgian nationals even to the point of using firearms." With the return of the demonstrators to Sukhumi, rocks were thrown at one of the buses and another bus was fired upon, as a result of which 24 persons were injured. This did even more to aggravate the interethnic situation. (Vol 36, p 18; Vol 136, p 9).

On 3 April at a mass meeting in Sukhumi, the Abkhazians affirmed the necessity of reforming the Abkhazskaya ASSR into a union republic and of secession

from the Georgian SSR. As a sign of protest, Georgian students declared a strike and did not go to classes.

In the days after that, strikes and meetings continued in Sukhumi, Gali, and other cities and there were appeals at the meetings to resort to even more vigorous forms of protest even to the point of violent actions in relation to the Abkhazians.

In this situation, the law enforcement agencies of Georgia failed to take the proper measures to stabilize public order in the republic, as a result of which the situation became even more difficult and in fact got out of control. (Vol 36, p 18; Vol 136, pp 9-10).

During the course of the 4th through the 9th of April 1989, the leaders and activists of informal associations Gamsakhurdia, Kostava, Tsereteli, Chamhuriya, and others undertook the illegal actions that they had already prepared and organized, grossly violating public order in the capital and in the republic as a whole and aimed at destabilizing the public political situation. They sought to have the destabilization of the situation culminate in a "dress rehearsal of the possibilities of the Georgian people" planned for 14 April, including as a result of the "punishment" of the Abkhazians and then of the Ossetians that they planned for 9 April.

On 4 April 1989, arbitrarily expelling police workers, they occupied the territory in front of the Government House and the Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting and from this time on in Tbilisi and other cities they began to carry out an unsanctioned mass meeting of many thousands, which were sharply anti-Soviet, nationalist, and extremist in nature.

They brought amplifying equipment and microphones to the meetings for the purpose of attracting a larger number of people to themselves.

At the Government House were basically workers of research institutes, publishing houses, and movie studios, employees of different institutions, organizations, and a number of industrial enterprises, students at VUZ's [higher educational institution], and senior pupils at schools for general education. They demanded that those present at the mass meetings, including youths, swear to resist actively, even "to the point of bloodshed," not to yield to the forces for the maintenance of law and order, and to remain at their places until the unconstitutional demands put forward by them were fully satisfied.

Gamsakhurdia, Kostava, Tsereteli, Chamhuriya, and the activists of their parties called on the population to carry out a general political strike and hunger strike in protest, to establish a "unified committee for the popular movement," to engage in a mass refusal to obey legally elected authorities, to establish a "provisional government," to picket industrial and transport enterprises and educational institutions, to establish youth detachments, to seize public transportation, to barricade the streets closest to the places of the mass meetings, and to

organize active resistance to the forces for the maintenance of law and order, "even to the point of bloodshed." They also called for the persons participating in the mass meetings to punish persons of Abkhazian and then of Ossetian nationality in Sukhumi on 9 April, for a violent change in the existing state order in Georgia, for the overthrow of Soviet authority in the republic, and for the secession of Georgia from the USSR. To carry out these unconstitutional demands, Gamsakhurdia, Kostava, Tsereteli, and other leaders of the "informals" appealed on behalf of "the Georgian people" to governments of foreign states to help, calling on them to provide the appropriate assistance and to bring UN troops into the territory of the Georgian SSR.

In the course of the mass demonstrations on the eve of 9 April, along with such slogans and appeals as "No Autonomy in Georgia!," "Eliminate the Autonomy of Abkhazia!," "Down With the Turkish Agency!," "We Demand the Independence of Georgia!," and "For the Secession of Georgia From the USSR!, on the instructions of the leaders of the "informals" the demonstrators also brought along previously prepared banners and placards with anti-Soviet and anti-Russian content: "Down With Soviet Authority!," "Oppress the Russians!," "USSR—Prison of Nations!," "Down With the Rotten Russian Empire!," "Down With the Red Kremlin!," "Down With Russian Occupiers!," "Down With the Fascist Army!," "Russians Get Out of Georgia!," etc.

At the demand of the leaders of the "informals," a "Unified Committee for the Popular Movement," which Gamsakhurdia, Kostava... joined, was established for the practical management of all illegal actions at the mass meeting.

Gamsakhurdia, Tsereteli, and the activists of the informal associations established mobile groups of agitators to inspire mass meetings, demonstrations, hunger strikes, and the picketing of enterprises and institutions in Tbilisi itself as well as other cities of the republic. In striving to give the appearance of the participation of representatives of the working class in their antisocial actions, the leaders of the "informals" resorted to provocative acts. Thus, not having received support from the workers of a number of enterprises, the groups of agitators, having already unrolled prepared banners indicating that these enterprises had joined the strikers, marched through the streets of the city and joined the crowd of those participating in the mass meeting at the Government House.

In the course of these days, there were numerous clashes between groups of rampaging youths and representatives of labor collectives as well as individual representatives of the intelligentsia and police workers, who called on the demonstrators to calm down and to refrain from confrontation with the authorities.

On the part of these groups of young people, there were also insults, threats, and attacks against individual police workers and military personnel.

A characteristic feature: A.A. Sobchak noted at the second Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR: "The organized actions of former 'Afghan-internationalists' was a positive feature in the regulation of conflicts between citizens and military personnel. That is indeed how it was at first but then they were also made participants in the illegal actions.

At the initiative of Gamsakhurdia, Kostava, Tsereteli, Chanturiya, and the activists of their parties, the demonstrators also established armed detachments from among the former soldiers in Afghanistan, athletes, and physically strong men and organized the seizure of buses, trolleys, and trucks with building materials, their use in barricading the streets closest to Rustaveli Avenue and the Government House, and the establishment of a so-called "zone of free Georgia." It was also on their appeal that the demonstrators organized active resistance to the forces for the maintenance of law and order with the preliminary collection for this purpose of sharpened metal rods, chains, pieces of cable, pipes, knives, stones, sticks, packages of explosives, bottles with inflammable mixtures, and other objects as well as money with the objective of acquiring firearms. The leaders of the informal associations categorically refused to enter into any negotiations with the leadership of the republic.

At the unsanctioned mass meeting that took place on 4 April by the building of the medical institute, in which as many as 2,000 to 3,000 students took part, the activists of the informal parties called for those gathering to form a "provisional government of the republic."

At the time of the meeting, they made insulting attacks against the Communist Party and the government of the republic and there were sharply anti-Russian and in general anti-Russian statements. Gamsakhurdia, in particular, noted in his speech that the actions of the republic government "are organized by Moscow and directed against the Georgian people and national movement." He also called on those present to travel to the city of Sukhumi and to take part in the illegal actions planned there for 9 April. The demonstrators passed a resolution, the main points of which amounted to the following:

- declare national disobedience to the government of the republic of Georgian SSR;
- form a "provisional government" of Georgia;
- abolish the Abkhazskaya, Adzharskaya and Yuzhno-Osetinskaya autonomous republics in Georgia;

The unsanctioned mass meetings at the Government House and building of the State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting continued from the morning of 5 April and the number of those participating reached approximately 5-6,000 people. In the addresses of the majority of orators on that as well as subsequent days, in addition to the so-called "Abkhazia question" whose forced resolution was planned for 9 April, the

leaders and activists of the "informals" paid most of their attention to the necessity of carrying out specific practical measures to put pressure on party and state bodies of the republic (political strikes, mass meetings, and appeals to governments of other countries) for the unconstitutional overthrow of Soviet authority in Georgia, the establishment of an "independent Georgian state," and the secession of Georgia from the USSR. The atmosphere at the mass meetings became more and more clearly anti-Soviet, nationalistic, and extremist in nature.

Gamsakhurdia, the leader of the independent "Helsinki group," called for participants in the mass meeting in Tbilisi and the population of Georgia to continue the antisocial actions and, in particular, he declared:

"Historically the Abkhazian nation never existed. If these tribes will understand this, then we will stand by them but only under the condition that they restore historical justice and concede to us our land and establish themselves where they came from...they are fighting against Georgians and Georgia to become Russified. Their goal is Russification and not self-determination. They are not striving for self-determination but to join Russia and to be located in Russia" (Vol 67, pp 142, 146)

At the mass meeting, Tsereteli, the chairman of the "Party for National Independence of Georgia, made the same sort of extremist appeals for an uncompromising struggle against the authorities and persons of the Abkhazian nationality: "It is necessary to abolish the autonomous units established in the territory of Georgia..." (Vol 67, p 140). "...We declare war not only on Abkhazian activists but also on the imperialism of the Kremlin." "...This involves not just Abkhazia...tomorrow such excesses will continue in Ossetia and the day after that in Marneuli and Akhalkalaki" (Vol 67, p 134). "Establish a temporary government of transition...announce to foreign states the establishment of the new government and we and you are obligated to defend it to the last drop of blood."

But here one cannot fail to remember the hysterical cries of our pseudo-democrats in regard to the establishment of "committees for national salvation" in the Baltic states. But here they created unconstitutional committees and parallel illegal structures of authority and for some reason nothing was heard from any Altsyns or Sobchaks, who would have declared: What are you doing, good people? Meanwhile, the separatists continued to act. They passed from hand to hand a so-called "memorandum to the Government of Georgia" that was first published at an unsanctioned mass meeting back in October 1988 and that demanded:

"1. Put an end to the Russification and Armenianization of Adzharia..."

"2. Stop the Armenianization of Meskheta and Dzhavakheti..."

"3. Put an end to the settlement of Guriya, Mingreliya, and Imereti by Armenians and Russians..."

"4. Stop the settlement of Kvarelskiy Rayon by Dagestanis..."

"5. Take measures in Telavskiy, Lagodekhskiy, and Sagaredzhoyskiy rayons, where they are bringing in Azerbaijanis..."

"6. Repatriate the Georgians who migrated to Krasnodar Kray..."

"7. Set up passport gateways at the border posts of Meskheta and Adzharia for citizens registered in Georgian SSR..."

"8. Take effective measures against the enrolling of the children of Georgians in Russian schools..."

"9. Stop the propagandizing of mixed marriages..."

"10. Raise before the union government the question of the return of detached Georgian territories to Georgia..." (Vol 98, pp 184-187).

For the holding of that mass meeting accompanied by violations of public order, 12 of its organizers and active participants, including Gamsakhurdia, Kostava, Tsereteli, and Chanturiya, were each fined from 200 to 800 rubles by decision of the people's court.

"...Political and economic sabotage must be carried out..." (Vol 136, p 61). "...All organizations...Abkhazian, Ossetian, Armenian, Azerbaijani, and of Turks and Meskhetaians...are condemned by our movement and are declared to be anti-Georgian criminal groupings, who will be fought implacably..."

Cases of insults, attacks, and beatings by groups of rampaging persons of other nationalities became more frequent. The work of public transport in the center of the city and in the places of the mass meetings was not resumed. Strikes and unsanctioned mass meetings also continued in Sukhumi and other cities of the republic.

Chairman Gamsakhurdia of the "Helsinki group": "...as long as Soviet authority exists, we will not be able to abolish the autonomies of Abkhazia, Adzharia, and South Ossetia..." (Vol 67, p 339).

Khabazi, another activist, called on those gathered:

"...on behalf of the participants in the meeting, establish in Georgia a truly national government to replace the current one...so that Georgia can become a member of the United Nations...establish diplomatic relations with other countries of the world...join the North Atlantic bloc as a military ally...set up a military and political alliance between Georgia and Israel" (Vol 67, p 366).

B.N. Yeltsin, as we see, was not original in signing with his collaborators from the Baltic republics an appeal to the United Nations. There was already a precedent, as they say.

On 7 April, the social and political situation in Tbilisi and in the republic as a whole continued to worsen and by the end of the day it became extremely tense and took on an intensely anti-Soviet and anticommunist character. The number of those gathered at the Government House increased to 10-12,000 and there were more students on a hunger strike, who were even joined by school children.

There were increased appeals for people to prepare and to take part in the banditry planned for 9 April in Sukhumi and in the "dress rehearsal of the possibilities of the Georgian people" scheduled for 14 April. Additional demands were made for the return to Georgia of lands formerly belonging to it and now part of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Russia, and Turkey....

The activist of the "informals" Saliya: "...we will not lament bloodshed...we came to stand with you...today's resistance will be very great..." (Vol 68, p 57).

The 7 April radio and television address, also broadcast on the square in front of the Government House, of Comrade Patiashvili, first secretary of the Georgian Communist Party Central Committee, who expressed a willingness for dialogue with representatives of informal organizations and who warned that "further development of events will lead to a catastrophe," was not accepted and did not have a positive result. The leaders of the informal associations refused to enter into any negotiations with the government. I. Tsereteli responded with one of his usual program speeches at the mass meeting: "We demand immediate secession from the so-called Russian communist empire. After the secession of Georgia from the USSR, the army of the Russian empire must be withdrawn from Georgia without delay and the authority of the puppet Georgian government must be abolished. UN army elements must enter Georgia to provide temporary protection of our security.... Furthermore Georgia will have to join NATO as a military ally. This is the position of all informal organizations of Georgia."

Lt. Gen. Sh.V. Gorodze, ministry of internal affairs of the Georgian SSR informed the minister of internal affairs of the USSR through an encoded telegram:

"...Beginning in October 1988 to the present time, the "informals" have carried out 6 authorized and 28 unsanctioned mass meetings. On 4 April in Tbilisi, unsanctioned meetings and marches began in connection with the events in Abkhazia ASSR. The number of participants ranged from 500 to 10-12,000 people depending upon the time of day. In the course of the meetings, they raised not only constructive social and political questions but also put forward slogans of a nationalist and in a number of cases anti-Soviet nature...." (Vol 36, p 232).

On the night of the 7th to the 8th of April, Mr. Gumbardze reported by encoded telegram:

"...The situation in Tbilisi has become extremely tense... The confrontation with the authorities was especially vehement in the reaction of the demonstrators to the appeal to them by D.I. Matiashvili, first secretary of the Georgian Communist Party Central Committee, who called for a normalization of the situation. After that there were insulting statements about the Communist Party and government of the republic. Those present, including young people, were made to swear not to give in and to stay at their places until the demands were fully satisfied..." (Vol 133, pp 206-208).

On 7 April 1989, the commander of the forces of Transcaucasus Military District Col Gen N.N. Rodionov sent to USSR Minister of Defense Army Gen. D.T. Yazov an encoded telegram informing of the events and illegal actions of the "informals." In addition, he reported the following:

"...None of the mass meetings was sanctioned and the leadership of the republic is not taking any measures to disperse them. No decisive measures are being taken against the leaders (organizers) of the meetings.

"The troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs are performing the role of observers.

"The leadership of the republic is trying to stabilize the situation with the help of active measures by troops, which will intensify the existing negative attitude toward the army. There are cases of attacks against military personnel, of their being beaten and insulted, and of break-ins into apartments..." (Vol 36, pp 152-154).

At 20:35 on 7 April 1989, an encoded telegram with the following content was sent to the CPSU Central Committee under Patiashvili's signature:

"...The situation in the republic has recently worsened dramatically. Extremist elements are inciting nationalistic moods, calling for strikes and disobedience to authorities, organizing disorder, and discrediting party and Soviet bodies. It is necessary to take extreme measures in the existing situation.

"We consider it necessary:

1. immediately to bring to criminal and administrative account extremists who are coming out with anti-Soviet, antisocial, and antiparty slogans and appeals (there are legal justifications for this).
2. with the bringing in of additional forces of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Transcaucasus Military District, declare martial law in Tbilisi.
3. to carry out through the forces of the party, soviet, and economic aktiv a complex of political, organizational, and administrative measures to stabilize the situation.
4. not to allow publications in the union and republic mass media that complicate the situation..." (Vol, 36, p 91).

In connection with the appeals of the republic leadership to union bodies for help on 7 April, the indicated questions were discussed at a conference in the CPSU Central Committee, which was participated in by members of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo comrades Ye.K. Ligachev, V.A. Medvedev, N.N. Slyunkov, and V.M. Chebrikov and candidate members of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo comrades A.I. Lukyanov, G.P. Razumovskiy, and L.T. Yazov as well as Chairman of the USSR KGB Comrade V.A. Kryuchkov, Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR Comrade V.P. Trushin, and other responsible workers.

Giving an explanation on this account when questioned, USSR Minister of Defense D.T. Yazov declared the following:

"...In the course of discussion of these matters, the decision was made to give the Government of Georgia the necessary help through the forces and means of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs and Ministry of Defense. It was not discussed at the conference in what specific form this help of the union ministries ought to be expressed. It was a matter of the necessity of providing assistance to maintain public order in Tbilisi. The leadership of the ministries was itself supposed to decide the question of the allocation of the necessary forces within the limits of its powers. At the conference, however, it was emphasized that the leadership of the republic must demonstrate extreme discretion in utilizing the forces and means allocated, undertaking all measures for the normalization of the situation through political means. In this regard, it was also decided that on 8 April comrades E.A. Shevardnadze and G.P. Razumovskiy would fly out to Tbilisi and for this reason the recommendation was made not to declare martial law in the city for the time being...." (Vol 98, p 207).

But neither Shevardnadze nor Razumovskiy went to Tbilisi on that day.... Meanwhile, the leadership of the republic, as Colonel General Rodionov reported to the ministry of defense, "sees the declaration of martial law as a possibility to remove from itself full responsibility for the events...the declaration of martial law is unsuitable and even harmful..." (Vol 36, pp 157-161). This was written by the same general whom to this day the supposedly "democratic" press and our most humane parliamentarians are accusing of practically every deadly sin, whereas it was he who restrained the use of extreme measures until the last hour.

It follows from the materials of the case that the question of the demonstration of combat equipment through the forces of two squadrons and three companies was tentatively discussed on 7 April at the Communist Party Central Committee Bureau as one of the preventive measures against those participating in the mass meeting. In accordance with the decision made by the leadership of the republic and command of the Transcaucasus Military District and Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Georgian SSR, military helicopters flew around the city at a low altitude on the morning of 8 April. Then, around noon,

three columns of combat equipment passed through the streets of the city along different routes, two of which also had to pass through Rustaveli Avenue.

At the time of the movement along the indicated avenue by one of the columns made up of 10 infantry fighting vehicles (BMP), the demonstrators began to throw rocks, metal urns, and other objects at the fighting vehicles, to jump on the armor, and to obscure the view of drivers. At the movie theater "Rustaveli," a group of rampaging youths seized a patrol vehicle of the State Motor Vehicle Inspectorate "VAZ-2121" ("Niva") and, turning it at right angles to the traffic lanes of the avenue in the immediately vicinity of a moving BMP, caused the collision of the latter with the "Niva" and, after beating up its driver, the police officer Megalladze, tried to make him lie down under the BMP.

As a result of the hooliganism of the demonstrators, six servicemen received bodily injuries in the form of contusions, abrasions, and bruises, a vehicle of the military motor vehicle inspectorate accompanying the column was damaged, and the above-mentioned patrol vehicle of the State Motor Vehicle Inspectorate was completely deformed (Vol 36, p 162; Vol 94, pp 273-292, 300-321, 324-335, 340-342; Vol 98, pp 9-10, 101).

Thus, the witness V.I. Molochko, who was leader of the column of infantry fighting vehicles, stated:

"...They threw rocks at me and hit me with flagpoles. In dodging the rocks, I ducked my head and at that moment received a blow to the head.... The blow was rather powerful against my interphone headset and it caused me to fall through the hatch into the BMP. From the inside I saw how people were already running around on the armor.... With difficulty I was able to close the hatch. The column began to move forward slowly in first gear" (Vol 94, pp 293-299).

Groups of rampaging elements from among the demonstrators at the Government House subjected a number of employees of the State Motor Vehicle Inspectorate to verbal and physical abuse.

N.V. Minadze, senior lieutenant of the police: "...when the armored personnel carriers passed us, young people who had gathered from among the demonstrators began to insult the workers of the State Motor Vehicle Inspectorate...with very vile language. They stripped the shoulder straps off of my jacket and to save myself I had to run from the young people and hide in the agency vehicle. When I jumped into my vehicle, one of the young people grabbed me by the hair and tried to drag my out into the street. I got free of his grasp, looked around, and saw a tuft of my own hair in the hand of this person..."

"...Someone in the crowd hit me in the back with his fist. Nevertheless, I was able to close the doors of the vehicle and get it started. Then I saw that in the vehicle were Senior Lieutenant Butskhkrikidze and Major Gioshvili, who also had parts of their shoulder straps ripped off and

torn uniforms. When I started the vehicle, the crowd parted and we began to move forward. In driving past these people, I felt how they were hitting my official vehicle with their fists and shoes and some hard objects. Later on it was in repair in connection with the damage..." (Vol 94, p 19/30).

The witness A.I. Butskhrikidze gave similar testimony: "...The attackers had an indecent appearance and cursed me and the other police workers with very vile language. Many of them reeked of liquor.... Senior Lieutenant Minadze got into the vehicle after me and then Major Gioshvili. They were also agitated. The young people tried to open the doors of the vehicle and grabbed at our clothes and hair, while we tried to protect ourselves. Personally they tore my uniform shirt, ripped a sleeve, and tore off a shoulder strap...." (Vol 94, pp 31-43).

Thus, the attempt made on the morning of 8 April 1989 to stabilize the situation in Tbilisi through the demonstration of combat equipment did not achieve its goal of prevention. During the day of 8 April, the social and political situation in Tbilisi and in the republic as a whole was boundless, as they say. And today it is simply astounding how our parliamentarians and journalists—"democrats"—continued so persistently to try to find out who among the leaders of the USSR sanctioned the participation of military personnel and special subdivisions of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in driving the demonstrators from the square near the Government House and did not at all consider the entire complex of extraordinary circumstances coming about in Tbilisi through current well-known persons. Why did they not take into account the massive and increasingly aggressive nature of the violations of social order essentially indicating the practical preparation in the capital of the republic and in Abkhazia of large-scale provocative actions with unpredictable consequences in the future.

Every life is priceless and its forced deprivation cannot be justified. But in that tragedy in Tbilisi, just as in any other, it is extremely important to clarify who was the killer and who was the victim.

The more you become familiar with the materials of the investigation in detail, the more you are astonished by the cynicism of the organizers of the historic unruliness at the Government House and their barbaric methods and willingness to go to all extremes to achieve their objectives.

Speculating on the national and patriotic feelings of those present and calling for their sacrifices "in the name of the freedom and independence of Georgia"—the leaders of the informal associations and their supporters sought at any price to keep the people at the square. At the call of Gamsakhurdia, Tsereteli, and others of the group of militants (former soldiers in Afghanistan, athletes, and young men), they began to seize public transportation and trucks with building materials and to use them to barricade the central streets of the city near the place of the mass public meeting and in the region of

Rustaveli Avenue at the Government House, creating so-called "zones of free Georgia."

This was explained through the supposed necessity of blocking the road to tanks and making it safe for the demonstrators. And initially the people could not understand that they were actually being driven into a trap. If they had started to dislodge the demonstrators through the use of force, and they were repeatedly warned about this by the leaders of the republic and workers of law enforcement agencies, they would not have had anywhere to go because of the barricades. Especially reprehensible was the fact that it was children in the intermediate and senior classes who were being penned up on a massive scale. In particular, on the eve of that they had made the following appeals to the demonstrators:

"...Teachers and school directors! Do not hinder the participation of your students in the strikes and demonstrations, do not lose your authority over them.... Compatriots! I appeal to all teachers to join ranks with their students..." (Vol 98, pp 213-214).

In inciting illegal actions, the chairman of the "party for the national independence of Georgia" I. Tsereteli declared at the mass meeting: "Long live uncompromising struggle! Troops and tanks have come here. No military people with clubs and in helmets must intimidate...." (Vol 68, p 181),

The parliamentary commission accused the government and the leaders of the Georgian Communist Party of not exhausting the political possibilities for acting on those gathered at the Government House. There is probably some justification for this assertion. But one must bear in mind who did everything possible to avoid dialogue and compromise. That same Tsereteli declared:

"...yesterday representatives of the intelligentsia came as mediators and declared that the situation in the republic was very acute and that they wanted to try to come to an agreement with us on the establishment of dialogue for the achievement of the common goal...we did not agree to negotiate with local authorities..."

I. Tsereteli also announced to those gathered that "standing with us is a delegation from Lithuania that is declaring its solidarity with us" (Vol 68, p 172).

The separatists of all kinds joined forces...

Among those present, of course, there were also people who sincerely believed that they were here on behalf of high goals—freedom and independence.

G. Petriashvili (writer): "Know that to die in bed is difficult but it is sweet to die in the name of the people, as did the children who laid down under the tanks. Know that we are approaching our cherished goal and dream of independence..." (Vol 68, pp 176-177).

From the statement of Mochavariani at the mass meeting: "...The question of happiness or unhappiness is being decided today in Georgia and today it will be clear

who has been betrayed and who loves the Fatherland more...today I and my family are with you and will remain with you until our last breath" (Vol 68, p 203).

Here we clearly ought to make a quite necessary explanation. Of course every people has the right to live as it wishes. If there is no desire to be in a single Union, there is the corresponding procedure for secession from it that has been developed and affirmed. Why take illegal actions in conflict with existing legislation and then "lie down under the tanks"? And is it moral to strive for freedom for oneself at the expense of the lack of freedom and humiliation of people who have lived next door to you for centuries? What the leaders of the informals were preparing to do is quite apparent from the declarations and appeals of the "Ilya Pravenny Society" and the "Ilya Chavchavadze Society."

"...Georgians must see to that Galskiy, Gulripshskiy, Gagrskiy, and Sukhumskiy rayons and part of Ochamchirskiy Rayon as well as the city of Sukhumi are separated from Abkhazia... It is inadmissible to return to Georgia not only the Meskhy and the Kurds deported in the past and the Turkomans... Along with the Russian danger as the largest national threat, no less frightening is the Turkish threat, which comes directly from Turkey as well as from the entire Moslem world as a whole... Turkey already has a loyal ally in the person of the rapidly multiplying Azerbaijani population in Georgia... If one adds to this the Meskhy, Kurds, and Turkomans... who are multiplying no less rapidly than the Azerbaijanis, then this is a policy favoring the interests of Turkey... We consider Georgians to be only those who recognize themselves as Georgian. A Georgian with a pro-Turkish orientation is still a Turk for us and there is not and cannot be a place for a Turk in Georgia...." (Vol 136, pp 99-114).

So you see they sought enemies and stirred up the young people and prepared to sacrifice them.

From the statements of the citizen T.Sh. Ninua: "Around noon on 8 April 1989, the information leaked out that tear gas might be used against the demonstrators. My sister and I began to prepare soda solutions. There was sodium bicarbonate in the pharmacy of the medical station... We poured the prepared solution into lemonade bottles and altogether we poured at least 100 bottles" (Vol 29, pp 164-166).

L.G. Drozdovskaya: "I noticed that the demonstrators were excited and in an aggressive mood and accordingly I got the impression that this was not a peaceful demonstration" (Vol 61, p 196). The witnesses V.N. Lesnikova and M.Yu. Popova told about this same thing under cross examination, whereby the latter declared that for her "it became frightening, for the crowd was becoming wild literally before her eyes" (Vol 61, p 250; Vol 90, pp 93-96). N. A. Vintonyak: "I saw many people in a drunken state and saw metal rods on the ground...."

M.V. Yarovenko: "About 0100 on 9 April, a GAZ-24 with a "universal" body stopped about 100 meters from

the Government House. The driver of the vehicle brought 2 cases of vodka and began to distribute it free of charge to the demonstrators. I saw just two cases but it may be that he had more cases of vodka. The driver was a Georgian about 40 to 45 years old..." (Vol 61, pp 223-224).

The delivery of alcoholic beverages to the mass meeting and the presence of a large number of intoxicated persons among the demonstrators is also confirmed by other materials of the case.

It was under such circumstances that the meeting of the Central Committee Bureau of the Georgian Communist Party was held on 8 April, where they discussed the situation in Tbilisi and the plan for priority political and organizational measures, including measures for the establishment of order and then the assembly of the republic's party aktiv. Here are the opinions of several of those speaking there.

N.M. Lekishvili: "...when the normal life of the city is paralyzed, when they organize strikes by force, and when they intimidate the population and insult people—this cannot be and is not an integral part of democracy...." Another participant in the party aktiv R.Kh. Kontselidze: "I was at this mass meeting yesterday until 3 in the morning. I left there frightened. This is fascism..." (Vol 36, p 129).

At the conclusion of the work of the party aktiv, the meeting of the Central Committee Bureau of the Georgian Communist Party continued and there they affirmed a resolution of the aktiv and the plan adopted there for measures to stabilize the situation" (protocol No 122/1 from 8 April 1989). Taking into account the "dramatic worsening of the political situation in the republic," the Central Committee Bureau of the Georgian Communist Party decreed (protocol No 122/2 from 8 April 1989):

"1. Take measures to free the square in front of the building of the Government House from participants in the unsanctioned mass meeting of many thousands with the help of the police, forces of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and subunits of the Soviet Army.

"2. Entrust the management of the realization of this operation to the commander of the Transcaucasus Military District Col. Gen. I.N. Rodionov" (Vol 36, pp 73, 141-144; Vol 98, pp 56, 157-158).

In this regard, the witness I.N. Rodionov stated the following: "The question of the use of force arose for the leadership whenever the crowd gathered at the Government House.... And here the question began to arise on 5 April and by 6 April it was already more urgent. But inasmuch as it was possible on the 5th, 6th, or even 7th of April to resolve the question of clearing the center of the city of demonstrators through forces of the Ministry of Internal Affairs..., I was categorically against the use of other forces and means. But by 8 April, when the

nature of the mass meeting had become clearly aggressive and the consequences were becoming unpredictable. I, just as all the members of the bureau, was in favor of the use of force, because I could no longer see any other effective measures" (Vol 98, pp 102-103).

In the opinion of Maj. Gen. Yu.T. Yefimov, who arrived in Tbilisi on 7 April 1989 from the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, even on 7 April the internal affairs agencies of Georgia could not have handled the situation with their own forces: "...In the first place, they had lost time, for the situation in the city was heating up with each passing day, the number of demonstrators was getting larger and larger, and the number of strikers of enterprises was growing. Secondly, most of the police were demoralized and the workers of the republic's internal affairs agencies were not able to maintain public order properly and counteract rampaging elements actively" (Vol 98, p 5).

At 17:30 on 8 April 1989, the members of the Defense Council (D.I. Patiashvili, B.V. Nikolskiy, O.Ye. Cherkeziya, Z.A. Chkheidze, G.G. Gumbaridze) held a meeting with the participation of representatives of the military command (K.A. Kochetov, I.N. Rodionov, A.N. Novikov) and heads of law enforcement agencies (Sh.V. Gorgodze, A.G. Karanadze, V.A. Sharashenidze, N.Kh. Shoshiashvili), in which the political situation in the republic was assessed as extremely tense, "bordering on catastrophic." In the course of the meeting, all of its participants once again unanimously expressed the necessity of "taking rapid and decisive measures within the scope of the law to restore the normal life and activities of the republic." In addition, a time was set for carrying out the operation—the night before 9 April. They thereby took into account that on the preceding days the fewest people remained at the square by the Government House during these hours. It was proposed to the Council of Ministers of the Georgian SSR that it issue the corresponding decree as the legal basis for the actions of the agencies of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the military elements involved in the establishment of public order.

P.I. Georgadze, assistant to the first secretary of the Georgian Communist Party Central Committee, stated under questioning that in the course of the meeting they discussed the question of the time for the carrying out of the operation—the period between 0300 and 0400 on 9 April. Here it was stated that ahead of the internal forces must go representatives of the party aktiv, behind them forces of the Georgian Ministry of Internal Affairs, and then the forces of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs. Elements of the Soviet Army must go last so as to protect the Government House after the freeing of Rustaveli Avenue from demonstrators. The plan of operations was not discussed in detail at the meeting, its elaboration being entrusted to Rodionov and Gorgodze. (Vol 98, pp 188-189).

The witness D.I. Patiashvili stated that at the meeting of the Defense Council they discussed the question of the

arrest of the leaders of informal organizations (for which the heads of law enforcement agencies were invited) and specified the time for the carrying out of the operation and other matters having to do with the imminent operation. In particular, "to avoid a confrontation between the army and demonstrators, firm instructions were given to put in the first rows definitely only representatives of the Georgian police, then forces of the Ministry of Internal Affairs armed with shields and clubs, and only after them must the freed square be occupied by military subunits of the Transcaucasus Military District.

The witness D.I. Patiashvili thereby explained that there were no instructions or directions from central agencies or union ministries to use force against the demonstrators.

Patiashvili declared: "...After this tragedy, much became clear to me and no less tragic, because after my departure from the position of first secretary responsible people and officials who bear specific responsibility for order, discipline, security, and the political situation in the republic changed their previous position, that is, the position that they held prior to 9 April—they lie, behave dishonestly, shirk responsibility, and create the opinion in public that they supposedly knew nothing and did not see anything or know anything about the operation that was carried out on 9 April.

"Some unpleasant things are now being invented that are quite illogical and not typical of our work" (Vol 98, pp 56-62, 203-205).

Former commander of the forces of the Transcaucasus Military District Col. Gen. I.N. Rodionov:

"...The situation arising in the republic in February and March 1989 was the logical continuation of the extremism throughout the summer and fall of 1988... As early as November 1988, the leadership of the republic came to a decision and raised the question of the declaration of martial law in Tbilisi. The garrison troops repeatedly guarded government and other vitally important facilities, for there was the possibility of an attempt to seize them. I personally viewed in the increase in extremism and nationalism as criminal connivance, flirtation, and the failure to take specific measures to prevent unsanctioned, illegal, and clearly counterrevolutionary actions on the part of the leadership of the republic and toward extremist and nationalist leaders.

"I was also surprised by the position of the leadership of the republic toward the events taking place in 1988 and on the eve of the April events. Overall the situation was assessed properly and the reasons and purpose for what happened were also evaluated properly but, other than numerous meetings and conversations, no specific political or law enforcement measures were taken.... And the agencies of the republic Ministry of Internal Affairs, which even before that time had not enjoyed the respect and confidence of the leadership and population, gradually became quite inactive as well.... At all emergency

meetings, the question arose of bringing in the Soviet Army for the establishment and maintenance of order, to which I and the military council of the district reacted extremely negatively.

"The situation in April differed from the preceding months through the heating up of a fierce extremism, nationalism, and anti-Sovietism with appeals for punishment and the seizure of power..." (Vol 98, pp 93-96, 98).

In accordance with established norms, the internal forces were equipped in the following manner: steel helmets, bulletproof vests, rubber clubs (PR-73), and plastic and metal shields; the officers were armed with personal weapons. The Fourth Motorized Rifle Regiment had a crew for the use of special substances acting like tear gas. The parachute assault subdivisions were equipped with steel helmets, bulletproof vests, and small infantry shovels, whereas the officers and warrant officers were armed with regular-issue weapons.

In accordance with the general plan for the operation by the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Georgian SSR on the basis of order No 18 of Lt. Gen. Sh.V. Gorgodze from 8 April 1989, on that same day a plan was worked out and confirmed by the latter for the interaction of forces of the republic police with elements of the internal troops in the course of the operation. Under this plan, an operational group of criminal investigation workers (125 people) headed by Col. T.N. Vardanashvili, chief of the UUR [expansion not given] of the Georgian SSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, was assigned the task at 4:00 of arresting the "organizers and active participants in the mass meeting" (Tsereteli, Gamsakhurdia, Kostava, and other lawbreakers).

This plan instructed:

- 250 police workers not only to block entrance into the Government House but also to ensure the evacuation of the participants in the hunger strike and their transport to institutions for treatment;
- the convoy company of the Internal Affairs Directorate of the Tbilisi Gorispolkom (60 people) to block the exit from Chichinadze Street to Rustaveli Avenue and thereby cover the left flank of the First Battalion of military unit 3219 in its advance from Chichinadze Street to the stairway of the Government House.

The overall leadership of the forces of the republic police involved in the operation was entrusted to Col. R.L. Gventsadze, chief of the Internal Affairs Directorate of the Tbilisi Gorispolkom.

Also, in connection with the "barricading" of Rustaveli Avenue by trucks, the State Motor Vehicle Inspectorate of the republic Ministry of Internal Affairs was entrusted with unblocking the streets adjacent to it at the beginning of the operation.

The employees of the State Motor Vehicle Inspectorate were not able to carry out their mission, however, because groups of rowdy youths did not admit them to

these barricades (subsequently, about 0100, at the request of Gventsadze and by order of Gamsakhurdia, the demonstrators themselves freed Putseladze and Dzhorzhiadze streets from the trucks). The convoy company of the city Internal Affairs Directorate was not posted for the cordoning off of Chichinadze Street.

The indicated omissions and inaction of the republic police substantially complicated in the course of the operation execution by the first and second battalions of military unit 3219—movement toward the Government House through the streets blocked by trucks.

Moreover, from 0100 until the start of the operation, the minister of internal affairs of Georgian SSR, Comrade Sh.V. Gorgodze, contrary to the set plan and his own written order No 18, ordered Lieutenant Colonel Gventsadze to rescind the arrest of the leaders and activists of the mass meeting, which also complicated the carrying out of the operation, for in the course of the ejection precisely these persons had organized the active resistance to demonstrating servicemen.

After repeated warnings on the use of force, when it had already become quite obvious that the troops and military equipment concentrated 200 meters away (on Lenin Square) would soon move along the avenue to the Government House to put a stop to the mass meeting, music and songs were heard at 3:50 coming from amplifying equipment on the square and small groups of demonstrators started to dance at separate places on the avenue near the Government House. The specially prepared sound recording of dance melodies and, at the same time, the clearly ostentatious and unnatural rejoicing at the moment of an imminent danger and the present of persons, including representatives of the mass media with photographic and video equipment indicate that the leaders of the informal associations, acting in accordance with a previously devised scenario, were striving to give the mass meeting the appearance of a harmless and peaceful demonstration.

The witness Yu.T. Yefimov, who in carrying out the operation was in charge of operational units of the internal troops as well as special subunits of the police, emphasized under questioning that the operational plan foresaw the ejection of the demonstrators from the square and then from Rustaveli Avenue but by no means their encirclement. As for the involvement of a parachute assault regiment of the Soviet Army in the execution of the operation, the witness Yefimov explained:

"Our forces were sufficient to carry out the operation itself.... But these forces were clearly not enough for the subsequent protection of the Government House and the blocking of the avenue. This is why I requested help from Comrade Rodionov, who detached a parachute assault regiment to carry out of the operation. The members of the airborne assault force were assigned to help, because they were supposed to perform the crucial task—that of protecting the Government House and blocking all streets leading to the avenue in this region after the

ejection of the demonstrators from the square. I want to stress that under the operational plan the members of the airborne assault force were not supposed to take part in the ejection of the demonstrators. This mission was put on the subunits of the internal troops, the personnel of military units 3419 and 3218..." (Vol 98, pp 13-14, 17-18).

In giving an explanation to the commission of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Gorgodze said in regard to the execution of the plan for the arrest of the organizers of the mass meeting that at 0200 on 9 April he received instructions from Patiashvili "not to arrest the people." (Vol 134, p 53).

The reader will probably understand how difficult it is to write about the operation for the so-called ejection of the demonstrators from the square in front of the Government House. It must be supposed that they did not please the demonstrators either, except for those who were already prepared to pay with the blood of their fellow citizens to satisfy their own claims to power. But it is necessary to talk about all of this, especially when certain politicians and journalists did everything they could so as to utilize practically every one of those dramatic minutes to discredit or openly defame the Soviet Army and its warriors and commanders. Even though—and the materials of the investigation prove this quite convincingly—they demonstrated discipline, firmness, self-control, responsibility, and outstanding human qualities in an extremely dramatic situation.

The tasks for the personnel of military unit 3419 in the impending operation were specified by the order No. 77 from 9 April 1989 of its commander, A.M. Baklanov. The order notes, among other things: "...Pay particular attention to the order of the utilization of the means of active defense and special substances and the observance of socialist legality.... I forbid the use of rubber clubs against women and minors...." (Vol. 70, pp 55-56). Analogous instructions on the planning of the operation and its tasks for the personnel of military unit 3219 were given by its commander, Col. L.V. Vyskrebenits.

Gventsadze (chief of the Internal Affairs Directorate of the Tbilisi Gorispolkom) stated that by order of Gorgodze at 0400 on 9 April 1989 he used a megaphone to appeal to the demonstrators at the Government House to leave the square, warning them that otherwise troops would be used to free the square of the demonstrators. Seeing that his words were of no avail, he had Gamsakhurdia called, to whom he suggested that he talk with other "leaders" and then all of them together could convince the people to disperse. He explained to Gamsakhurdia that in the event of their refusal the troops would be employed and that victims were possible in such a crowd of people, for the demonstrators might crush each other. But Gamsakhurdia declared that "no one of the demonstrators will leave the square in front of the Government House before 14 April 1989."

At 0400 on 9 April 1989, as foreseen by the plan for the command of Colonel General Rodionov, subunits of the regiment deployed in three ranks along the entire width of Rustaveli Avenue slowly moved toward the Government House. Armored personnel carriers moved ahead of them at minimum speed 20 to 40 meters apart in the traffic lanes. Immediately behind the files of troops (the group for ejection) moved the group for the use of special substances and also a cover platoon. After them came fire engines and a medical bus. Also on the avenue on the right and left flanks of the regiment followed the second and third parachute assault battalions in columns.

From the first minutes of the movement of the files of troops along the avenue, the servicemen of the assault subunits at Lenin Square as well as traveling along the avenue at the junction of Putseladze Street and the Pioneer House were subjected to an attack by a group of rowdy youths. Even before the combat formations engaged the demonstrators on the square in front of the Government House, six members of the assault force received bodily injuries of varying degrees of severity from blows from rocks, bottles, and other objects.

P.P. Rybak:

"A group of youths ran out of the underground passage to the square and began to throw rocks, sticks, and broken bottles at us. One hit me in the knee and then from a distance of five meters someone hurled a brick that hit me in the head. I lost consciousness from the blow and came to in the hospital, where they treated me for a concussion until 20 April 1989" (Vol 12, pp 155-163).

And here is testimony from the other side. M.G. Teradze: "...I saw that some of the men—it is said that they were karate experts—were the first to enter into combat with the soldiers and were rather successful..." (Vol 83, pp 79-85)

G.D. Vochorishvili (21 years old): "...I am an athlete and I practice physical culture and the martial arts. I came to the demonstration with the purpose of protecting the demonstrators against physical punishment by the military people....

"I fought with the soldiers without caring for my life... My fists were all bloody, because even though I practice ushu I still scraped up my fists from the blows..." (Vol 101, pp 105-107).

By no means helpless people stood in the way of the soldiers trying to carry out a difficult order. It ought to be time to stop speculating about the defenselessness of the demonstrators.

In giving his explanation of the circumstances of the ejection of the demonstrators from the square, the witness A.M. Baklanov also stated:

"...In their approach to the square in front of the Government House and before they even reached Chitadze Street, the files of troops stopped and once again

appealed to the demonstrators through a megaphone to leave the square. Some of the citizens began to leave the square by way of Putseladze and Dzhorzhiadze streets (the indicated streets were free of traffic, that is, they were not blocked) and some of them passed through our files in lanes organized by soldiers. Some of them left the square on sidewalks (toward Lenin Square) and we did not hinder anyone.

"I wish to note that the organization of such lanes created serious difficulties for the servicemen in the course of the operation, subjecting them to the danger of being injured, for this disrupted the integrity of the military files and hence the protection of the soldiers. It is one thing when the servicemen moved compactly, tightly covered by shields, and another when they continually had to "open up" to let citizens through. Despite this danger, we were forced to organize passageways so as to avoid an excessive number of victims among the demonstrators..." (Vol 98, pp 39-40).

Police Sergeant Kh.A. Karosliyev: "As the troops advanced, the resistance of the crowd increased. The soldiers began to press with their shields and this touched off insults and cursing. They threw bottles, jars, rocks, and stakes and the soldiers began to hit them with their clubs. After that, the people ran..." (Vol 45, pp 46-47).

I.O. Abalkin, junior sergeant of the police: "Initially the servicemen stopped alongside the demonstrators. But when empty bottles and other suitable objects flew in their direction, the servicemen started to dispel the demonstrators. At first they seemed to push them away from themselves but then, seeing that the situation was getting out of hand..., they began to use clubs..." (Vol 27, pp 77-79).

Police Sergeant N.Sh. Bigashvili: "In the front rows of demonstrators, strong men came into contact with the internal troops. Then they got scared and began to disperse and this is why the women were trampled..." (Vol 27, pp 33-36).

Several dozen people gave testimony about the circumstances of the "ejection" and all of them noted essentially the same thing.

One participant in the mass meeting, the witness L.G. Butskhrikidze, described the ejection this way: "...the soldiers started to expel the unruly mass of demonstrators. Rocks, empty bottles, and garbage cans were thrown at the soldiers. As a result of this resistance, someone hit me in the hand...I got the head injury not from a soldier but from a guy trying to get out of the crowd..." (Vol 100, pp 125-127).

Sergeant I.S. Yurchenko: "...I saw that a woman whom we let through went across to the side of the Government House and was hit in the head above the left ear by a bottle that flew in our direction. I saw that the bottle

broke upon impact and the woman staggered, the left part of her face covered with blood..." (Vol 28, pp 125-130).

Senior Sergeant A.V. Vilkov: "...When we moved, the women started rushing around and some asked us to help them get to our rear. But the men did not let them..."

It is dreadful to read these lines....

The critical situation fraught with a marked increase in losses of personnel and the disruption of the operation and also the lack of reserve forces of the Ministry of Internal Affairs forced Colonel General Rodionov at the request of Major General Yefimov to detach a parachute assault company numbering 59 men to help the ejection group. Deploying in a file, they joined the left flank of the Fourth Regiment and together with them expelled the demonstrators from the lawns and balustrades of the right wing of the Government House including to the stairway. Defending themselves against the flying objects and the men demonstrators who were attacking them, the assault soldiers used their small infantry shovels in individual cases. After this short (no longer than 10 minutes) contact with the demonstrators, the personnel of the parachute assault subunits, as foreseen by the plan, carried out only guard functions and did not participate in the further ejection.

In explaining the reasons for the decision made to bring a parachute assault company into the operation, the witness I.N. Podionov stated:

"Only extreme necessity forced me to make such a decision. Otherwise the number of injured among the servicemen of the internal troops would have been significantly greater and the ejection operation itself would have been threatened..." (Vol 98, pp 221-222).

In the course of the investigation, servicemen of the Seventh Parachute Assault Company stated that they used force against the demonstrators only in the case of resistance and they used the infantry shovels for self-defense. Private K.V. Koltsov: "We tried not to let them get behind us to avoid any danger for ourselves. It was necessary to grab the demonstrators and to push them forward. We had to punch and kick those who resisted. Some of them threw rocks, sticks, and bottles at us. We had to protect ourselves with our sapper shovels... When one of the demonstrators grabbed my arm, I hit him on the arm with my shovel..." (Vol 32, pp 195-196).

Now about the consequences reported to the USSR Supreme Soviet.

In the course of stopping the mass meeting, 19 people died, of whom three were men and 16 were women. Among the women, two were 15 and 16 years old. Eighteen people died of mechanical asphyxiation from compression of the chest, two of whom died in the hospital after 9 April, and one person (Kvasoliashvili) died from a serious cranial injury received from a blow

against a blunt rigid object as the result of a fall at the time of active resistance to servicemen through karate techniques.

The conclusions of the Research Institute for Forensic Medicine of the USSR Ministry of Health on the reasons for the death of demonstrators as a result of mechanical asphyxiation also agree with other evidence, including the conclusions of forensic, chemical, physical, and toxicological investigations.

According to the results of the investigation of samples of fabric from the clothing of those killed as well as control objects picked up at the place of their death, there were no signs that they had come into contact with the gases "KhAF" or "SI-Es" or any other toxic substances. Taking into account the weather conditions and the quantity, the special substances used did not cause a concentration of gases dangerous to life.

The bodily injuries inflicted on the men participating in the resistance caused by the sapper shovels—minor bodily injuries resulting in a short-term impairment of health. The information on the large number of people suffering injuries caused by shovels has no basis in fact.

The information of the Georgian SSR Ministry of Health on the injuries of 282 participants in the mass meeting has been checked out. It has been determined that 69 of them did not suffer from the events of 9 April but on other days or the data indicated in the medical documents were invented. There is objective confirmation of 141 injuries of demonstrators, of whom 74 suffered from the actions of servicemen and the rest from the actions of the demonstrators themselves or other reasons.

According to the information of the Georgian SSR Ministry of Health, more than 4,000 people came for medical help by reason of toxic effects from chemical substances. It was ascertained that for only 13 persons were the toxic effects caused by the use of special substances by soldiers. Of them, one person had minor bodily injuries with impairment of health, one had no impairment, and for 11 persons there was no assessment of the degree of seriousness.

The reasons for the substantial disagreement with the data of the Georgian SSR Ministry of Health are the following: there were numerous cases in which healthy people came to the medical institutions (the so-called "reaction-to-disaster syndrome") and the medical workers made unfounded diagnoses of the existence of "toxic effects." In addition, the category of "toxic effects" included pregnant women, persons with food and other everyday poisoning, invented persons (272 people), the same persons counted more than once, and also persons with nervous and psychological manifestations, disorders of the central nervous system, cardiovascular diseases, and illnesses that might have been produced by some toxicant but not in connection with the events of 9 April.

The investigation ascertained that after the event of 9 April there were many cases of "etching" with the compounds "KhAF" and "SI-ES" by undetermined persons in the region of Rustaveli Avenue and also in other places through various chemical substances. Thus, the examination of scrapings from the walls of the Theatrical Institute revealed traces of compounds of the "Malathion" and "Dikhlofos" type, a concentration of phenol exceeding the allowable limits by a factor of 122 was found in a class for labor training in School No 1, etc. On cases of toxic effects after 9 April 1989, materials have been singled out for separate investigation.

The degree of physical resistance is indicated by the fact that there were more injured servicemen protected by bulletproof vests, helmets, and shields than civilians without such means of protection. There were a total of 189 injured servicemen, including 13 officers.

...I understand very well that the documents and fragments of evidence presented here may give only the most general idea of what happened in the Georgian capital in those April days of 1989. But even they, in my opinion, allow the reader to draw conclusions about who is demolishing our union and how and about the kind of inhuman measures that the separatists are capable of resorting to.

Abkhazia Relationship to Georgia, Future in Union Viewed

91US0414A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
29 Mar 91 Union Edition p 3

[Article by IZVESTIYA special correspondent V. Arsenyev: "Abkhazia: Between Heaven and Earth"]

[Text] Sukhumi-Moscow—The coffee house on the shore in Sukhumi across from the Ritsa Hotel is a small model of the Caucasus, embodying all the diversity of the local area and almost all the problems that have accumulated over the past two or three years, perhaps more than necessary. Early in the morning when the owner of the coffee shop, the Armenian Akop, places the first pots on the hot sand one can hear the guttural speech of Georgians, usually noisy ones whose feelings are all on the surface—both joy and anger. Then, after drinking their coffee, they disperse. And then there are mainly Abkhazians sitting at the little tables. Then under the awning of the Chez Akop coffee shop the soft hum of Abkhazian speech prevails, reminding one of the abundance of hushing sounds of an ocean wave running along the shore ten steps away from the little tables. And during the day there are also tourists here...

I have almost never seen Georgians and Abkhazians together. Perhaps only toward evening will they be found at tables next to one another holding conversations, frequently about the same subject only from different viewpoints. At the beginning of last week the main subject was the all-Union referendum and its results. Close to the end of the week they were already talking about the Georgian referendum scheduled for 31 March. It was obvious that those who had voted on 17 March

would not go to the polls on 31 March. And, conversely, the Georgians would come to vote "Yes" for an independent Georgia. "We understand," they said, "that the 17 March election was rigged." The Abkhazians, on the other hand, have no doubt that the elections on 31 March will be rigged.

This is the way they live side by side. Under the same sun, on the same earth, next to the same sea. They are very restrained with one another and cautious, as if walking on egg shells. They see. And they do not hear. Knowing everything good about what is "theirs"—their past and present, the finest nuances and details of their history—they do not want to know anything good about what is the "others." And a newcomer should not try to persuade them by resorting to cliches like "what do you have to share?" or "all people are equal." Anyone who would decide to do this in an off-handed way, not remembering and not knowing precisely the causes and effects of what happened in July 1989 risks ending up in an absurd position—in the zone of alienation. Writer Aleksey Dzhentia was right when he said: "It is difficult to hold sand in your hand hoping to turn it into cement. But it is even more difficult to gather up in your hand the same amount of sand that has been scattered."

I was here during those July days and then again and again on assignment from IZVESTIYA. I have met many people of various nationalities. And perhaps this gives me at least some kind of right to compare and draw conclusions. I have gotten the impression that with the recent election of Doctor of Historical Sciences Vladislav Ardzinba to the post of chairman of the Abkhaz ASSR Supreme Soviet there are better hopes for peace here. Perhaps this is also because the policy of the autonomous republic in relation to the policy conducted by the leaders of the Republic of Georgia has become more flexible and more sensitive. At the same time it is not ambiguous but clear. The work experience of the subcommission for the state and legal status of autonomous republics, oblasts, and okrugs in the USSR Supreme Soviet, of which Vladislav Ardzinba is a member, apparently had an effect on its adoption of balanced decisions that take the opinions of various parties into account. I was convinced of this especially when studying the newspapers and discussing this with both Abkhazians and Georgians. Additionally, he is able to take responsibility for himself, his words coincide with his actions—a sign of a real man, which is especially valued in the Caucasus. Vladislav Ardzinba did not cancel the all-Union referendum on the territory of the Abkhaz ASSR, which Zviad Gamsakhurdia called for. But he did not prohibit the Georgian referendum either; in both cases he felt that a person, regardless of his nationality, has the right to free expression of his will.

Relations between Ardzinba and Gamsakhurdia are difficult. They have only met once. True, they have talked on the telephone more frequently but they have not always found a common language. And how could they, for example, in the question related to the appointment of a prefect in Galskiy Rayon of the Abkhaz ASSR,

which is populated mainly by Georgians? The policy of the Republic of Georgia is such that the office of the prefect is to replace the communist system of rule and change, as Gamsakhurdia emphasizes, the obsolete communist system. Ardzinba, in turn, sees in this a desire actually to place Abkhazia, which, as he emphasized, is a state with its own independent policy, on the same level as an ordinary administrative-territorial unit.

On Saturday, 16 March, a group of representatives of Chechen community flew to Tbilisi from Sukhumi with an offer to act as intermediaries in the organization of a meeting between Ardzinba and Gamsakhurdia in Groznyy. So far there has been no response from Tbilisi. And one could hardly expect one so quickly. Zviad Gamsakhurdia had plans to meet Boris Yeltsin at the Daryal Pass, apparently putting the Abkhazian problem off until later.

But the problem exists, and even with the external peace in Abkhazia, the problem is in no way decreasing. It is another matter who wishes and who is eager to escalate it to the level of an out-and-out confrontation. In the Georgian press there are almost no articles that are offensive to Abkhazians, offensive in the way it was when they were called "a tribe of Apsua who came down from the mountains some century and a half ago and impudently took over the name of the real Abkhazian Georgians" (Z. Gamsakhurdia's words from 1989). Now they, along with the Georgians of Tbilisi, are called "indigenous peoples of Georgia" (the words of Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Georgia T. Sigua on a Leningrad TV program in 1991). But the fact that the Abkhazians want to live a different life from that of the majority of Georgians is apparent to any unprejudiced person. During both the sixties and the seventies in Abkhazia there were rallies for separating from Georgia. And at the beginning of 1989 they were speaking of this with renewed force.

True, Mr. Zviad Gamsakhurdia sees nothing but Kremlin intrigues in everything. When a DER SPIEGEL correspondent wanted to know about his attitude toward the 1989 drama: "Were the conflicts also provoked by Moscow?"—Gamsakhurdia answered:

"Of course. The minute our struggle for independence gains strength, Moscow immediately incites ethnic conflicts and even openly threatens us with them..."

In his words, Gorbachev himself is threatening them. And you know people are reading this (the discussion in the issue of DER SPIEGEL for 11 March was reprinted in the Georgian and Russian languages in the press here). And people pay attention to his categorical judgments such as, for example, on 16 March when Zviad Konstantinovich spoke on Georgian television:

"We remind you that the future of the non-Georgian population and the prospects for their future life in Georgia depend completely on whether or not they participate in tomorrow's referendum and whether or not they participate in the referendum on 31 March,

which pertains to the question of the restoration of Georgia's state independence..."

Poor, poor Abkhazia! It is really between heaven and earth. But how is a simple person who is used to tilling his garden with a hoe supposed to figure out where is heaven and where is earth, where is the truth and where are lies, when the stratagems of the politicians are like a spider web which has entangled his home, his garden, his own life and the life of his loved ones. Previously all disagreements among neighbors were resolved by an eternal and simple method which is not unknown even to the diplomats of White Hall over a glass of good wine. First one would start off in Abkhazian: "O rayda! Siua rayda-a-a?" Then another, in Georgian: "O ra ni na nina-a-a!" and drift off into the distance, to the mountains and higher and higher, to the place where it no longer makes any difference whether you are Abkhazian or Georgian, a party member or not.

But now they prefer to sing separately, if they sing at all...

More than 30 representatives of Georgian families, including women and children, having left the village of Abgarkhuk in Gudautskiy Rayon last week, moved into one of the boarding houses in Agudzery near Sukhumi. They demanded that they be granted the status of refugees. And although Abkhaz ASSR Procurator A. Kvitsiniya had explained quite clearly on the pages of SOVETSKAYA ABKHAZIYA that the brawl between young Georgians and Abkhazians on 17 March (simple stupidity!) was not a sign of animosity toward Georgia, the people in Agudzery did not decide to return home while I was in Sukhumi. But those who went to the polls on 17 March did not decide—at least for as long as they were living next door to Georgians—to vote in the all-Union referendum in their place of residence; they selected precincts farther away. Just in case. The more so since everyone had heard about someone somewhere having perhaps actually threatened to settle accounts later with those who cast their votes in favor of the Union.

This, I remind you, is the same Caucasus...

The Abkhaz state is young. In the newspaper of the people's forum of Abkhazia AIDGYLARA, the young scholar Stanislav Lakoba writes the most interesting articles, which make it possible to get a better idea of the sources of the creation of Abkhazian statehood not only during Soviet times but also earlier—for example, during the days of the Georgian Democratic Republic. With all the apparent external similarity of their traditions and rituals, the Georgians and Abkhazians had different aspirations under both the Mensheviks and the Bolsheviks. A people's eternal yearning to take care of its own business independently can hardly be condemned. When the Russian Empire declared the Abkhazians to be a "population guilty" of helping the Turks during the Caucasian wars and forced them to "Makhadzhirstvo" (essentially, emigration to foreign lands), this was an obvious evil. But so much real wisdom and tact are

necessary even now in order for the shadow of imperialist ambitions and their evil essence not to fall on the relations between Abkhazians and Russians and Georgians—that is, the peoples who are numerically the largest!

I understand why, for example, the Abkhazians are drawn toward other Caucasian peoples—Adyg, Cherkess, Kabardins, Chechens... With them it is simpler to solve their own, similar problems. It is no accident that representatives of various Caucasian autonomous regions united two or three years ago into the Assembly of Mountain Peoples, which could be transformed into the Caucasian parliament. Together they are seeking guarantees of freedom for each people in this extraordinary union. Apparently, other guarantees are inadequate.

And on the other hand, I understand those Georgians who live in the Abkhaz ASSR and think with alarm (because everything—unclear words, strange actions, and foggy goals—is alarming!): If Georgia becomes independent and Abkhazia does not want to stay with Georgia, where will they end up then? In emigration? They also know history, and the Georgian variant of it contains completely different pages. Judging from everything, they do not have sufficient substantial guarantees either. And so it turns out that each is drawn in his own direction. As in the Chez Akop coffee shop across from the Ritsa hotel in Sukhumi—this small, sad model of the Caucasus with all of its contradictions, doubts, and searches for a better future.

It has been a long time now—two years—since July 1989 when the Georgians convened with the Abkhazians, each protecting themselves and their people. I asked a senior priest in the village of Lykhny:

"Father Petr, even sworn thieves have called for peace between the Abkhazians and Georgians. What about the church? You, yourself?"

"I have read to my parishioners," he answered, "a prayer about greater love and eradication of hatred and all evil, a prayer about the world during times of internecine strife and relief and averting discord, sedition, and sentiments. I read the Gospel of Luke, Chapter 21: "Watch out that you are not deceived, for many will come in my name, claiming 'I am He' and 'The time is near.' Do not follow them..."

Even now I think as I did then: Is it difficult for man to be humane to man? It is easy, all you have to do is want to. But how difficult it is—to want to!...

Abkhazia's Ardzinba Defends Sovereignty

91US0438A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
10 Apr 91 First Edition p 2

[Interview with V.G. Ardzinba, chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Abkhaz ASSR, by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Captain Second Rank V.

Urban; place and date not given: "Union Treaty: A View From the Republics—the People Must Decide"]

[Text] From KRASNAYA ZVEZDA files:

V.G. Ardzinba, born in 1945, an Abkhaz. Graduated from the Sukhumi state pedagogical institute, doctor of historical sciences. Worked as director of the Abkhaz institute of languages, literature, and history. CPSU member.

USSR people's deputy from Gudauta City national-territorial electoral district No. 486 of the Abkhaz ASSR. Last year he headed the parliament of the autonomous republic.

[Correspondent] Vladislav Grigoryevich, the first question, in my opinion, is very difficult. Abkhazia is trying to come out as the subject of a union of sovereign republics treaty. At the same time, the parliament of Georgia, of which your autonomous republic is part, approved a decision not to sign this treaty. Can this contradiction be resolved?

[Ardzinba] I do not think there are any contradictions here. From my standpoint, each people must decide their fate independently. In this instance, it looks like this: It is for the people to decide whether they will be in the union system, or whether they will choose the path of full independence. I personally support the principle of self-determination, but, at the same time, any decision, in the final analysis, must be approved not by parliament and not by the government, but by the people themselves. First of all, the people must be asked. Moreover, in a very calm situation.

[Correspondent] Excuse me for interrupting. But why did Abkhazia choose its future in the union system?

[Ardzinba] This, most likely, is natural, inasmuch as the question concerns a federation of equal sovereign republics. Abkhazia was such for a long time. It emerged in 1921 as a sovereign republic. It had treaty relations with Georgia. And it was only in 1931 that Abkhazia was reorganized into an autonomous republic.

[Correspondent] So, let us return to the first question...

[Ardzinba] And now treaty relations between Abkhazia and Georgia actually exist. These are old neighbors, and the traditions of our peoples are similar in many ways. We cannot get away from this. It is not accidental that in the adoption of the declaration on state sovereignty of Abkhazia, the parliament highlighted the following positions.

First: Abkhazia restores its sovereignty, and it becomes a Soviet republic, as it was proclaimed in 1921. Second: Until there is a final resolution of this question, the existing ties with the Republic of Georgia are fully maintained. Third: We have said that we are ready to begin negotiations with Georgia on the conclusion of a treaty between the two republics. And fourth: Abkhazia, as one of the republics that participated in the creation of

the Union of SSR, desires to be a subject of the new treaty (during the signing of the treaty in 1922, a representative of Abkhazia affixed his signature as a member of the delegation of the Transcaucasus Federation).

[Correspondent] Undoubtedly, the results of the Union referendum will give a new impetus to the treaty process. Therefore, how do you evaluate the results of the voting in your republic?

[Ardzinba] When talking about the referendum, it is necessary first of all to assess the conditions under which it took place. On the one hand, the Abkhaz Supreme Soviet approved the decision on the conduct of a USSR referendum. But, on the other hand, the parliament of the Georgian Republic came out for nonparticipation in the referendum. All of this has complicated the situation.

Especially at a time when Z.K. Gamsakhurdia, the president of the Georgian Republic Supreme Soviet, quite openly declared: "We will not permit the conduct of a Union referendum on the territory of Abkhazia." Moreover, he expressed the idea that if representatives of the "population of Abkhazia that speaks another language" will come out for the Union, then they can be deprived of citizenship and of land. In a word, a tactic to intimidate the population was being conducted.

[Correspondent] Did it succeed?

[Ardzinba] It is difficult to give an unequivocal answer here. For example, a coordination council to boycott the referendum was established. It dispatched its representatives to all of the rayons. Pickets were organized at each electoral precinct. On the evening before the referendum, there was an attempt at a two-hour warning strike in railroad transport. And buses did not operate during the morning for a period of four hours.

And worst of all is that there were observations of efforts by representatives of this boycott coordinating committee to stare fixedly at all citizens who came to vote. Can this really be viewed calmly. Therefore, under these conditions, people sought precincts where there was no threat to their free will.

I think that if it were not for this intimidation, a significant part of the Georgian population would have come to vote. But, in any case, it is indicative that 52.3 percent of the adult population of Abkhazia took part in the USSR referendum, and of these, 98.6 percent voted "yes" for the Union.

Address of Z.K. Gamsakhurdia to the Abkhaz people:

"...We should remind him (Ardzinba—editorial note) that the communist system and the Soviet empire are doomed, and that some are trying to turn the wheel of history back in vain. Sooner or later the enslaved peoples of the Soviet Union will cast off the yoke of the communist dictatorship, and then Ardzinba and figures like him will be regarded as traitors to their own people..."

[Correspondent] On the eve of the USSR referendum, Z.K. Gamsakhurdia addressed the Abkhaz people. Can you say, Vladislav Grigoryevich, whether there are any consequences? As far as is known, you prepared an answer to him...

[Ardzinba] I already spoke of attempts to boycott the USSR referendum in Abkhazia. The address was meant to deal with this. It is characteristic that the address of Zviad Konstantinovich was read out over Tbilisi television. We also did not cover it up. It was published in the newspaper SOVETSKAYA ABKHAZIYA. My answer was next to it. We live under conditions of glasnost, and we are striving for democracy. But, also, television did not publicize my letter. But I would like the public of Georgia to be informed and to know our position. Most of all, because it is necessary to find a compromise, and not to aggravate the situation. A calm situation—whether in Georgia or in Abkhazia, or in some other region—is the basis for any process of reform and political renewal.

[Correspondent] But have you met with Z.K. Gamsakhurdia?

[Ardzinba] Yes, we had one meeting. Almost immediately after my election as chairman of the Abkhaz Supreme Soviet. It should be said that the meeting took place in a normal situation. There was a quiet conversation. But since that time, to my profound regret, more and more ultimatum demands have appeared on his part.

Several days ago a letter came from Zviad Konstantinovich in which he raises questions about changing our Constitution and rescinding Abkhazia's political system. That is, there is already talk about eliminating the local soviets here.

[Correspondent] This is a policy, as I understand it, for the creation of prefectures, which is now being done in Georgia.

[Ardzinba] Yes. True, the Presidium of the Georgian Supreme Soviet temporarily suspended the designation of prefects. Although a prefect remains in our Galskiy Rayon. I think that to normalize the situation and reach a compromise, it will be necessary to revoke the decision on the appointment of this prefect.

From the letter of V.G. Ardzinba to Z.K. Gamsakhurdia, chairman of the Georgian Supreme Soviet:

"The appointment of a prefect of the Galskiy Rayon cannot be interpreted in any way other than as the failure of the highest organs of authority of the Georgian Republic to observe elementary legal ethics. The removal of one of the regions of the autonomous republic from under the jurisdiction of the Supreme Soviet of the Abkhaz ASSR is the first step on the road to the elimination of constitutional structures, and afterwards, the statehood of Abkhazia."

[Ardzinba] I once said in an interview, and I now repeat: It was not I who established Soviet authority in Abkhazia; it was established by our grandfathers. Therefore, the decision on whether there should or should not be Soviet authority belongs to the people. At a minimum, a referendum should be held on this question.

[Correspondent] And what is your parliament's point of view?

[Ardzinba] Recently, the Abkhaz Supreme Soviet adopted a law on elections of local soviets of people's deputies. That is, parliament—moreover, unanimously—affirmed that the soviets remain our basic political system. This has to be taken into account.

[Correspondent] But would you like to meet with Gamsakhurdia once more?

[Ardzinba] Personal contacts and meetings—this is the normal path in politics. But... Appropriate conditions have to be created for a new meeting. I have in mind the revocation of the unconstitutional decision on the Galskiy Rayon, about which I already talked earlier. Once the prefecture is eliminated, this will mean that the principle of discussion not by the method of dictating but on an equal basis and on the basis of mutual respect is asserted once again.

[Correspondent] Vladislav Grigoryevich, my next question is this. You, of course, know that the participation of former and present autonomous republics in the treaty process for the creation of a new union is being subjected to harsh criticism on the part of some leaders of Union republics and in the press. What do you think about this?

[Ardzinba] My vision of the problem is as follows. The starting point here should be not autonomy as such, but the people. We proceed from the principle of the equal rights of people...

[Correspondent] No one is likely to come out against this. This means...

[Ardzinba] This means that all autonomies are a form of self-determination by specific peoples, and it is their statehood. If we put people in an equal position, then we must also put their statehood in an equal position. In my opinion, there is no other way out. This is in no way a destructive process. Just the opposite. Such a process unites the Union.

[Correspondent] But let us take the Russian Federation. Here, most of the arguments are on this question. I would like to know your opinion, although this is outside the scope of our discussion.

[Ardzinba] I think that the right to sign the treaty on the union of sovereign republics by former autonomies will only strengthen the RSFSR. Prohibitions must be avoided.

Central Asia**Tajik CP Plenum on Current Party Tasks****Information Report**

91US0356A Dushanbe KOMMUNIST
TADZHIKISTANA in Russian 20 Feb 91 p 1

[Report on Seventh Plenum of Central Committee of Communist Party of Tajikistan in Dushanbe on 18 February 1991]

[Text] As earlier reports said, the Seventh Plenum of the Tajik CP Central Committee was held in Dushanbe on 18 February.

The first secretaries of party gorkoms and raykoms who are not members of elected bodies of the republic party organization, the deputy chairmen of the Supreme Soviet and Cabinet of Ministers of the Tajik SSR, the chairmen of committees of the Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet, secretaries of the Tajikistan Komsomol Central Committee, deputy chairmen of the Tajik SSR Federation of Trade Unions, chairmen of republic sectorial trade-union committees, the heads of several ministries and departments, a group of secretaries of primary party organizations and people's deputies, party veterans, and representatives of the scientific and artistic intelligentsia and news media were invited to attend the plenum.

A speech on "The Current Objectives of the Republic Party Organization" was presented by President K.M. Makhkamov of the republic, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and first secretary of the Tajik CP Central Committee.

Participants in the discussion following the speech included T.M. Mirkhalikov, first secretary of the Leninabad party obkom; N.D. Novichkov, member of the Presidential Council and repairman at the Tadzhiktekstil'mash Production Association in Dushanbe; S.Sh. Mirzoshoyev, first secretary of the Kulyab party obkom; K. Koimdodov, first secretary of the Khorog party gorkom; V. Khodzhiyev, first secretary of the Dushanbe party gorkom; A.Kh. Kurbanov, chief agronomist and secretary of the primary party organization on the Yazgulom Sovkhoz in Vanchskiy Rayon in Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast; R.K. Mirzoyev, chairman of the Council for the Study of Productive Resources of the Tajik SSR Academy of Sciences and member of the Tajik CP Central Committee's Commission on Socioeconomic Policy; A.T. Pulatov, department head at the Tajik State Medical Institute imeni Abuali ibn Sino; Kh.I. Kasymov, first secretary of the Gissarskiy party raykom; N. Askaliyeva, student at the Tajik Pedagogical Institute of Russian Language and Literature; and T.A. Dzhurabayev, chief editor of SOVET TODZHIKISTONI.

The appropriate resolution was passed on the topic of discussion.

In connection with the upcoming referendum, the plenum adopted the appeal of the Tajik CP Central Committee to communists and all workers in the republic.

The plenum discussed and approved the resolution on the Party Control Commission of the Tajik CP Central Committee.

A report on the budget of the Tajikistan Communist Party for 1991 was presented by A.G. Akilov, administrator of affairs of the Tajik CP Central Committee. The appropriate resolution was passed on this matter.

Organizational matters were discussed at the plenum.

D.Kh. Karimov was released from his duties as a member of the Tajik CP Central Committee Bureau in connection with his reappointment.

Chairman K. Aslonov of the Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet and First Secretary V. Khodzhiyev of the Dushanbe party gorkom were elected Tajik CP Central Committee Bureau members.

The following individuals were elected members of the Tajik CP Central Committee at the plenum: Ortuk Asimov, 28th CPSU Congress delegate and driver at the Dushanbe Taxi Enterprise; Yevgeniy Aleksandrovich Bazhenov, chairman of the Party Control Commission of the Tajik CP Central Committee; Saidmamed Nasryovich Karimov, rector at the Leninabad State Pedagogical Institute imeni S.M. Kirov; Nurali Khaydarovich Kurbanov, first secretary of the Tajikistan Komsomol Central Committee; Akbar Nusratullayevich Maksimov, director of the Botany Institute of the Tajik SSR Academy of Sciences; Rakhim Masov, director of the History, Archaeology, and Ethnography Institute imeni A. Donish of the Tajik SSR Academy of Sciences; Salimdzhan Madzhidovich Makhkambayev, administrator of affairs of the president's staff and Tajik SSR Cabinet of Ministers; Adolat Rakhmonova, first secretary of the Dangarinskiy party raykom; Atakhon Sayfullayev, head of the Department of Interaction with Sociopolitical Organizations and Ethnic Relations of the Tajik CP Central Committee; Abdudzhilil Akhadovich Samadov, deputy chairman of the Tajik SSR Cabinet of Ministers; and Sattor Tursunov, head of the Ideological Department of the Tajik CP Central Committee.

Department heads of the Tajik CP Central Committee were approved.

This concluded the work of the Seventh Plenum of the Tajik CP Central Committee.

Makhkamov Address on Party Goals

91US0356B Dushanbe KOMMUNIST
TADZHIKISTANA in Russian 21 Feb 91 pp 1, 3

[Speech presented by K.M. Makhkamov, first secretary of the Tajik CP Central Committee and member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, at Seventh Plenum

of Tajik CP Central Committee on 18 February in Dushanbe: "The Current Objectives of the Republic Party Organization"]

[Text] Comrades!

The present phase in the life of the republic and the Communist Party of Tajikistan lends particular urgency and significance to the topic of our discussion. Many of the matters we will be discussing are of statewide and partywide significance.

We must admit that no discussion of the current political stage in national affairs, the related need to reorganize the state administrative structure and to make the transition to new economic relations, and the party's place and role in these processes in recent years has been as astute and principled as the discussion that took place at the January CPSU Central Committee Plenum.

In the political statement: "On the Present Time and Party Objectives" and in other documents approved at the plenum, participants defined their views and position on vital political and economic issues with a strong sense of responsibility for the future of the society and the Soviet State.

The main goal of party policy and activity was resolutely reaffirmed: the steadfast defense of the positive democratic gains of perestroika, the achievement of civic peace and national accord in the country, the preservation and reinforcement of the renewed union of sovereign republics, the guarantee of the stabilization and consistent development of the economy, and the social protection of the population under the conditions of a market economy.

This is the common party position, dictated by the vital interests of all national groups. Each party committee, each primary party organization, and all Communists must understand it completely and learn to defend and affirm it. Concrete and resolute action will be needed for the attainment of planned political and socioeconomic objectives and the continuation of the work of perestroika.

When we assess the current situation, we must tell people frankly that the friction in all spheres of life has become so acute that any upheavals or reckless acts could plunge us into political and economic chaos, as they already have in some parts of the country.

In other words, the present situation requires the most careful and precise political analysis, with a view to the future, and it requires us to make decisions responsibly and without delay.

Which are the main problems today?

Above all, we must be aware of the considerable divergence in the rates of reform in the political, economic, and administrative structures. The political struggle is taking on a life of its own, so to speak, and frequently contributes nothing at all to the emergence of the

economy from its state of crisis and the rectification of the decline in the standard of living of most of the population.

Under these extraordinary conditions, many party committees were quick to yield their influence in the economic sphere and effectively lost it. Apparently, they assumed that they no longer had any responsibility for everything that was happening in our life. This was a deeply mistaken assumption.

In some cases there was an obvious inability to make the move to political methods of work and concentrate it in primary party organizations and labor collectives.

Therefore, we must learn to actually, rather than verbally, master the art of work with the masses. We must resolutely stop all attempts to divert the party from direct participation in carrying out socioeconomic programs and in solving the problems that are a daily annoyance to people, doing this with the help of Communists and progressive forces in the society.

This always was and should remain a priority area of party activity. This is all the more important today, now that signs of crisis in the economy are becoming more distinct.

Of course, it is completely out of the question to return to the old practices of petty guardianship and the displacement of administrative bodies. What we need is a transition to political methods, to action through Communists, through the convictions of people.

Yes, the state of affairs in the republic economy is extremely disturbing, and this is due to a whole group of circumstances. Above all, we must always be aware of the sociopolitical tension and economic instability throughout the country, which have disrupted inter-republic economic ties, have caused contracted deliveries to be neglected, and have deformed the entire mechanism of the national economic complex.

The war of sovereignties and laws and the delays in the establishment of the presidential form of government led to a situation in which the ukases of the president of the country are hanging in midair and are not being implemented. We are witnessing unprecedented disparities in plans and material and technical supplies and the deterioration of financial, executive, and labor discipline. All of this is being compounded by mounting economic sabotage and an increasingly active shadow economy.

Of course, this had to have the most negative effect on socioeconomic affairs in the republic. Last year, for example, our national income was 1.6 percent below the previous year's figure, and the productivity of social labor was two percent below.

The measures that were taken to improve the financial situation and fill the consumer market did not produce any perceptible results.

What is more, the market displayed a tendency toward further disparities as a result of the increase in the population's monetary income, the general state of economic instability, and the growing shortages of consumer goods.

The situation with regard to the main types of food grew worse. The gross product of agriculture last year was equivalent to only 82 percent of the previous year's figure, and labor productivity in the agrarian sector decreased by seven percent.

Difficulties in construction were also exacerbated. The rates of construction projects in the production sphere and, in particular, in the social sphere were much lower than in 1989. As a result, the housing program was jeopardized, and many public health, public education, cultural, and consumer facilities were not completed. Many problems also existed in industry, transportation, communications, and other branches.

Under these conditions, it would be an unforgivable political error for the republic Communist Party to take the position of a casual observer and refuse to strive for economic recovery. This would cause the further reduction of its role and influence. Furthermore, the people who expect the Communist Party to give them strong political support and protect their vital interests could be disillusioned. We must not allow this to happen.

We have to admit quite frankly that some Communists—the heads of several republic ministries and departments, including Central Committee members—did not secure the necessary level of leadership in their branches.

This applies above all to the leadership of the agroindustrial and construction complexes, both on the republic level and in several oblasts, cities, and rayons. By the same token, there was not enough demand for this on the part of Communist government leaders or enough party demand on the part of party committees, beginning with the Central Committee.

As the ruling party, the Communist Party should exert political influence, through Communists, especially in the new structures of state authority and control and in the republic parliament, on the decisions that are made and on the state of affairs in general. It should be a pillar of presidential support in the republic and influence all processes in socioeconomic, social, and other spheres of life effectively.

It was precisely for this reason that the Central Committee Bureau recently asked the Kulyab party gorkom to report on its efforts to implement the president's ukases and instructions. The document it adopted provides guidelines for party committees. They should become the fulcrum of our political work with the masses.

First of all, however, we must give destructive behavior the disapproval it deserves and expose all attempts to

take advantage of economic and social difficulties and attempts to misinform the population and thereby influence public opinion and the sociopolitical climate in labor collectives for the purpose of crushing the enthusiasm for concrete action and for conscientious and enterprising labor.

There is no question that the transition to market relations will mean a great deal of work of various types. Unfortunately, we still do not know the full extent of the problems that might arise in connection with this, although we do know that there will be some extremely difficult and disturbing problems.

It could also give rise to various types of political maneuvers. Some people are already trying to associate the concept of "regulated market relations" with the revival of authoritarian methods and a return to old practices.

The possibility of revising several laws and of changing the administrative structure will be discussed at the upcoming session of the republic Supreme Soviet in this context. Even today, however, people are deliberately trying to give the public a distorted view of such matters as privatization, especially in relation to private ownership of the land, the price increases, and so forth.

I can confidently say that the Supreme Soviet and the administration have a clear view of these matters in relation to the distinctive features of our republic. A mechanism for the denationalization of property, envisaging primarily the transfer of this property to members of labor collectives, is being developed at this time. Small enterprises in trade and the service sector are to be turned over to private entrepreneurs.

We staunchly support the opposition to private ownership of the land, however, because it would be undesirable in our republic.

One of the crucial stages in the transition to the market will be the institution of new retail prices. Our position on this matter is equally firm and unequivocal: All population strata in the republic should receive 100-percent compensation in the event of a rise in the prices of bread, sugar, tea, vegetable oil, and baby food.

Furthermore, this should be done at least a week before the new prices go into effect. Party committees should make use of this situation in their work and take principled and resolute action to carry out the program for the transition to the market, never forgetting that the laboring public needs social protection and that the vital interests of low-income population strata must be defended.

At this point I would like to inform all of the people present here that a 5-percent surcharge on the prices of goods for sale—i.e., goods entering the trade network—was instituted in the republic on the 13th. The fact is that an ukase of the president of the USSR already stipulated last November that a five-percent tax should be collected

on all sales and that the money should be used for extra-budgetary expenditures. Otherwise, it would be returned to the republics and establishments with insufficient funds. The surcharge was supposed to have been instituted on 1 January this year throughout the country.

When the USSR Cabinet of Ministers was unable to draw up the instructions in time and did not finish them until the end of January, the matter was delayed, and we did not institute the surcharge until 13 February. Furthermore, we took the risk of not extending the surcharge to bread, sugar, tea, and vegetable oil, because we are always saying that these are our most necessary products. There has been something amazing about all of this, however. After all, all of this was reported repeatedly in the newspapers and was discussed on radio and television, but as soon as the surcharge was instituted, there were rumors in the republic that the five percent was a presidential tax for Makhkamov. People actually spread these rumors, and we have been getting phone calls and letters asking why this has happened.

I am telling you this so that you will be able to explain the circumstances clearly and precisely to anyone who asks you about this.

Comrades!

When we analyze current requirements, we must arrive at the inescapable conclusion that it will be difficult to make the move to political methods of work and to give the Communist Party all of the qualities of the main force in sociopolitical affairs unless the party itself is renewed. During this process, we must resolutely oppose all attempts to destroy it from within, fight to preserve the unity of our ranks, and be able to defend its ideological and theoretical foundations.

In more precise terms, the party must finally learn to defend itself and defend its policies with confidence and determination and, obviously, in complete accordance with the constitutions of the USSR and Tajik SSR and existing laws.

Here is another important point.

When we develop intraparty democracy and acknowledge the right to express diverging opinions and views, we must be able to recognize those who use these lofty concepts as a cover for irresponsible demagoguery, their own inactivity, their personal ambitions, and sometimes even goals that are far removed from the public interest.

The time has come, as speakers noted at the CPSU Central Committee plenum, to put an end to the anarchistic approach to party practices and insist on the procedures legitimized in the party charter. The republic Communist Party Central Committee and its staff should set an example in this area.

I must say that the overwhelming majority of Central Committee members have displayed the qualities of true

Communists, genuine political fighters, and uncompromising defenders of the party line and position and of party unity more than once, and in the most difficult situations.

They displayed these qualities in their response to the tragic events of last February, in their active campaigning during the elections to local soviets and the supreme organ of state power in the republic, and in the struggle for the presidency. We must strengthen and consolidate this unity and encourage heightened political and civic activity and persistence in the efforts to attain set goals.

Nevertheless, Comrades, we cannot close our eyes to the cases in which certain members of party committees, including the Central Committee, express opinions and take actions contrary to the general party line, to the decisions of the party committees to which they belong and, finally, to elementary civic ethics. These incidents warrant strict appraisal by the party.

Communists today are displaying a fully justifiable and completely understandable concern with regard to an important question: How can the Communist Party retain its political strength and influence under the conditions of democratization, especially now that the multiparty system has become a reality and we are witnessing the unprecedented politicizing of our society, with the expression of a broad range of political views and positions.

It seems to me that we must adhere to the basic organizational precept of the party in a resolute and principled manner: We are a party of people sharing the same views and united by our political and ideological convictions.

The present situation requires us to do everything within our power to strengthen the sociopolitical stability that took so much effort to establish in the republic and strive for the formation and establishment of strong, effective, and definitive governmental authority on all levels.

We must always remember that any vacuum in the political foundation will soon be filled by another ideological force. This is why we cannot allow our internal conflicts to give certain forces a chance to wage a struggle, with the support of new parties and informal sociopolitical organizations, not only against party committees and Communists, but also against government agencies.

In this area we must take an absolutely unequivocal stance and resolutely defend and support the Communist deputies and Communist leaders working in government agencies and other organs.

We should make particularly high and principled demands on the Communists who had the support of the party to thank for their administrative positions but are now trying, under the guise of the pluralism of opinions, to diverge from the party line and avoid implementing the Communist Party's policies and decisions.

I think we should learn to use the power of the press and of public opinion more actively in these cases, to the point of the frank expression of the party's lack of trust in all types of "turncoats." It will no longer be possible to use democracy as a cover for unprincipled behavior or the inability to wage an open political struggle against those who oppose the party.

Today we have to admit that the renewal of the union has turned out to be the most complicated part of perestroika. Until this matter has been settled, the sovereignty and the economic and sociopolitical unity of the fraternal republics, and even their future, will be in question. This is why the referendum scheduled for 17 March will be of colossal importance.

The republic Supreme Soviet has already advocated the preservation of the union. We are certain that the majority of the republic population shares this opinion and will vote accordingly.

Nevertheless, we must be prepared to oppose destructive forces, our political and ideological opponents, who might take advantage of the situation for political reasons.

The fact that these impulses already exist is attested to by the message to the republic Supreme Soviet from people's deputies T. Abdudzhaborov, A. Sakhibnazarov, Abdurazakov—the director of a specialized equipment plant in Gissarskiy Rayon, Bozor Sobir, and Sharif Yakubov—the deputy chairman of the Batan Kolkhoz in Gissarskiy Rayon, who expressed their fundamental disagreement with the questions on the 17 March referendum ballot and who demand that they be changed. Otherwise, they declare, we will not vote, and they advise the republic population to follow their example.

They try to validate their behavior with the statement that, in their opinion, if Tajikistan joins the renewed union, it will "lose its freedom and independence and commit a crime, a betrayal of its own people." These are bombastic words. There is no other description for them. What lies behind them? By advising people not to vote, they are essentially insisting on the self-isolation of the republic and on the withdrawal of the sovereign socialist republics from the union. It will not take long to explain the implications and the results of this.

First of all, there are the statements by the good-for-nothing economists that we could fill the republic with everything imaginable if we were to sell all of our cotton—270,000 tons of fiber, the gold we mine, and the crude minerals from some of our deposits for dollars abroad.

We have discussed this a thousand times and have presented examples and calculations to prove that this is not true, but some people are still stubbornly adhering to this line of reasoning. Furthermore, they are using all available channels to influence university students, the rural population, and teachers, just for the purpose of awakening doubts in people's minds.

In their opinion, we could sell our cotton, gold, and crude minerals for 7 or 8 billion dollars, which would make us rich and make our problems disappear.

These people, however, do not want to realize that we have to have a million and a half tons of grain shipped into the republic, including a million tons just for food, and that we have to have almost 3 million tons of petroleum products shipped to us. We get them at our domestic prices. Just try to buy all of this at international prices and have it shipped here! They cannot understand this.

We explained all of this in detail in response to questions at the Komsomol congress, and I discussed all of this in great detail at the trade-union congress, but the wave has not subsided. Obviously, someone is benefiting from this.

I must say that Tajikistan can continue developing and existing only as part of the renewed union and only in conjunction with the union republics. If there is no union or if Tajikistan secedes from it, it will isolate itself completely and will return to the 15th century, if not earlier. This is a fact, Comrades. Consider this: Because of our geographic location, we have no southern outlet and will have none in the north if the road is closed to the republic, and the same applies to the east and west. We will be completely land-locked.

The comrades who discussed this matter today in the Commission on Inter-Ethnic Affairs suggested quite accurately that our efforts to publicize all of this have been extremely unsatisfactory and that our people do not know the facts.

In connection with this, I want to ask our ideologists to give this matter serious consideration. We still have time before the 17th. Our television and radio programs should begin and end with explanations of this matter. We have to let the people know what the union gives us. We should report on one of the republics every day or every other day and explain our relationship with it, telling what we give it and what it gives us. This is the crucial job of our ideologists.

Party committees should join local soviets of people's deputies in launching widespread organizational and agitation-propaganda work with the population in preparation for the exceedingly important political campaign the referendum represents, making use of all the means at their disposal. This must include concrete and principled work in labor collectives, in academic institutions, and in residential neighborhoods. We must have a precise program of action to follow during the referendum itself.

I believe that the Central Committee plenum should ask all Communists in the republic to do everything within their power to ensure the efficient and orderly conduct of the referendum, to guarantee the genuine and complete expression of the will of the people.

Comrades! Under the conditions of the multiparty system and fierce political struggle, the Communist Party must move as quickly as possible from a defensive position to a resolute political offensive. Complacency, ideological compromises, and unprincipled conciliation must be renounced.

We must advance boldly into open political struggle, backed up by the party's Communist masses and healthy forces in the society and forging stronger ties of friendship with trade unions, women's, veterans', and other social organizations, and internationalist soldiers.

Unfortunately, some party committees have lost contact with them. This is a serious mistake.

It was called to our attention in a message to the leadership of the Tajik CP Central Committee, which said:

"We veterans who linked our future with Lenin's party are deeply disturbed by the present situation.... We are extremely disturbed by the degradation of Lenin's party in recent years and the creation of other parties and factions. All of them are pursuing policies aimed against the people and are undermining the bases of the socialist order in our state.

"At this time the party administrative structure and ideological centers are not conducting any kind of work for the further development of socialist ideals and the struggle against the groups that are acting against the public interest and are concentrating on the exaggerated criticism and defamation of their predecessors, helping the forces discrediting Lenin's party and our order.

"We veterans appeal to the people of Tajikistan: 'Protect the legacy of your forefathers. Protect the socialist gains that give a person dignity and security!'"

Here, Comrades, is the truth to which the majority of people subscribe. It expresses a definite point of view and justifiable criticism, and we simply do not have the right to ignore it!

Today we must proceed, above all, from the knowledge that the political boundaries of social forces have already been defined and distinguished. First of all, there is the growing opposition to the Communist Party, represented by the Democratic Party of Tajikistan and the "Rastokhez" Society, which work together directly. Their position is an unequivocally anticommunist one. Furthermore, the Democratic Party of Tajikistan has allowed the existence of religious factions within its structure and has united with cells of the illegal Islamic Resurgence Party.

They share common, far-reaching goals—to sow the seeds of suspicion of the Communist Party and the republic leadership, especially its president, without being too fastidious in their choice of methods, and to seize political and governmental power.

In fact, their complains are no longer confined to the president of the republic. They also have complaints about the president of the country and are almost shouting: "Down with Gorbachev!"

They are striving for the same thing as the destructive movements in the country that are known to you, all of the different national fronts, and are establishing contact with them.

The social base of their influence is fairly homogeneous—it consists mainly of a certain segment of the intelligentsia, some teachers and students, and individuals who feel that they have been "offended" or who simply discredited themselves in the past.

Nevertheless, we must not judge the new sociopolitical currents only by the actions of certain leaders, who are turning many other members of their organizations into the hostages of their own ambitions and policies.

We must conduct painstaking explanatory work and patient, persuasive dialogue with the healthy forces in the new associations, consolidating them for constructive action of genuine benefit to all the people.

Therefore, we must choose a path in republic politics that will first strengthen civic and ethnic harmony and then promote the stabilization of the overall situation.

At this time, however, we are still dealing with a difficult migration situation in the republic, which is still losing intellectual, managerial, and labor potential. Furthermore, we have seen that no one gained anything—neither housing nor food—when tens of thousands of families moved out of the republic, and that this only created additional difficulties.

It is true that some families are returning, and we must take an understanding and sympathetic approach to this. We must be more concrete and efficient in taking the measures the Supreme Soviet, the administration, and the Tajik CP Central Committee advised in this area.

The growing influence of religion in the present sociopolitical situation and interethnic relations requires special attention.

The Communist Party's attitude toward religious organizations is still a principled one, dictated by the law on freedom of conscience. We treat clergymen with understanding and respect when their objective appraisals of current difficulties motivate them to cooperate with local government agencies, when they acknowledge the need for concerted action to surmount crises in the republic, and when they preach and defend common human values and civic peace and harmony.

We cannot, however, tolerate the ones who resort to various destructive actions under the cover of democratic freedoms, violate Soviet laws, and urge people to commit unlawful acts.

This is all the more important now that Communists and the Communist Party of Tajikistan have been attacked and threatened openly by the fundamentalist clergy for the purpose of discouraging active social work by individuals, to the point of suggesting their withdrawal from the CPSU, and now that the members of this clergy are creating an atmosphere of intolerance for the intelligentsia and denying everything the society accomplished during the years of Soviet rule.

Not everyone has been able to resist. Unfortunately, we are still seeing Communists turn in their party membership cards and women teachers and students leave school.

Besides this, some members of the party in scientific, artistic, and cultural establishments and academic institutions are just marking time and are displaying complete passivity because they have doubts about the accuracy and strength of the Communist Party's position.

We would advise these comrades to take another, unbiased look at their own beliefs from the standpoint of the realities of the present day. Party organizations must take a greater interest in our artistic and scientific intelligentsia, in its accomplishments, interests, and daily concerns.

A resolution was recently passed on a salary increase for high school teachers (this was done for elementary school teachers on 1 September last year). Now the government is planning salary increases for scientific personnel. Housing allocations for this group were recently increased substantially. This will be continued in the future.

Practical work in this area should be based on the Central Committee bureau decision on attitudes toward religion, on the recommendations of republic applied-science conferences on freedom of conscience and conventions of social scientists, and on the suggested group of measures in work with the artistic and scientific intelligentsia and the fuller satisfaction of its vested interests.

There is no question that the press is playing a special role in the current perestroika processes. It has become not only a powerful means of molding public opinion and influencing people's thinking and behavior, but also the object of fierce political struggle.

We have seen how pluralism and glasnost have sometimes been used in the press for political speculation, dishonest criticism, and attacks on the Communist Party, parliament, and administration of the republic and their leaders.

Along with publications not registered in the republic, the ADOLAT and RASTOKHEZ newspapers and the press organ of the Union of Journalists of Tajikistan, SUKHAN, have distinguished themselves in this field. The Communist leaders of the union have taken an

incomprehensible position. It was at their suggestion that a man named Murodaliyev, who was fired from TODZHIKISTONI SOVETI for his improper behavior during the events in February and who then resigned from the CPSU, was recently appointed editor of SUKHAN. Furthermore, this appointment was not approved by the last plenum of the Union of Journalists. Besides this, it was this newspaper that published the appeal I was discussing, under the heading "Federation: Yes Or No."

There have also been some incidents of a different nature.

The attempt by Chairman Ikramov of the Dushanbe gorispolkom and former editor Egamov of PAYEMI DUSHANBE to separate this newspaper from the Dushanbe party gorkom is also indicative. Incidentally, Ikramov is a member of the Auditing Commission of the Communist Party of Tajikistan. The Party Control Commission of the Central Committee is now investigating the matter.

It is obvious that some administrators of the press regard democracy, pluralism, and glasnost as a total lack of restraint. This was confirmed by the Central Committee bureau resolution (of December 1990): "On the Political Stance of the Editor of the Republic Journal TADZHIKISTAN, Comrade T. Radzhabov," who was judged unworthy to head a party publication because of his political nearsightedness and ideological instability.

Today the threat that some party committees could lose their press organs is a completely real danger. The state of affairs in the editorial offices of the Fayzabadskiy Rayon newspaper, for example, is disturbing. Its name was changed for no special reason, and it discarded the slogan "Proletarians of all countries, unite!"

There is nothing particularly surprising about this. Two of the five members of the editorial board of this newspaper are members of the Democratic Party, and one of these is Kutbidin Mirzoyev, the head of the Fayzabadskiy cell of this party. It is true that one of the members, Shamsidinov, resigned from the Democratic Party, and the dismissal of the second is being considered at this time.

It appears that everything is being put in order, but the fact itself is quite alarming.

In today's complex sociopolitical situation, practical aspects of the political-organizational reinforcement of party organizations and the guaranteed unity of our ranks are extremely important. The main thing today is to enhance the ability of party committees to conduct work, strive for the stronger organization and discipline of Communists, and augment their responsibility for the present and future of perestroika.

During the reorientation of party committees to political forms and methods of work and the reduction and

reorganization of their staffs, they are certain to encounter new difficulties in the organization and conduct of their activity.

This is why it is important today to rid ourselves of uncertainty and vagueness as quickly as possible and to become genuine political headquarters.

Party gorkoms and raykoms need strong support and assistance today. They are largely responsible for the implementation of CPSU policy among the masses and are on the frontlines of the struggle for our socialist ideals and for the preservation and renewal of our union.

This is why the Central Committee and party obkoms and their commissions, bureaus, and departments must give them active assistance in their daily activities. Incidentally, in this context, we do not understand why gorkoms and raykoms, which represent political organs of the Communist Party, have reduced the staffs of their ideological departments to the minimum and why half of them have closed their political enlightenment offices. Yes, I realize that staff reductions are necessary, but is it sensible to reduce the size of ideological departments today?

It will be extremely important to pay closer attention to primary party organizations. They are our fulcrum, the main link of our political work with the masses. They are having a hard time today. After all, more than half of the released personnel were in these organizations, and they are obviously not receiving enough attention from superior party organs. The regional conferences with their secretaries in December and January corroborated this quite explicitly.

Under the conditions of the multiparty system, the center of political influence should be moved to residential neighborhoods. Positive experience of this kind has been accumulated in Frunzenskiy Rayon in the capital, the city of Khodzhen, and Leninabad Oblast, where centers of local self-government are functioning, and their soviets are headed by party organizers from the corresponding party committees.

In our opinion, now that our political opponents are striving to influence people in the neighborhoods, this initiative warrants immediate generalization and dissemination. Incidentally, this will be exceptionally important in view of the upcoming elections to soviets on all levels.

Now that the CPSU Charter grants broad autonomy to party links on the lowest level, it will be extremely important to augment party membership. Despite the fact that the number of new members of the CPSU was 60 percent higher in 1990 than in 1989 for the republic party organization as a whole, the total membership was reduced by 2,070 Communists, or by 1.6 percent. We are pleased to report that more than a thousand employees of the public education system joined the party during

the most difficult period of perestroika. Members of other segments of the laboring public also augmented its ranks.

The dramatic reduction in the number of workers and kolkhoz members, especially women, joining the CPSU, however, is alarming. Women represent only a negligible percentage of the people joining the party in the Ordzhonikidze-Abadskiy, Garmskiy, Komsomolobadskiy, and Leninskiy party organizations. This matter warrants serious consideration, especially in view of the fact that the fundamentalist clergy are also quite active in these rayons.

Many party organizations were taken aback somewhat by the voluntary resignations from the CPSU. Yes, the cleansing process of separation along ideological and political lines is continuing. This is a reality, and it must be taken into consideration. In 1990 alone, 1,941 Communists left the party, including 632 in the Dushanbe city party organization and 260 in the Chkalov party organization. Of course, we certainly do not regret all of the resignations.

Nevertheless, it is important for party obkoms, gorkoms, and raykoms to make a constant effort, on the one hand, to augment party ranks and, on the other, to purge them of uncommitted and unworthy individuals. As part of this process, they should pay maximum attention to each person who leaves the CPSU, especially workers, women, and veterans, investigate all of the causes, and take preventive measures.

Much remains to be done for the reinforcement of party discipline and the establishment of an atmosphere of mutual demandingness, responsibility, and party camaraderie.

I want to say a few words about the personnel policy of the Communist Party of Tajikistan. It is still one of the important jobs of party committees, which should submit and defend their proposals on personnel matters more boldly in the party, on all levels of government, and in other organs. Obviously, while they are doing this, they should take the differing functions of party, state, and economic administrative organs into account.

Perestroika processes naturally led to the Communist Party's renunciation of the formal approach to work with personnel, but not the pursuit of a personnel policy in general. To this end, the resolution recently passed by the Central Committee bureau on the procedure for the consideration of personnel issues defines the particular levels on which work with specific categories of party personnel should be conducted—party obkoms, gorkoms, and raykoms. Furthermore, we decided to grant them broad autonomy in these matters. There is no question that this also gave them a corresponding responsibility to the Central Committee and their elected bodies.

As for the heads of other organs and establishments, the right to recommend party members and non-members

for certain administrative positions was retained. The mechanism of recommending candidates at a Central Committee plenum or bureau meeting, for example, will be used for nominations to key positions in the republic. This is how comrades Karimov, Samadov, Zukhurov, Mirzoyev, and Satorov were recommended to serve as members of the administration's cabinet.

It is also important, however, to make use of the right to recall a Communist from office for a breach of trust.

Finally, it will be extremely important to preserve and strengthen the Communist Party's political influence directly among Communists in all areas of governmental control and administration in the republic.

As you know, the work of the Fifth Session of the Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet will begin on 20 February. Important questions connected with the stabilization of the economy and the sociopolitical situation in the republic, the creation of a new executive cabinet, the improvement of the structure of organs of local self-government, and other matters will be discussed.

I want to talk about some of them here.

In the new administrative structure, there will be no production ministries with direct jurisdiction over enterprises. The absolute majority of ministries and departments will be maintained by republic budget funds.

Expenditures on new republic administrative organs, including the presidential staff and the Cabinet of Ministers, are projected at 17.6 million rubles—2.5 million less than before.

In connection with the expansion of the functions and rights of local soviets, the number of ministries will decrease from 34 to 29. This will constitute the basis of the Cabinet of Ministers.

The chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers will have four deputies, instead of the seven in the present Council of Ministers.

The ministers and committee chairmen will serve primarily as authorized representatives of the state and will be expected to conduct an effective policy to promote the augmentation of the republic's economic, scientific-technical, social, and intellectual potential.

In view of the difficulties of the transition period, however, some ministries and departments will have to remain part of the republic administrative structure, but with definite changes in their functions.

During the process of the creation of progressive sectorial, intersectorial, and territorial structures, the elimination of several ministries will be accompanied by the establishment of concerns, associations, and organizations, which will not have to be part of the administration. Obviously, the creation of new structures will require a balanced approach, so that the entire matter will not be confined to a mere change of titles.

Nonstate concerns, representing associations of other forms of ownership, could be established along with state concerns. Their relations with the state would be regulated exclusively through taxes and licenses. The concerns and their enterprises should finance their own operation and development. Their sources of funding could be augmented by the state on a refundable basis and for a fee.

The most complex group of problems in our republic has accumulated in the agroindustrial complex. A decision has already been made to abolish the State Agroindustrial Committee.

The main organ of agricultural administration will be the Tajik SSR Ministry of Agriculture, which will be maintained with republic budget funds. A search is under way for the best methods of managing other branches of the agroindustrial complex. The main objective here is the autonomy of producers, based on the most diverse forms of ownership and free of diktat.

The functions of managing these enterprises, in our opinion, should be performed by the organs they establish themselves—nongovernmental organs. An organ appointed by the state to coordinate the operations and development of the processing industry, in our opinion, should exist only on the republic level.

The creation of a body on the republic level similar to the Agricultural Supply Administration appears to be the best way of ensuring efficient material and technical supply operations.

I want to emphasize the fact that the structures serving the agroindustrial complex on the basis of cost accounting principles should not be eliminated, and should be developed, beginning with rayons and oblasts, but with a view to market relations. This is why we are considering a more important role for local soviets—oblispolkoms, rayon soviet organs, executive organs, and so forth—in agriculture.

All monopolistic and dictatorial behavior should be curbed effectively.

In view of our acute demographic problems, we plan to merge two former committees into a single organ—the State Committee for Labor and the Training of Workers. Today, however, it was suggested at a meeting of a group of Supreme Soviet committees that this committee be named the Ministry of Labor.

Today there is an absolutely distinct need to create a state committee for the management of state property, a ministry of foreign economic relations, a ministry for industrial affairs, and a ministry of energy, with the appropriate functions and with a view to the conditions of work in a market economy.

We will retain the Ministry of Grain Products, the Ministry of Finance, the State Committee for Statistics and, for now, the State Committee for Material and Technical Supply. Its functions will change gradually.

We recognize the need to retain all of the ministries and departments of the sociocultural complex, but also with the necessary improvements in their functions and their forms and methods of work. The creation of a committee on family and women's affairs is being considered in response to numerous proposals from the commissions of party committees, the Council of Women, and the Committee of the Supreme Soviet.

As for other proposals, we could put the State Environmental Protection Committee under the direct jurisdiction of the Supreme Soviet, but we do not think there is sufficient reason to combine the ministries of health and social security, as some people have suggested.

Obviously, this will not be the end of the process of improving the structure of administration, especially central organs. The market economy and changing conditions will necessitate adjustments. Some organs will disappear and others will come into being. In short, the structure will be extremely flexible and dynamic.

In this connection, we are requesting Communist deputies to support the proposals on the structure of the Cabinet of Ministers and the ukases on this matter at the session.

The session will also discuss the bill: "On Local Self-Government and Local Economic Management in the Tajik SSR." Many different opinions and suggestions were voiced when it was being drafted. In essence, all of them addressed the need to eliminate the dual power established on the local level by soviet ispolkoms and presidiums. We support this approach.

The reorganization has to be reasonable, however. Several options were considered. The combination of the offices of ispolkom and soviet chairmen is one of the possibilities that will be discussed at the session of the republic Supreme Soviet, but we have learned that many do not agree.

There were other proposals as well: a return to the earlier structure of the soviets, or the elimination of the soviet presidiums, leaving the offices of ispolkom and soviet chairmen separate but creating a single personnel staff for them.

In short, the session will decide all of these matters by means of debate.

Comrades! The present stage in the life of the republic and the Communist Party of Tajikistan requires party committees on all levels, primary party organizations, and all Communists to become active political fighters for the renewal of society, the publicizing of party ideals, and their realization.

We are not concealing our goals, because they are in the interests of the republic and its people. For this reason, we must fight for them boldly and openly, using the whole arsenal of political, ideological, and organizational forms and methods, backed up by the support of Communists and the laboring masses.

The Central Committee bureau hopes to hear concrete and objective proposals today on the best way of accomplishing all of this.

Thank you for your attention.

Kaunas, Tyumen Sign Cooperation Agreement

91UN1266A Moscow TRUD in Russian 10 Apr 91 p 2

[Article by V. Pavlenko: "Profitable for Both Cities"]

[Text] Tyumen—Politicians who are devoted to the idea of national sovereignty are calling for demarcation; at the same time, the conviction is growing stronger among leaders of local governments and business that there is a need for the development of mutually profitable ties.

G. Raykov, chairman of the Tyumen City Soviet of People's Deputies, having returned from a trip to Lithuania, emphasized this thought in a speech before the voters. In Kaunas, the leaders of delegations from both city soviets signed an agreement on economic cooperation and cultural ties.

Formerly there were no such relations between Tyumen and Kaunas. The residents of Kaunas, whose delegation arrived in Tyumen about a month ago, proposed the establishment of cooperation. So a return visit took place. Having studied one another's capabilities, the municipal delegations worked out a program of relations for both the near and long-term future. G. Raykov reported that practical implementation of the agreement will begin without delay—the city organs of administration, business executives, and scientific and cultural workers are acting on it.

Ethnic Soldiers in Baltic MD Polled

91UM0548A Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA
in Russian 23 February 91 p 2

[Article by Lieutenant Colonel N. Stepanets, instructor in the department of military teaching and psychology of the Tallinn higher political and construction service school: "On Time and on Oneself: Results of a Poll of Servicemen of Indigenous Nationality From the Baltic Republics"]

[Text] This urgent period of perestroika has posed difficult problems for our society and for the Armed Forces. What do those who are presently at the very epicenter of opinions and events think about all of this? What do the rank-and-file soldiers and sergeants who are representatives of the indigenous nationalities of the Baltic republics think about what is happening in the country and in the Baltic region in particular?

A comprehensive sociopsychological poll conducted at a number of units of the Baltic Military District helped to answer these and a number of other questions. The issues may be tentatively divided into two sets: General political questions, and the military questions that are closely tied with them; in the course of the poll the latter occupied a somewhat larger place in terms of volume. The basic method of conducting the poll was via an anonymous questionnaire. In fact, many servicemen voluntarily indicated their last names, which would seem to indicate the firmness of their personal positions. In a

number of instances this basic method was supplemented with individual interviews.

The way the poll was conducted bears a number of significant features noticeably influencing the degree of accuracy and objectivity of the points of views expressed by rank-and-file soldiers and sergeants on any particular question.

First, the poll was conducted during and soon after the well-known tragic events in Vilnius and Riga; that is, during the January aggravation of the situation in Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia.

Second, the poll coincided in time with the beginning of preparations for the all-Union referendum on the fate of the USSR, and it took place on the eve of the well-known poll of citizens of Lithuania on 9 February and the preparations for the republic-level polls of residents of Latvia and Estonia designated for 3 March. However, I make the reservation that the servicemen were not asked questions that paraphrased the all-Union referendum.

Third, the poll was conducted in the period when the situation connected with the latest conscription campaign had reached its greatest tension in the Baltic republics.

Thus, what do Latvian, Lithuanian, and Estonian rank-and-file soldiers and sergeants of the Baltic Military District think these days? When asked how well they know the situation in their republic, the majority—56.8 percent—answered that they are familiar with the situation on the whole but do not know it fully. Another 34.2 percent of those polled answered that they know about the situation only somewhat, and only nine percent believe that they know the situation thoroughly.

The poll indicates that 40.6 percent of the servicemen get their information from the central press, radio, and television; 25.2 percent indicated letters from relatives and acquaintances from their republic as their basic source of information; 16.1 percent regularly read newspapers and journals of their republics; 14 percent of them are familiar with the situation in their homeland through conversations with visiting relations and acquaintances as well as recruits from home; and 23.9 percent of the soldiers and sergeants, that is almost one-fourth, indicated that they get their information from practically all the aforementioned sources.

When asked about central mass media reporting on the situation in the Baltic republics, 31 percent of those polled declared that they trust it, 20.6 percent reacted negatively, and 48.4 percent were unable to answer.

The servicemen also expressed their opinion of the position of the press, radio, and television of the Baltic republics. The poll indicates that 33.6 percent, that is to say one-third of those polled, trust their own mass media, 27.7 reacted negatively, and 38.7 did not answer the question.

Of special interest are the questions on attitudes toward military service. Of those polled, 29 percent noted that during their service their ideas about the military changed for the better. The poll also showed a far from uniform attitude toward alternative service. Expressing their opinion of countrymen who have refused service in the USSR Armed Forces and registered for alternative service, 26.4 percent of the servicemen support their actions, 38.7 percent do not support them, and 34.9 percent were unable to respond to the question.

The poll asked, "If you were presented with the opportunity to choose service in the USSR Armed Forces or alternative service in your republic, which would you prefer?" In response, 42.5 percent are in favor of the opportunity to choose service in the USSR Armed Forces, 26.5 percent are for alternative service, and 31 percent were unable to give an answer.

Speaking of service in the military, servicemen from the Baltic republics reacted in different fashions to the opportunity to choose where they carried out military service. Thus, 67.7 percent are convinced it would be better to serve in their own republic and 20.6 percent believe that it is better to serve beyond the borders of their own republic inasmuch as this broadens their exposure to the USSR in general. And 11.6 percent of the rank-and-file soldiers and sergeants answered that they basically do not care where they serve.

The scourge of today's military is deserters and runaways, that is to say those who leave their duty station. And although a tendency toward a decline in that phenomenon has been noted, it is still too early to speak of a fundamental resolution of the problem. The soldiers and sergeants were given the following question: "Have you considered leaving your duty station and going home?" According to the poll, 65.9 percent answered that they have not considered it; 20.6 percent answered that they have considered it but changed their minds; and 13.5 percent suppose that with an aggravation of the sociopolitical situation in their republic they might decide on such a step.

The poll asked whether interethnic conflicts in the country undermine the friendship and unity of servicemen of different nationalities. According to the poll, 49.8 percent declared that they do not; 43.2 percent believe that some tension is felt in relations between servicemen of different nationalities; and only seven

percent presume that conflicts in the country have a negative influence on interethnic relations in military collectives.

And how do servicemen of other nationalities treat servicemen of Latvian, Lithuania, and Estonian nationality? According to the responses, 52.9 percent of those polled believe that others relate to them in a normal, friendly manner; 41.3 percent noted that relations with them are satisfactory on the whole; and only 5.8 percent expressed the opinion that representatives of other nationalities treat servicemen from the Baltic republics poorly.

And finally, one more interesting and important aspect. It is connected with the attitudes of servicemen from the Baltic republics toward antimilitary laws and acts adopted in Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. About 19 percent of those polled view these acts positively, 33.4 percent negatively, and 47.7 percent believe that questions of the USSR Armed Forces on the territory of the republic should be decided in coordination with the USSR.

Without going into great detail, it is probably necessary to look at a number of conclusions that result from the poll in general.

First, at a time when many fundamental problems of our society are at the stage of legislative and practical resolution, one should not set one's hopes on extremes. As we see, we do not need dogma, ambition, and dilettantism but rather knowledge of the problem—concrete, deep, and comprehensive knowledge.

Second, youths conscripted from the Baltic republics are not indifferent to the fate of our society and their republics and to the problems of military service. And the points of view not only can but must be disparate in a process that is truly democratic. So that with development they will become points of contact on the basis of general human values.

Third, today one must not indiscriminately declare, as representatives of some movements are so hasty to do "in the name of all of our youths," that "all our youths want," etc. This inevitably leads to mob rule, anarchy, and chaos.

And, finally, the last point. This sociopsychological poll is not an "isolated instance." From various points of view it allows us to look more broadly at the wide spectrum of problems and foresee, predict, and anticipate many things. And, of course, to improve educational work with servicemen on the base of all of this.

Pugo Presents Statistical Crime Report

91UN1172A Moscow VETERAN in Russian Vol 11,
Feb 91 p 3

[Interview with USSR Internal Affairs Minister Boris Pugo, by S. Ovsienko: "From a Position of Law"]

[Text] Prior to the new USSR internal affairs minister's press conference, journalists were given copies of "Data on the State of Law and Order in the USSR." I must say right away that they give no grounds for optimism: 2,786,605 crimes were registered in the country in 1990, which is 13.2 percent higher than the previous year. Our conversation with Boris Karlovich Pugo began on this alarming note.

[Pugo] The collegium of the USSR MVD met recently with the internal affairs ministers of all the union republics; afterwards, USSR President Gorbachev received the leadership of the USSR MVD and the republic ministers. This was the first such meeting, and it had great significance for us. We held not only professional but also important political talks. Principal attention was focused on improving the MVD, and on measures for enhancing law and order and legality. Serious dissatisfaction was expressed with respect to combatting crime, and uneasiness over the growth of negative phenomena. The weakness and ineffectiveness of the operational measures of the organs of law and order were noted as well.

Overall Composition of Crime

Serious Crimes—422,647

Economic Crimes—265,427

Property Crimes—1,687,162

Street Crimes—333,247

Crimes on Transport—121,551

What is alarming, is that total crime en masse for the past year reached the highest level for the entire post-war period. The aggressiveness and the use of firearms by the criminal elements is increasing—the number of violent personal assaults has grown by 11 percent, while crimes involving use of firearms has increased by a third.

[Ovsienko] Boris Karlovich, the "economy" was ranked second in the overall composition of crime. Please explain this shift.

[Pugo] Crimes of avarice, embezzlement and speculation are growing rapidly in all branches of the national economy. There is also a burgeoning crime wave connected with currency, valuable papers, bank operations and illegal credit, with the creation of false stock companies and cooperatives, and with swindling on an international scale.

Of all the crimes exposed in the sphere of economics, 10,000 involved embezzlement of large and especially-large amounts.

MVD organs found themselves unprepared for the changes which have taken place in the nature of economic crime. Talk about combatting it was not sufficiently backed up by deeds. The lack of a law on combatting corruption is significantly holding back our struggle with bribery. And after all, corruption promotes organized crime.

And the end of 1989, according to official data, there were about 3,500 criminal organizations. Right now there are almost 5,000. The layers of organized crime run deep, and in spite of the struggle it remains untroubled today. The USSR President's January ukazes present new opportunities for energizing the struggle with the shadow economy, and with organized crime.

Street Crime

Premeditated Murder and Attempted Murder—2,918

Aggravated Assault—14,194

Rape and Attempted Rape—2,499

Robbery and Seizure of Personal Belongings—7,546

Personal Property Theft—65,689

Hooliganism—57,407

[Ovsienko] How many rumors the joint police and military street patrols have generated, and how many predictions of assaults on democracy...

[Pugo] The stir in certain of the mass information media is, in my own view, unfounded. The military have received no additional rights whatsoever with respect to the civilian population. The presidential ukaze has specified the type of assistance—joint patrols with the military.

I do not think that one single measure is capable of changing the entire situation in the country. And we have not placed any great hopes on this.

Organized Crime

Seven-thousand-twenty-nine crimes committed by criminal groups have been registered; of these, 226 by groups with corrupt affiliations. These crimes are clearly of a violent-avaricious nature: one in every third is theft of personal property; one in every seven is apartment burglary.

On the average every criminal group identified has committed up to four criminally-punishable acts during its period of existence; meanwhile, police have confiscated 550 firearms from the criminals.

[Ovsienko] Crime is growing, and rapidly. The low wages of the police, their lack of protection in the law, the

parade of republic and other sovereignties, and attempts to divide the police according to nationality provide social and political capital for this crime. What sort of principles has the MVD leadership established for the activities of the law-enforcement organs?

[Pugo] I am convinced that the all-union internal affairs system must remain intact. At the same time, we must strengthen our ties with the republic ministries, and clarify and delimit their jurisdiction, rights and responsibility. From our viewpoint, all rights and responsibility for solving the practical problems in combatting crime must remain under republic jurisdiction, and that of their legislative and executive organs.

At the same time, republic internal affairs organs delegate a number of powers to the USSR MVD. These are, for example, organizing the struggle with the most dangerous crimes, of a nation-wide or international nature; leadership of internal troops; and working out nationwide programs for combatting crime...

I am not in favor of separating the police forces, for breaking them up is fraught with great danger. Unfortunately, it has begun in the Baltics. We intend to undertake efforts not to allow it.

I am also disturbed by the processes going on in the Moscow police department in particular. You are aware of the peculiar position of the Moscow Soviet, wherein General Komissarov was named candidate for chief of the GUVd [Main Administration for Internal Affairs], without the permission of the USSR MVD. And, this was done in violation of the law. General Komissarov met with me not long ago. Until the status of Moscow is decided, Gen-Lt Bogdanov is carrying out the responsibilities of chief of the capital police department. This was the decision of the collegium of the USSR MVD. And General Komissarov agrees with it.

We have already had one unhappy experience in eliminating the all-union MVD; that was in 1959, and there was a sharp increase in crime. So why should we repeat that?!

An increase in crime has been noted in all union republics, especially in Armenia (43.9 percent), Estonia (24.4), Lithuania (18.6), and Latvia (16.9 percent). The growth rate of property crime is increasing rapidly in Armenia (64.5 percent), Georgia (42.1), Estonia (33.0) and Lithuania (31.0 percent).

[Ovsienko] And nevertheless, Boris Karlovich, no matter how you restructure the internal affairs organs, the main thing is the people working in it...

[Pugo] Every day, every hour, police officers are risking their lives. Over the last year the number of assaults on them using firearms has increased by 12 percent. In 1990, 193 policemen died in official performance of their duty.

In connection with the severe shortage of cadres, we must increase the authority of the police, and the social

prestige of serving in the police force. The USSR Cabinet of Ministers has adopted a resolution on significantly increasing the monetary remuneration of police officers, their pay and compensation, beginning 1 March. We hope that the nation's Supreme Soviet will pass a law on the police.

[Ovsienko] The Riga Special-Purpose Military Detachment [OMON] is currently at the center of attention. To some, the OMON are heroes; to others, renegades...

[Pugo] An investigative group of the USSR Procuracy is currently at work in Riga. The participation of the OMON in the well-known events is within its sphere of interest. The situation, I would like to point out, is complex: on the one hand, the police have taken an oath of loyalty to the USSR Constitution and the Laws of the USSR. At the very same time, the republic has its own laws. The internal affairs minister insists that the police should carry out only the laws of the republic Supreme Soviet. I have given the Lithuanian leaders my own point of view: You must not entangle the police in political games. They ensure the safety of the populace, and are struggling with crime. The disbandment of the OMON would not be interpreted in the same way by the police and the public. We must await the conclusion of the investigation and take measures against the guilty parties.

Over 233,000 crimes were committed by juveniles or with their participation. Among these, crimes of avarice, rape and attempted rape predominated. Persons previously brought to criminal liability committed more than 350,000 crimes; groups of people, 278,400; and almost 457,000 were committed while in a state of alcoholic intoxication.

[Ovsienko] Boris Karlovich, what is your point of view on the separation of the party [departizatsiya] from the internal affairs organs?

[Pugo] I stand on the position defined by the Law and Constitution of the USSR. Every person has the right to join any party. One's party status should not affect the execution of one's official duties, and party decisions are not binding on the law-enforcement organs.

[Ovsienko] In a speech at a recent meeting in Zelenograd, General Komissarov declared that he is in favor of separation of the party from the police...

[Pugo] That is strange. When we met, he rejected this formula, believing that MVD organs could contain representatives of all parties. What he later said in Zelenograd somehow characterizes the man himself.

Police have registered 35,309 crimes associated with narcotics and other virulent substances, which is 24 percent higher than in 1989.

Narcotics addicts committed 4,384 crimes, including 43 murders and attempted murders, 33 aggravated bodily assaults, 36 rapes and attempted rapes, 84 robberies, and 99 thefts.

MVD organs have exposed 24,700 persons for narcotics crimes, of which 2,000 were engaged in the illegal manufacture, storage and transfer with intent to sell.

[Ovsienko] The criminal situation in the country remains complex, and in some places even dangerous. Under such circumstances, where should the MVD organs focus their efforts?

[Pugo] I consider one important task the protection of the rights and liberties of the citizens, and ensuring order and safety on the street. We believe that we must start with the individual and his true state of safety. The collegium of the ministry views with alarm the lack of a comprehensive approach, the disjointed actions of the services and subunits, and the passiveness of police officers.

A top-priority task for law-enforcement organs is improving the organization of investigating and exposing crimes. We are beefing-up the criminal investigation department. Incidentally, on investigation, the USSR MVD believes that we are not yet ready to establish an Investigative Committee, and that it is better to concentrate all investigation in the MVD system.

[Ovsienko] Boris Karlovich, our conversation is taking place on your birthday. Permit me to wish you good health, happiness and success in your difficult work! Thank you very much for the interview.

[Pugo] Thank you for the congratulations, and your good wishes.

MVD Special Purpose Subunit Described

91UN1255A Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY
in Russian No 14, Apr 91 p 4

[Interview with unidentified squad commander of the first MVD Spetsnaz "professional" subunit by military journalist D. Andreyev; place and date not given: "'Pros' From Spetsnaz: Counterterrorism as a Science"]

[Text] **The first Special Purpose Forces [Spetsnaz] subunit staffed by professionals has been created as part of the USSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] Internal Troops.**

Military journalist D. Andreyev met with the "professionals" squad commander, Lieutenant S. Dmitriyev (name changed.—ed.) and asked him to describe the work of the Spetsnaz.

[Andreyev] What is the reason for creating such a subunit, and what are its tasks?

[Dmitriyev] The creation of a professional Spetsnaz subunit in the MVD is necessitated by the increasingly complicated situation in the country.

[Andreyev] Is it really necessary to maintain this aura of secrecy around your subunit?

[Dmitriyev] This is not just our fancy. We do not disclose our operational tactics; otherwise, it will be difficult, for instance, to neutralize terrorists who hijack an airplane. Or another example... The subunit arrives at its "job" destination—let us say, Karabakh. With knowledge of our unit, the criminals prepare for our arrival and the element of surprise is lost. Then, after the operation, they start a hunt for us: The price on the head of a Spetsnaz officer is 50,000 rubles [R]. We do have families, you know.

By the way, people in similar groups abroad work under pseudonyms and wear masks. And they do not get in front of journalistic "spotlights."

[Andreyev] Many are inclined to see the creation of such unit as one more threat to democracy in our country.

[Dmitriyev] I do not think we should go into questions like "Will you shoot at your own people?" This is already a worn-out theme. Our main adversaries are crime and terrorism.

[Andreyev] Does this mean that the MVD leadership cannot use "pros" at its discretion to solve situations that are "not by-the-book?"

[Dmitriyev] The situations where our unit is to be used are clearly stipulated by the normative documents; there are only four such situations: freeing hostages; liquidation of especially dangerous armed criminals; capture of instigators of mass unrest; and escort and protection of the USSR MVD leadership and the chief of Internal Troops. There are no other purposes stipulated for the use of this experimental unit.

[Andreyev] Nevertheless, one "independent" journalist called your unit the party's sharpest bayonet...

[Dmitriyev] If such a comparison is appropriate at all, this bayonet belongs exclusively to law and order. As for our political beliefs, no one can forbid me personally to be a Communist, and the same goes for other officers.

[Andreyev] Are you sure that after their contract expires, former "pros" will not use their acquired skills for criminal purposes?

[Dmitriyev] After the two-year training, it would be practically impossible to neutralize our soldier—should he choose the path of crime—without the use of weapons. That is why we study our recruits attentively. If the slightest doubt arises in regard to his integrity and reliability, he is dismissed. We will follow the life of a "pro" after his contract expires, too. Spetsnaz protects the honor of its uniform.

[Andreyev] How do you select people for the professional unit?

[Dmitriyev] "Pros" are soldiers who transfer to reserve after a fixed term of service, who decide to devote themselves to our difficult work. During the selection

process, the candidate has to undergo tests for professional fitness. Checked especially thoroughly is physical fitness: pull-ups or push-ups judged by a 500-point system (18 of the former and 70 of the latter get 100 points), a three-kilometer cross-country dash, and gymnastics.

Then we test the moral and psychological qualities of future Spetsnaz members in the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute for Biophysics, using specially developed methods. Those who successfully pass all tests have to undergo hand-to-hand combat with two "pros," to test the recruit's combat qualities.

[Andreyev] What are the terms of the contract and the pay?

[Dmitriyev] A soldier gets R300; R10 is added for each step up in military rank. In addition, servicemen are provided free meals on a special ration three times a day. Unfortunately, we are not able to get many of the high-quality products that are needed.

The contract term is two years and may be canceled by either party. Officers do not sign a contract. On the average, our salary is R470.

[Andreyev] How does your squad differ from similar Western groups?

[Dmitriyev] We follow the work of the English SAS, American Delta, Austrian Cobra, and German GSG-9. We are also establishing business relations. I do not want to brag, but the Cobra commander after looking at our guys' work said: "The whole world should visit you to learn."

It is, however, both premature and thankless to compare us with "their" professionals. We may not be behind them in training, but when it comes to the technical side... In other countries, the state provides everything for these groups by special order, from key chains to personal weapons. We do not even have the bare necessities: comfortable uniforms, equipment, special weapons, simulation equipment. When we were showing our "work" to our foreign colleagues, we even had to "pass the hat" to buy window and door frames and glass. Of course, there was nothing left of them after the demonstration. We have to put together many things on our own.

Here is a completely paradoxical example. Some time ago we needed a video cassette recorder to review our sessions and to analyze the work of the Western special groups. According to procedures, we made a request. We got back the response: "No video tape recorder; will provide accordion and two guitars."

Commentary on Kalugin Civil Action Against Ryzhkov

91UF0605A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 2 Apr 91
Union Edition p 6

[Article by Yu. Feofanov: "Justice Denied: Postscript to the 'Kalugin Case'"]

[Text] Oleg Kalugin lost his case before he even got to court. The final obstacle on his way to Themis' premises was placed by the unanimous verdict of the USSR Supreme Court plenum. They decided that a suit against the Council of Ministers chairman was not a court matter; the complaint should be submitted "through the chain of command" or, in other words, to the USSR Supreme Soviet which is a very authoritative but not a legal body.

This last point, in my opinion, is much more important than what has happened with the generalship of Oleg Danilovich. I am not saying this because I adhere to the principles of socialist ethics—"one individual is nothing." No! The fate of one single individual is no less valuable than the interests of the entire country. The decision of the USSR Supreme Court deserves extra attention and discussion for the very reason that it confirms the antilaw reality of our life: An individual has no protection in his conflict with the state authority at any given level; he can complain but he does not have the right to argue.

Even though the case "Kalugin versus Ryzhkov" is well known, it might be useful to outline its stages in brief. Kalugin was stripped of his generalship by a decree of the USSR Council of Ministers. A decision by the KGB chairman took away his corresponding retirement pension. Kalugin tried to start legal proceedings but the court refused to accept his suit. He went to the RSFSR Supreme Court which agreed that the suit should be considered. The Moscow city court agreed to initiate the proceedings. However, the deputy procurator general protested. The protest was considered and overruled by the RSFSR Supreme Court Presidium. People were looking forward to the trial. But then a protest came from the acting procurator general to the USSR Supreme Court which accepted the protest, as we have already said.

The meaning of these events is extremely simple: An individual wants "to be tried" but he is denied justice. Why is he? Kalugin and his lawyer Boris Kuznetsov are convinced that there was no decision by the Council of Ministers. It was made solely by its chairman and then was presented as the act of a collective body. Had any proceedings been initiated, the court would have definitely investigated this circumstance. The plaintiff has in his possession depositions of 12 Union ministers in which they claim that they never heard about the meeting at which Kalugin was stripped of his rank. Besides, the CPSU Central Committee Plenum took place on the day mentioned in the document and the Council of Ministers could not meet for that reason

either, it seems. All this would have been demonstrated to the judges, together with the objections of the defendant, naturally, if he had any. You have to agree that the court had to examine rather serious subjects. If one can suppose that the Kalugin issue was not discussed by the Council of Ministers at all, then one may conclude that the head of the government abused his power.

There exists an opinion that that was the only reason why "the authorities were scared of a public trial" and the law enforcement agencies, such as the Procuracy and the Supreme Court, just complied with their wishes. But how well-grounded is this accusation? First we have to decide whether Kalugin's suit should be considered at all, if we do not deviate from the law in the least.

This legal issue was what the Supreme Court plenum was discussing. They had it all pigeon-holed professionally. The Council of Ministers decree (nobody knows whether it existed or not) was properly drawn up. The law allowed, by the date mentioned in the decree, the initiation of proceedings with respect to actions of certain officials but not of collective bodies. This reason alone was sufficient not to have the suit considered in court. The new law became effective two days later—1 July 1990. The supreme judges, nevertheless, used this new law as they considered Kalugin's action; still it did not work. According to the law (currently in force), legal proceedings may be initiated with respect to actions of officials and of state governing bodies. But the Constitution says that the Council of Ministers is "the highest executive and administrative organ of state power." This is the law, whatever we might think of it. A village soviet, by the way, is an organ of power, as well as the rayon, city, and oblast soviets. Their executive committees are justiciable but they are not.

I am asking myself whether the high judges could go against the existing law? No, I answer to myself, they could not. The law is their highest authority. But why then did I not feel deeply satisfied with the verdict based on law? Why, on the contrary, did I feel deeply disappointed? Maybe, because everything was decided so impassively. Nobody even had any doubts about the legitimacy of denying justice to someone; at least nobody voiced any doubts. There were no arguments, no comments, no attempts to display a legal initiative. I would like to hear such words: "We have to pronounce our verdict in full accordance with the law. But this law is not legitimate..." Alas...

Some rights are considered sacred and inalienable: They are the right to life, right to inviolability of person and property, right to freedom of speech and of ideas. These are the "universal human values." No individual, or democracy, or rule-of-law state is possible without them. The right to justice is among them. An individual must be given an opportunity to resolve his conflict with the government in an independent court. I am not saying "government" in the abstract, journalistic sense of the word; I mean a strictly legal term reinforced by definite procedures. To put it simply, I must have the right

mentioned in our code to sue a soviet, a ministry, the government, the president, the parliament, and the very congress of USSR people's deputies if any of them has violated my rights by its or his act. There is nothing blasphemous or terrifying in such a demand; the American Government is not afraid of a suit "Mr. Smith versus the United States." I doubt that the government wanted such a law—it was made to accept it by the people. Our government is still scared and for this reason does not even come close to the mark of a "rule-of-law" state. And the people...

From the "practice" of our transfer to a market economy we know how difficult it might be to give up stereotyped concepts, ethics, or lifestyles. The fear of the market is being overcome only with the help of empty store shelves: To hell with it, let there be capitalism as long as we do not starve to death. We are ready to go through the barricades to fight for "sausage." But I am not sure that our people will go there to fight for their rights. We have gotten used to having no rights in the face of any power and that has become another stereotype of our life. Our people willingly join commissions to audit warehouses and storage closets but they stubbornly refuse to accept even such legal power as is given to them by the government: We cannot assemble a pool of jury members capable of making our courts truly independent—nobody can give them orders, by either telephone or with a bullhorn. No we are not going to judge, let them rather judge us... So our free parliamentarians, ready to settle personal accounts till they grow hoarse, vote indifferently for curtailing their own privileges... Where can we find any responsible concern for the sacred and inalienable rights of an individual? We have not come that far yet, it seems...

The decision of the USSR Supreme Court on the "Kalugin versus Ryzhkov" case follows exactly the letter of the existing law. The fact that the existing law does not follow the universal human law was not mentioned at the plenum. I do not have the right to reproach the high judges for this. But neither can I help feeling deeply disappointed.

Hijack Attempt Over Baltic Defeated by Crew

*PM0304115391 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 1 Apr 91
First Edition p 2*

[Yu. Trefilov report: "Disarmed in the Air"]

[Text] Last Thursday 18-year-old Aleksey Kuznetsov from Severodvinsk decided to go abroad. He planned to realize his dream on a Tu-134 flying the Arkhangelsk-Leningrad-Kaliningrad route. On the approach to the final destination Kuznetsov demanded that the crew change course and fly to Stockholm.

The crew tried to dissuade him from his criminal plan, but the hijacker was not to be swayed. Crew members then surrounded him and isolated him from the other passengers. Captain G. Popov landed at Kaliningrad bang on schedule. There were no casualties.

Estonian KGB's Role in Fighting Economic Sabotage Discussed

91UF0614B Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA
in Russian 17 Feb 91 p 3

[Interview with Arnold Arro, deputy chairman of the Estonian KGB, by SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA correspondent A. Podvezko; date and place not given: "Sabotage, Smuggling, Profiteering—KGB Asks for Plenary Powers"]

[Text] On 26 January 1991 the president of the USSR issued an ukase "On Measures to Support the Fight Against Economic Sabotage and Other Crimes in the Economic Sphere." Our correspondent talks with Arnold Arro, deputy chairman of this committee, about the problems that face the republic's KGB in connection with the implementation of this ukase.

[Correspondent] Arnold Eduardovich, we can get a general idea of the scale of the spread of economic crime in our country on the basis of individual reports in the central mass media. But what is the situation in this respect in Estonia? Perhaps it is not as bad here as in other regions of the Union?

[Arro] We were also previously involved with individual questions connected with economic crimes—smuggled goods, hard currency intrigues, and the like. And judging from the picture that is being drawn, matters in this sphere in Estonia are no better than in the Union...

Each of us has a vivid and striking impression of the shortage of consumer goods that has evolved in Estonia. And it would be interesting to the residents of our republic to learn that, at the same time, in Togliatti, for example, it is very easy to buy Estonian furniture, products of "Kalev," "Marat," and other enterprises of the republic. I think that it is clear as to how it gets there: in exchange for passenger cars.

In 1990, scarce products equaling 2.55 million rubles [R] were delivered from Estonia alone to the VAZ [Volga Automobile Plant imeni 50 Years of the USSR in the City of Togliatti]. Moreover, licenses were not issued for the export of this product from the republic. And we only checked out seven state enterprises and cooperatives! Now the list of enterprises that are subject to verification has increased to 60.

I said that licenses for the export of scarce products were not issued. But smuggling is not the only way they leave the republic. Here, for example, is another channel: An enterprise receives a license to export its product allegedly in exchange for needed raw materials. But, in fact, it exchanges the product for passenger cars, refrigerators, and other consumer goods.

The work to expose such violations is rather detailed and labor intensive, inasmuch as after the conclusion of pertinent contracts, documents are as a rule destroyed and it is very difficult to find any traces.

We have proposed that the government of the Estonian Republic establish a commission of representatives of the Procuracy, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the KGB, and other monitoring organizations to verify closely and thoroughly who is exporting what from the republic...

[Correspondent] Excuse me for interrupting, but to whom principally were the passenger cars received in this way distributed?

[Arro] They were distributed mainly among the managers of enterprises and persons close to them. So that talk about the welfare of the collective in a majority of such cases turns out to be demagoguery that covers up personal interests...

But I will continue. Not only consumer goods and food products are exported from the republic, but also raw materials. Including exported abroad. Here is just one example.

The joint enterprise Estkompeksim—the famous Penguin—exports thousands of tons of raw materials and food products abroad. Among these are powdered eggs, dried milk, hides, fish, and others. It has licenses. All the documents are in order. Everything is legal overall. But is the benefit that this joint enterprise brings the republic comparable to what it loses? I think not.

Two hundred and thirty joint enterprises are registered in Estonia. Only 15-20 of them are engaged specifically in the work for which they were established—the output of products or the provision of services. An overwhelming majority of the joint enterprise restrict themselves to middleman activities: buying and selling. Moreover, at times this activity turns into the usual profiteering. For example, we are now investigating the activity of a joint enterprises—I cannot name it now—which was supposed to have established a woodworking shop. As a matter of fact, the managers of this joint enterprise were engaged in the resale of electrical household appliances, wines, and other scarce items. The foreign partner, realizing the direction that the activity of the joint enterprise took, refused to participate in it. But the chairman of the board still has the forms, the stamps...

[Correspondent] But how does the joint enterprise get the opportunity to engage in something that is not its direct activity but only intermediary?

[Arro] The fact is that there is almost always a paragraph in the charter of these enterprises about purchase and sale which allows them to engage in this also. Moreover, while purely intermediary activity is prohibited in the Union, this decree is not observed by us. Therefore, it can be said that the Baltics are a paradise for such joint enterprises and cooperatives...

I intentionally began the conversation about economic crimes in illegal trade operations, inasmuch as they, besides others, for purely economic reasons, contribute

to the creation of shortages. And shortages, as is known, in turn engender corruption, profiteering, and other crimes.

[Correspondent] Tell me, the production and sale of drugs and smuggled goods, and rackets—all of this can also be categorized as economic crimes?

[Arro] In a certain sense, yes. Because money obtained in this manner is later "laundered" in the economic sphere precisely by way of illegal transactions. It is apparent that in trying to "unravel" this line, it is also possible to run into the mafia.

[Correspondent] But what is the situation like in the republic with respect to the aforementioned types of crime?

[Arro] Drugs. On 13 December 1990 in Helsinki an attempt was uncovered to bring in a batch of 18,000 anabolic steroids from the USSR.

On 29 January 1991 a resident of Estonia was arrested who was trying to export in a hiding place in his car 125 ampules of morphine, 707 grams of marijuana, and 850 tablets of anabolic substances.

Again on 29 January, Finnish police arrested a group of businessmen who were suspected of acquiring and selling drugs. Sixteen kilograms of narcotic substances were confiscated from them. Among those arrested, in addition to foreigners, were four Estonian residents.

Racketeering. We know that about 30 groups operate in the republic; moreover, both local and passers-through—from Tyumen and Kazan. Why do we not pick them up? We are still gathering material, for it is not only necessary to arrest them but also to prove their guilt. Unfortunately people, fearing criminal vengeance, rarely turn to us for help, and therefore we have few facts...

[Correspondent] Let us return to the subject of the conversation: What problems and tasks do you face in connection with the implementation of the ukase of the USSR president?

[Arro] I said that we have already partly become involved with economic crimes, although with small forces. Now, a separate subunit is being established to fight against sabotage and organized crime, and it will be involved in a whole complex of issues associated with economic crimes.

The methods of work are also being changed. While previously in an investigation of a crime we went from the fact of its commitment to the guilty parties, now the scheme will be different: from the criminal environment to the crime. The experience of our colleagues abroad indicates that deep penetration into the criminal environment is the best method of preventing crimes and exposing them.

The main direction of our work in this sphere is the search for the facts of the crime themselves. The USSR

president earlier published an ukase on worker control in the hope that ordinary citizens who are interested in establishing justice will help law enforcement organs uncover cases of crime. This ukase has not been annulled by the leadership of our republic, but it also has not been put into force on its territory. Therefore, we appeal to you, dear citizens, that if you know of cases of the concealment of commodities, profiteering, illegal deals, and the like, call telephone number 443-400. We are prepared to deal immediately with each report.

But appeals to the consciences of our citizens are also not a resolution of the problem. The law enforcement organs must have the opportunity themselves to uncover crimes. But for this they need a legal basis and public plenary powers.

[Correspondent] In your opinion, does the ukase of the USSR president on the fight against economic crimes grant any kind of extraordinary rights to law enforcement organs, including the KGB?

[Arro] The USSR criminal code, which we in particular are guided by in our work, no longer corresponds to the changed reality. For example, all enterprises previously were mainly state enterprises. Their managers, who were under the threat of party and administrative punishment, were obligated to assist law enforcement organs in the exposure of crimes. We now have a mass of cooperatives, joint enterprises, and private employers who by no means consider themselves obligated in this regard, even just the opposite. Indeed, managers of state plants, factories, stores, and warehouses, under the pretext of free economic activity, are also not trying to help, to put it mildly, in the control of their activity.

This is also the answer to your question on extraordinary rights granted by the president's ukase to the KGB and other law enforcement organs. Although more specifically we should be talking about rights that are necessary at the present time.

Of course, the KGB, according to the ukase, assumes part of the functions of other controlling state organs—financial, tax, and so forth. But only for the reason that these organs are just being formed, that they are weak, and that they simply are not in a condition now to organize effective control.

As for possible infringement on the rights and freedoms of citizens by operational employees who are acting on the basis of the president's ukase, I would like to note that, first, I do not admit such an interpretation of the ukase, and, secondly, the constitution grants citizens the right to judicial protection from encroachments on honor and dignity, life and health, and their personal freedom and property.

Moreover, there is also procuracy oversight over the activity of KGB and MVD organs. So that an operational employee of these organs, before taking action, has to check his plans with the law.

[Correspondent] And the last question. The leadership of the republic has not expressed its attitude toward this ukase of the USSR president. What kind of situation has the republic's KGB ended up in with respect to this?

[Arro] For the time being it is unclear. At a meeting of the government commission on profiteering we, together with O. Laanjarv, minister of internal affairs, proposed that the government of the Estonian Republic express its attitude on the ukase of the USSR president on worker control and on assigning necessary plenary powers to law enforcement organs, including the KGB. We have not received an answer yet.

RSFSR Crime Figures for 1990 Detailed

91UN1255B Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY
in Russian No 14, Apr 91 p 8

[Response to reader's question by Colonel V. Kolesnikov, deputy chief of a service of the criminal militia of the RSFSR MVD; no headline given]

[Text] *Prices are going up. Will it not cause another rise in crime: murders, robberies, and theft? I would like to know the crime "picture" for 1990 in figures.*

L. Kramarov, Arkhangelsk

Our correspondent asked Colonel V. Kolesnikov, deputy chief of a service of the criminal militia of the RSFSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] to answer this question.

In 1990, the number of criminal acts on RSFSR territory grew, in comparison with 1989, by 15.7 percent (16.3 percent in the USSR as a whole) and reached 1,336 thousand. Aggravated crime increased by 13 percent. This totals over 250,000.

The number of crimes against individuals increased by 10.3 percent (USSR—10 percent). Out of them, premeditated murders—by 15.4 percent (14,979); aggravated assault—by 11.4 percent (39,673); and rape—by 2.7 percent (14,443).

The number of property-related crimes increased by 152,731, or 16.3 percent (USSR—by 19.8 percent) and totaled 938,790. Residential burglaries increased by 24.3 percent (USSR—by 24.5 percent).

The rate of solved crimes in the republic was 45.6 percent (USSR—45.4 percent). In 1990, 684,739 crimes remained unsolved; this is 25 percent more than in 1989 (the same for the USSR as a whole). Remaining unsolved are 1,830 murders, 10,000 aggravated assaults, about 2,000 rapes, over 5,000 robberies, over 43,000 muggings, and about 410,000 burglaries involving personal property of citizens.

More than 120,000 criminals were wanted by the police last year: 1,323 of them for murder, and over 2,000 for rape.

The trend towards an increasing crime rate, unfortunately, continues. The number of registered crimes during the last two months grew by 25.9 percent (USSR—24 percent).

In the 1980's, every other murder was committed on interpersonal grounds, and only one in four was premeditated. Today every other murder is premeditated.

Quite distressing are the data on increasing crime among teenagers. Today the crime rate among youth aged 14 to 17 is 1.5 times higher than among those 25 to 28 years old.

Azerbaijan Termed 'Magnet' for Foreign Intelligence Services

91UF0614A BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY in Russian
6 Mar 91 p 3

[Article by Akshin Kyazimzade: "There Are Various Kinds of Guests... Azerbaijan Republic KGB Briefing"]

[Text] The grim prose of Chekist statistics: Our republic has always been a peculiar magnet, attracting the attention of foreign intelligence services that view intelligence work against it as one of the priority directions of subversive activity on the territory of the Soviet Union. And this is explained first and foremost by the geopolitical position of Azerbaijan. The significance of this factor has sharply increased in connection with recent events in the Near East.

It is impossible also not to consider the fact that "intelligence interest" in Azerbaijan increased noticeably as a result of the provocation of the "Karabakh problem" by Armenian nationalists and separatists, speakers F. Abbasov, chief of the counterintelligence subunit of the Azerbaijan Committee for State Security; T. Babayev, deputy chief of the department for the protection of the constitutional system; and T. Geydarov, chief of the public relations center, emphasized at the briefing.

Suffice it to say that in 1990 alone in Nagorno Karabakh, Azerbaijani Chekists identified and evicted 98 foreigners who, first of all, were on the territory of the autonomous oblast absolutely illegally, and, secondly, were engaged in illegal, antisocial activity.

The officers conducting the briefing also cited other figures, which at one time bore the "secret" stamp. For example, this kind: In 1990, among foreign citizens visiting Azerbaijan, 14 were exposed as professional intelligence officers, and another six were exposed as persons who in one way or another took part in intelligence work.

There also was information about the fact that six representatives of the foreign diplomatic corps, after arriving in the republic, are conducting reconnaissance of strategically important industrial and other installations, employing special technical systems in the process.

It was noted at the briefing that the total number of persons suspected of having contacts with foreign intelligence services, who visited Azerbaijan in the last two years, exceeds the number of similar "guests" for the entire period of the 1980's. Responding in this connection to a question from the BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY correspondent, the Chekists reported that during their stay in the republic some foreigners, in order to fulfill specific intelligence tasks, employ photographic, television, movie, and video equipment, violate established procedures for travel and living on the territory of the USSR, commit illegal entries into border zones, etc.

"For the period since 1989," it was said at the briefing, "such gross violations were recorded on the part of 44 citizens of foreign countries. It is necessary to emphasize that this figure exceeds many times over similar figures for previous years!"

It was explained to journalists that, with respect to three foreigners who were sent to the territory of our republic on intelligence tasks, criminal proceedings were instituted in 1990 in accordance with Article 58 of the

Criminal Code of the Azerbaijan Republic, which characterizes their activities as espionage. However, taking considerations of a political nature into account, and based on principles of humanity, it was deemed advisable to evict those who were arrested from the USSR.

Recently, it was noted at the briefing, there has been an increase in cases of the so-called recruitment approach to citizens of the Azerbaijan Republic while abroad—on tourist trips, on official assignments, while visiting on a personal visa, and others.

Here is one more piece of information that was brought out at the request of BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY: During the last two years Azerbaijani organs of state security recorded more than 10 attempts to persuade residents of our republic to cooperate with foreign intelligence services. We must give our people credit that in the majority of cases they contemptuously reject these foul proposals.

The Azerbaijan Republic KGB officials who conducted the briefing answered journalists' questions, including about the situation on the state border, the fight against smuggling, illegal crossings into adjacent countries, etc.

Poll on Popularity of Newspapers Reflects Societal Polarization

91UN1203A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
30 Mar 91 Union Edition p 7

[Article by B. Dubin: "Too Much To Read?"]

[Text] The expansion of glasnost was one of the most gratifying phenomena of the past year—this was the opinion of every fourth participant of the 4,600 participants in the public opinion poll conducted by the All-Union Center for Public Opinion Research. (Eight percent supported the official condemnation of the press for its "unbridled" attitudes).

During the same year, however, the popularity of the majority of the leading publications fell, and so did subscriptions. The decline in subscriptions can be explained by the rise in subscription prices, which in turn can be explained by paper shortages, chaos in the printing industry, etc. However, the decline in readers' affections should not be explained by monetary reasons alone. It was also a manifestation of complex social processes, changes in the "balance" of social forces and groups, and the emergence of new interests and reference points. Here are the changes in the ratings of our main mass publications which the people consider to be the "best" (as a percentage of the total number of respondents across the country).

Best Newspapers	End of 1989	End of 1990
ARGUMENTY I FAKTY	33	24
KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA	16	20
TRUD	10	8
IZVESTIYA	6	4
LITERATURNAYA GAZETA	4	1
MOSCOW NEWS	2	1
PRAVDA	2	1
SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA	1	1

Best Magazines	End of 1989	End of 1990
OGONEK	21	12
KRESTYANKA	5	5
RABOTNITSA	5	4
SMENA	4	4
NOVYY MIR	4	2
CHELOVEK I ZAKON	3	1
YUNOST	2	2

The newspapers that suffered minimum losses as they entered 1991 are the publications valued by those strata of the population which are most active socially and

culturally. Clarity of viewpoints expressed by the newspaper, clear presentation of the will and positions of active social forces—this is the only way to preserve or expand an audience today. Society is becoming polarized, and the press is following it.

On the other hand, the position of publications that are trying in these circumstances to hold onto the disappearing "center," to stay in the "golden middle," leads to a loss in readership. As a result of attempts to find an impossible compromise between the extremes, such newspapers alienate most radical and politicized strata. They are increasingly valued, however, by more moderate or more conservative readers who are only now becoming familiar with this level of political discussion. Such a shift is typical for a whole number of publications that have always thought of themselves, and continue to do so, first, as a cultural standard, and, second, as a political avant-garde. The mainstream readership for such publications now is the mid-level apparatus, and the salaried intelligentsia of advanced or sometimes retirement age. However, they lose the most demanding and mobile part of the audience: young intellectuals and scientists and students. They start looking for newspapers that are closer to their own positions, and sometimes find them outside of the list of official central publications.

Many "thin" magazines are going through a hard time now. The stratification of readers and the shift in their interests has caused a decline in the popularity of such dissimilar mass-circulation magazines as SOVETSKIY EKLAN [SOVIET CINEMA] and KROKODIL. Maximum losses have been suffered by official publications such as IZVESTIYA TsK KPSS or SOVETSKIY SOYUZ. The least affected were TRAMVAY (for children), OKHOTA [HUNTING], and PCHELOVOD-STVO [BEEKEEPING].

Judging from the survey by the All-Union Center for Public Opinion Research, not only the long-imposed unanimity, but the recent feelings of unity from perestroika are being eroded in our society. The wave of general unity around "thick" literary journals with a clear (be it "left" or "right") ideological program, unprecedented in the history of magazine publishing, is ebbing. The public that has only recently become attuned to this type of periodical is losing interest in both their current events departments (which in thick magazines cannot keep up with fast-developing situations) and in the fiction that would have been sensational in earlier times but not anymore.

As to the traditional readers of thick journals—the most critical and attentive readers—according to recent research, they are not happy with the "wheel spinning" of their once favorite publications which have stopped at the level they achieved. Part of this readership shifts its interest to a type of publication—the so-called independent magazines and newspapers—which is completely new for us.

One could agree with those who explain the decline in subscriptions and popularity of the "big" press by the fact that people are tired of perestroika and politics (or, in another version, of poverty and lines), were it not for the fantastic growth in the number and circulation of these publications. Both the lines and the tiredness unquestionably exist, but the indifference to life—which many would have welcomed as useful—is just not there. The publications that lose their readers are those that cannot keep up with the people's interest in what is happening around them.

GLASNOST Institutes 'Canard' Awards

91UN1209A Moscow GLASNOST in Russian No 12,
21 Mar 91 p 8

[Unattributed report: "The Canards Are Flying... Introducing a New Rubric"]

[Text] These are not the best times for the army of anticommunists. As is known you can fool one person all the time, or fool everybody some of the time, but nobody ever succeeds in fooling everybody all of the time. The people see increasingly clearly a true face of Messrs. Democrats, their goal and their moral makeup. Yesterday's idols of the crowds are catastrophically losing their popularity. It is becoming increasingly difficult for their loyal cohorts to defend their bankrupt policy and to sustain camouflage. For lack of a convincing argument, everything is being put to use: information juggling, distortions, and outright falsifications of facts and figures. Not a week passes by without a new flock of newspaper, magazine, television, radio, and podium canards.

Therefore we are opening a new rubric, in which we will report on who has lied about what in the past week. We hope that our readers will actively participate—there is more than enough material.

The new rubric is called "The Canards Are Flying...". Its creators have established a weekly "Greatest Canard" award for their customers. This time there were two contending publications.

MOSCOW NEWS reported that 800,000 people participated in the 10 March rally on Manezh Square. According to numerous official statements published in the press, Manezh Square and the "mouths" of adjacent streets physically cannot accommodate more than 120,000 people, even if people stand in a tight unmoving crowd—something that has never happened here.

The second contender is ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA. Its report that the CPSU Moscow Gorkom [city party committee] ostensibly had spent 64 million rubles [R] on propaganda for the Union referendum stands out even in a commonly typical for this newspaper disinformation. According to MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA, the entire expense part of the city party organization's budget is R69.5 million.

We believe that both contenders treat obvious facts with equal contempt; therefore, the "Greatest Canard" award goes to MOSCOW NEWS and ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA.

What Is More Than a Thousand Is a Countless Multitude

"Hundreds of thousands of Muscovites and visitors came to support B.N. Yeltsin's policy..." (VECHERNYAYA MOSKVA, 11 March)

"Hundreds of thousands of Muscovites came to Manezh Square on 10 March to show their support for B.N. Yeltsin..." (KURANTY, 12 March)

"Over 500,000 Muscovites came to Manezh Square to support their leader, Chairman of the Russian Supreme Soviet Boris Yeltsin, and to express their attitude towards the referendum." (MOSKOVSKIY KOMSO-MOLETS, 12 March)

"Manezh Square, 10 March... In any case, it was the first time in all the noisy years of perestroika that 800,000 people gathered here." (MOSCOW NEWS, No 11, March 1991)

"...the rally that gathered, by the most conservative estimate, had over 800,000 participants..." (SEM S PLY-USOM, No 11, March 1991)

"Hundreds of thousands of Muscovites and visitors to the capital were going towards Manezh... About a million people... Manezh Square has never seen such number of demonstrators." (ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, 12 March)

"Ten rallies with 5,000 participants took place in Sverdlovsk." (KURANTY, 12 March)

"By various estimates, up to 100,000 people gathered for rallies in Sverdlovsk." (ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, 12 March)

In short, the crowds turned out in countless multitudes! It appears that our colleagues did their arithmetics according to our ancestors' rules: Anything more than a thousand is a countless multitude.

"According to the independent miners union, 27 mines in Rostov Oblast are currently idle..." (KURANTY, 13 March)

"Over 70 mines are on strike in Rostov Oblast" (From the "Pulse" program on Kemerovo Oblast television, 14 March)

In reality, 10 out of 47 mines in Rostov Oblast were on strike.

"Eight mines of the Tula Coal Production Association went on strike." (NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, 14 March)

In reality, three mines were on strike.

Ukrainian Democratic Press Group Founded

91UN1202A Kiev LITERATURNА UKRAYINA
in Ukrainian 21 Mar 91 p 2

["Statement of the Collectives of Editorial Boards Initiating and Founding the Ukrainian Democratic Press Association: We Are Creating a Ukrainian Democratic Press Association"]

[Text] Respected colleagues! A number of disturbing circumstances and growing trends in society have prompted us to turn to you. Especially alarming is the fact that conservative and the administrative command structures, having warded off the first wave of popular discontent and successfully manipulating public thinking, have launched a decisive attack on those who support democratic changes. In essence, this is an assault on the fate of perestroika, whose innumerable achievements include the foreign policy course of the country with its orientation toward universal human values and the affirmation in society of democratic principles and glasnost. These very areas where we have so far made the greatest headway are today subject to disparagement, massed attack, and unprecedented persecution and defamation on the part of conservative forces that have been waiting in the trenches and concealing their true intentions for a long time. Now they believe that the time has come to take off their masks. One hears open calls to put an end to the Law on the Press, return censorship, ban "unfriendly" newspapers and journals in order to restore the "monopoly on objectivity," etc., etc.

The situation is being worsened by economic stagnation and the entry into the so-called "socialist regulated market," all of whose allurements journalists have already had time to sample. The monopoly of the monstrous governmental departments on paper and ink and on their distribution and delivery of newspapers and journals makes the editorial boards virtually completely dependent on the whims and orientations of the leaders of those structures. It has reached the point that even clearly visible, shameless actions to increase prices and fees do not meet with any rebuff from the higher leadership. Open attempts are made to economically "obstruct" publications that defend pluralism of thought, glasnost, and the principles of democracy.

In such a situation the collectives of the editorial boards of the newspapers VECHIRNIY KYIV, KOMSOMOLSKOYE ZNAMYA, MOLODA GALICHINA, RABOCHEYE SLOVO, LITERATURNА UKRAYINA, and MOLODA GVARDIYA and the journal TRIBUNA have decided to combine their efforts to create a voluntary nongovernmental and nonparty organization with the right to introduce legislation—the Ukrainian Democratic Press Association (ADPU).

The goal of the Ukrainian Democratic Press Association is to combine and coordinate the efforts of creative collectives of editorial boards for the free, independent,

and truthful representation of reality and the realization of the ideas in the Declaration on the State Sovereignty of the Ukraine; the moral, material, financial, and social defense of publications and member journalists of the Association, especially under conditions of the formation of market relations; and the granting of aid to journalists who suffer oppression and persecution as a result of political motives. For this purpose the Association is creating the ADPU fund.

It is stipulated that members of the Association may include editorial boards of newspapers, journals, structurally distinct television and radio programs, and other periodical publications as well as representatives of news agency offices and individual correspondents that are outside the borders of the republic; that they recognize the Declaration on the State Sovereignty of the Ukraine; that in their daily activities they defend the principles of democracy, freedom of speech, pluralism of thought; and that they guarantee the truthful representation of reality.

These as well as other organizational questions may be discussed at the general assemblies of the Association, preparations for which will be made by members of the initiative group of the founders of the Association. We call upon all willing persons to work on draft documents. The telephone number in Kiev is (044)-44-18-233. Membership in the Association is for the most part collective with the right of simultaneous membership in creative unions and other public organizations. If you wish to take part in the constituent assemblies, inform us of your request using the aforementioned telephone number.

Respected colleagues! At a time that is so difficult for the country, the republic, and for each of us, let us recall the words of the poet: "Let us join hands, my friend, so that we do not fall one by one!" Only together, only by our combined efforts can we withstand the pressure of conservatives of all shades and colors and of administrative command structure as well as the pressure of market relations.

We Are Creating a Ukrainian Democratic Press Association!

In the name of the collectives of the editorial boards:

[signed] Mikhaylo Batig (MOLODA GALICHINA), Vitaliy Karpenko (VECHIRNIY KYIV), Volodimir Kuleba (KOMSOLOLSKOYE ZNAMYA), Gennadiy Korzh (MOLODA GVARDIYA), Valentina Menshun (TRIBUNA), Petro Moskalenko (RABOCHEYE SLOVO), and Boris Rogoza (LITERATURNА UKRAYINA).

Computer Publication Introduced in Ukraine

LD0403235591 Kiev Domestic Service in Ukrainian
1915 GMT 2 Mar 91

[Excerpt] A presentation of the republican electronic newspaper EVERYTHING TO EVERYONE took place at the Presidium of the Ukrainian Academy of Science. Ihor Kulinichenko, our correspondent, reports.

[Kulinichenko] This is the first such newspaper in the country and today is its birthday. The idea of the new paper lies in the fact that information is broadcast at high speed via the channels of the republican or local television. The readers or subscribers of the new paper receive and save information directly into the computer's memory with the help of special television adapters. Thus the new paper makes it possible to create a system of dissemination of large volumes of scientific, technical, social, political, and business computer information for enterprises, organizations and private users of the whole republic. [passage omitted]

USSR TV Trends Outlined

LD0904133391 Moscow SEM DNEY in Russian
No 11, 11-17 Mar 91 (signed to press 5 Mar 91) p 13
LD (Tentative)

[Part three of interview with Professor M.I. Krivosheyev, honored worker of Science and Technology of the RSFSR and doctor of technical sciences, by B. Fomin, special correspondent: "The Main Directions of Television Development"; Parts 1 and 2 published in JPRS-UPA-91-019, 9 Apr 91, pp 73-75.]

[Text] In issues No. 9 and 10 Professor M.I. Krivosheyev, doctor of technical sciences, discussed trends in television development, focusing mainly on cable television and information systems for owners of television sets. Today we publish the next part of the interview.

Part Three

[Correspondent] Letters from our readers frequently mention trends in the development of television technology. Please tell us about this ...

[Krivosheyev] In speaking about trends in television development, I want especially to emphasize the important role of digital technology. Thanks to the efforts of specialists from various countries, including Soviet specialists, an international recommendation was adopted for a unified standard of digital studio television equipment enabling an extensive development of work on its design and practical introduction.

In this connection it is necessary to mention another area of television development.

Figures show that the whole of the country's population now has access to television programs, while society's other means of information are underdeveloped. To eliminate this discrepancy, specialists are devising methods and equipment enabling, without loss of picture quality, further signals to be added to television program signals as part of the development of multi-purpose specialized digital communications. We have already discussed one such system—*teletext*—in a quite recent issue of our weekly.

The task is to ensure that the overlaid digital signals carrying textual, graphic, or facsimile information can be received in all television reception zones either in our country or abroad, either on regular television sets or on simplified receivers—and not merely so that the information can be observed on the screen, but so that it can be registered via printer equipment and fax machines, and also stored in a computer memory.

There is interest among many departments, organizations, and enterprises, such as news agencies, television and radio editorial offices, newspapers, Interior Ministry services, hydrometeorological centers, central organs, diplomatic and trade offices, various types of exchanges, and so on, in direct specialized links.

The transmission of data on such television channels not only makes for more sparing use of expensive and scarce telephone channels but also speeds up the supply of information to remote and inaccessible regions. The experience of using this new system in transmitting TASS information to Delhi and Beijing, where our television programs are received, has confirmed its usefulness.

Information in the *teletext* system is added to the signals of transmitter stations and relays and is reproduced on television screens. It is mostly of a local nature (train and aircraft schedules, movie theater programs, and so on). However, local editorial offices will receive a number of teletext pages from the center (political, financial, and sports news, and so on) on a specialized link, which significantly expands the possibilities of teletext.

Teletext transmission equipment has already been developed in accordance with the international recommendation. Pilot transmissions have started in Moscow. The new "Gorizont" and "Foton" television sets can receive teletext programs, while appropriate attachments have been developed for existing television sets. Thus, the specialized channels that are being created, combined with all the existing and new television channels, could secure in a short time and with minimal expenditure a fundamental enhancement in the efficiency of the television broadcasting network and an extensive information service for the population and for enterprises.

Digital technology is used increasingly at television centers, on communications lines, and at receiver installations. Automated digital equipment is now being developed that allows inter-frame and within-frame montages—that is, a synthesis of images from fragments provided by the most diverse sources, including drawings created by digital electronic graphics. The creators of television programs are relieved from the routine part of the creative process. Problems of developing intelligent systems for compiling and broadcasting programs according to a schedule—in effect without human intervention—are virtually already resolved.

Digital technology has made it possible to basically improve the television receiver and to enhance the quality of the image and accompanying sound, and offers a number of solutions in the development of flat-screen television sets. In the future, the television set could become the center of the *home television system*, which will include a video recorder, a video disk player, a tele-camera, a set of equipment for video effects and montages, an installation for a videophone and fax link, a personal computer, and a comprehensive printer system. Such a set-up, with access to computer networks, program and data banks, libraries and video files, could offer many new services.

[Correspondent] Mark Iosifovich, I think that you will agree with me that television so far has developed in breadth, as it were, by satisfying people's increasing requirements for information. However, the possibilities of television technology, along with the great scientific potential of scientists and designers, have made it possible to begin exploiting the deep layers, so to speak, of this area of human knowledge. I am thinking of the breakthrough that has commenced in respect of qualitative aspects of television installations and also unusual areas of application, such as photography. What can you tell us about these trends in television development?

[Krivosheyev] I will begin with the new area of television mentioned by you—television photography. Yes, the range of video recording facilities will shortly be augmented by television photography equipment in which the chemical processes for obtaining images will be replaced by electromagnetic processes. Photographic film is replaced by a light-sensitive plate and a miniature magnetic disk, while the color television set is used instead of a projector screen. The video camera superficially is almost identical to a regular photographic camera; the flat magnetic disk—hardly bigger than a matchbox—can record several dozen color pictures which can be immediately reproduced on a television screen with the aid of a special machine—the photographic video player. It is also possible to obtain a regular color photograph from the magnetic disk, using equipment that works on the principle of electrostatic printing. The disk recordings can be mass copied and transmitted on telephone channels, while the miniature disks can be mailed and so forth.

Electronic methods allow image color to be controlled, montages to be produced, and image shape to be modified. The recording can be wiped clean and the disk used repeatedly for new shots. The video camera is also used as a regular television camera for recording on a regular video recorder. The further development of the technology of television photography will lead to a transformation of traditional photography both qualitatively and economically. Clearly, soon afterward there will appear a new industry for the production of such video disks with wide-format recordings of various subjects to be replayed at home.

[Correspondent] In speaking of the future of television, you have not told our readers about one real achievement in this area, albeit one that has not become universal. I am thinking of high-resolution television. Over a year ago our weekly published an article about high-resolution television in which your name was mentioned. What has changed since then? Have new ideas appeared concerning the sale and widespread introduction of high-resolution television?

[Krivosheyev] I will recall that high-resolution television is a new standard with an increased number of lines, thanks to which the line structure of a picture is made clear and image quality becomes like that of a color slide, for example. The first high-resolution television broadcast equipment was developed by specialists of the Japanese broadcasting company NHK and Sony (1,125 lines, 60 cycles per second). Several leading European firms, working jointly, have proposed a variant of this (1,250 lines, 50 cycles per second). The USSR has proposed a system of 1,375 lines, and the United States one of 1,050 lines. Thus, there is still no unified standard for high-resolution television. Evidently, only a switch to a digital standard for high-resolution television will provide the main route to a unified world standard.

The introduction of high-resolution television is complicated not only by the fact that it is necessary to update the entire range of television sets, but also that very wide bands are needed in communication lines to "deliver" the signal to the viewer, and there are still very few of these.

[Correspondent] But Mark Iosifovich, in your report at the conference you set out proposals to overcome these obstacles. Could you tell our readers about them in plain language?

[Krivosheyev] I will try. I will begin with the simplest aspect—image format. Television sets today are equipped with a tube that has a screen with sides in the ratio 4:3. It is proposed to switch to the ratio 16:9 or 4:2.25. As is clear from these figures, the proposed screen is more elongated than the current one.

I consider that industry should switch right now to tubes of the new, wider format. This will also make it possible to better show today's wide-format films and to achieve yet another possibility, which essentially is that this narrow screen will be able to show the main image of the current 4:3 format, plus three additional small images of the same format. These small images will provide information on what is happening on other programs and save the viewer from constantly switching programs, and will also make it possible to see magnified portions of the main image if these portions appear on the small screens. And when the time comes for high-resolution television, it will be simpler with such television sets to switch to receiving programs under the new standard.

The production of television sets with a 16:9 (4:2.25) format will necessitate the development of new video recorders for wide-format images. Evidently, the agenda

includes video recorder models with a "two cassette" option offering the possibility of recording and compiling in the home. Taking into account everything that has been said, I assume that enterprises that are studying questions of high-technology conversion could be interested in the mass production of a completely new form of output— video technology for wide-format images, wide-format television cameras, attachments for specialized digital communications and teletext, and others.

[Correspondent] Now I would like you to discuss the main thing: what strategy should be chosen to accomplish the ideas of high-resolution television?

[Krivosheyev] Hitherto it was believed that, as high-resolution television is a wideband concept, only fiber-optic lines would be suitable for signal transmission and that the existing ground network is unsuitable. But billions of rubles have been invested in the existing network, and there are insufficient funds to build a new one. Therefore scientists are strenuously seeking ways to convert the high-resolution television wideband signal into a narrowband signal which would make it possible to use today's networks to distribute and relay high-resolution television program signals. Experiments have already been conducted which have provided promising results. (concluding part to follow)

Journalist's 'Means to an End' Questioned

91UN0658B Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA
in Russian No 50, 15 Dec 90 p 8

[Article by V. Potemkin, SOVETSKAYA KULTURA correspondent: "Octopus-600?"; Interview with Aleksandr Nevzorov published in JPRS-UPA-91-004, 29 Jan 91, pp 79-83.]

[Text] Leningrad—A couple of days ago (9 December) LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA published an interview—almost a full page—with the leader of the popular television program "600 Seconds," Aleksandr Nevzorov, and a large photograph of him. I did not find anything new in the interview, in which he was rude and quarrelsome as always. Aleksandr harped upon his eternal subject: All means are good for a reporter to achieve his goal. I have a different viewpoint. The photograph placed in a drawing of a target surprised me. Well, fellow colleagues, go ahead—I thought. Who is going to shoot Nevzorov?!

And suddenly early in the morning of the 13th I heard on the radio: An attempt was made on the life of Nevzorov.

They shot him point blank. During the dark night of 12 December at 2329 hours. In a vacant lot. He was wounded on the left side of his chest. The bullet passed right through the soft body tissue. His coworkers who were waiting for Aleksandr in the car immediately took him to the clinic. He is out of danger. And possibly in a couple of days Aleksandr himself will tell us all about it from the television screen.

The investigatory department of the Leningrad Procuracy initiated a criminal case under Article 102 Part 15: Murder attempt in connection with performance of duty. An investigation is in progress. Nevzorov refused all interviews. One thing is clear: A couple of days before the attempt on Nevzorov's life someone called and offered him some unique information and set a time and place for a meeting. At first he was busy but then he freed up a block of time after 2100 hours. He went to the vacant lot on Zenya Yegorova Street, which is in Kalininskiy Rayon. His friends waited in the car and he went to meet the person in the hope of obtaining the information. Then came the shot.

And so far there are no details. Who? What? Why? All you can do is guess and construe versions of what happened.

One thing is known: Nevzorov had set up a network of paid informers whom he sometimes paid out of his own pocket. And he did not consider this practice disgraceful. For a reporter, as Nevzorov asserts, all means are good in order to achieve the goal. The only problem is that the Law on the Press and Mass Media does not socially protect the reporter in these cases. It is as if he is oriented toward an ideal society in which quickly obtaining truthful information from "competent sources" does not cost anything. If you want it you can have it. That is not the way it is. And a journalist is simply forced to wheel and deal in search of information and resort to extreme steps that sometimes converge with aesthetic norms.

A reporter will not go at night to a vacant lot to meet some stranger in order to obtain official information. Overcoming his fear, he goes there to obtain "compromising information."

Does the law protect the journalist? Do the authorized organs protect him, can he obtain real freedom from the powers that be, both "left" and "right"—these are the questions that automatically arise today as I wait with great impatience for the recovery of my colleague and his return to "600 Seconds."

22161

SPRINGFIELD, VA
5285 PORT ROYAL RD
ATTN: PROCESS 103
NTIS47
22161

This is a U.S. Government publication containing policies, views, or attitudes of the U.S. Government. It is not to be cited as an official U.S. Government position unless it is specifically identified as such. It is not to be cited as an official U.S. Government position unless it is specifically identified as such. It is not to be cited as an official U.S. Government position unless it is specifically identified as such.

Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) and Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS) publications contain political, military, economic, environmental, and sociological news, commentary, and other information, as well as scientific and technical data and reports. All information has been obtained from foreign radio and television broadcasts, news agency transmissions, newspapers, books, and periodicals. Items generally are processed from the first or best available sources. It should not be inferred that they have been disseminated only in the medium, in the language, or to the area indicated. Items from foreign language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed. Except for excluding certain diacritics, FBIS renders personal and place-names in accordance with the romanization systems approved for U.S. Government publications by the U.S. Board of Geographic Names.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by FBIS/JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpts] in the first line of each item indicate how the information was processed from the original. Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear from the original source but have been supplied as appropriate to the context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by the source. Passages in boldface or italics are as published.

SUBSCRIPTION/PROCUREMENT INFORMATION

The FBIS DAILY REPORT contains current news and information and is published Monday through Friday in eight volumes: China, East Europe, Soviet Union, East Asia, Near East & South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, and West Europe. Supplements to the DAILY REPORTs may also be available periodically and will be distributed to regular DAILY REPORT subscribers. JPRS publications, which include approximately 50 regional, worldwide, and topical reports, generally contain less time-sensitive information and are published periodically.

Current DAILY REPORTs and JPRS publications are listed in *Government Reports Announcements* issued semimonthly by the National Technical Information Service (NTIS), 5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield, Virginia 22161 and the *Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications* issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

The public may subscribe to either hardcover or microfiche versions of the DAILY REPORTs and JPRS publications through NTIS at the above address or by calling (703) 487-4630. Subscription rates will be

provided by NTIS upon request. Subscriptions are available outside the United States from NTIS or appointed foreign dealers. New subscribers should expect a 30-day delay in receipt of the first issue.

U.S. Government offices may obtain subscriptions to the DAILY REPORTs or JPRS publications (hardcover or microfiche) at no charge through their sponsoring organizations. For additional information or assistance, call FBIS, (202) 338-6735, or write to P.O. Box 2604, Washington, D.C. 20013. Department of Defense consumers are required to submit requests through appropriate command validation channels to DIA, RTS-2C, Washington, D.C. 20301. (Telephone: (202) 373-3771, Autovon: 243-3771.)

Back issues or single copies of the DAILY REPORTs and JPRS publications are not available. Both the DAILY REPORTs and the JPRS publications are on file for public reference at the Library of Congress and at many Federal Depository Libraries. Reference copies may also be seen at many public and university libraries throughout the United States.